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To Nora, Agheg, Lara and Mekhitar
.
Thank you notes1
We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we
pretend to be. (Kurt Vonnegut)
Think slow, act fast. (Buster Keaton)
Jusqu'ici tout va bien, jusqu'ici tout va bien. Mais l'important n'est pas
la chute, c'est l'atterrissage (La Haine)
These quotes might seem strange at the commencement of a PhD dissertation on
monetary and macro-ﬁnancial topics. However, they do seamlessly describe many of
the transitionary phases I encountered during my personal path towards academic
maturity. In line with Buster Keaton, during the past six years, I was instructed to
take my time to think profoundly about important economic questions and many
unsolvable puzzles. This was nicely contrasted with all of the submissions and
deadlines, which required us to act quickly, and demanded a more realistic and head
on approach.2
During a PhD, the most important characteristic one will have to rely on is
probably perseverance. Being surrounded by wonderful, intelligent and supportive
people enormously helps one to endure the harshest perils. I am blessed with four
family members that each have their unique and unparalleled qualities. Starting
with my mother Nora3, I have never met a woman with so much generosity and
ability to sacriﬁce herself for her children. Gifted with a magical sixth sense, she
has always gently guided us through all the important events in life. Gigerenzer
surely must have had her in mind when he talked about the value of intuition and
heuristics.4 My father, Agheg, a successful business man in his own right, thought
1reference to the Weekly Thank you notes, featured in the Tonight Show, starring Jimmy
Fallon
2sometimes even wandering into realm of the quick and dirty, better known as schnell und
schmutzig
3or Vergine as she was wrongly named at birth
4in his book `Gut Feelings' Gigerenzer describes how gut feelings can have their merit above
and beyond complex rules
me to be self-reliant, follow a righteous path, and most importantly, how to become
a real man.5 Finally, Lara and Mekhitar, my two much more talented siblings, the
former being a state of the art pediatrician, specialized in neonatology; the latter
a renowned artist, and talented philosopher. You both provide great examples. In
the French movie La Haine, the protagonist Hubert tells a story about a man falling
down from a high-rise building who during his fall repeatedly reassures himself that
`up till now everything is ﬁne'. However, Hubert sharply remarks, it is not the
descent that matters, but the landing. Surrounded with such a dream team, even
when I break down at times, the landing is soft on every possible occasion.
Amy Cuddy advises us to fake it till we make it, or fake it till we become it. I
guess a lot of things we grow into are simply a result of doing them often enough.
In the beginning of a PhD one has no clue of what the academic world is really
about. It is only by watching and acting like a researcher, that one is slowly able
to become one. However, Vonnegut provides us with a valuable warning in this
context. As this process happens automatically and without full awareness, many
undesirable traits we actually would not like to incorporate, might trickle through
as well if we follow in the wrong footsteps. Hence, we should be careful about whom
we try to emulate. I am very thankful for having had two magniﬁcent supervisors,
to whom I could mirror myself. Firstly, Koen Inghelbrecht is a role model to me,
both as a researcher and as a family6 man. I will probably never again encounter the
combination of such high competences together with such humility. A man loved
by all, hated by none. Secondly, Michael Frömmel ceaselessly supported me and
believed in me, and gave me valuable insight into the peculiarities of the academic
world, which I will always carry with me. But the reoccurring theme is surely the
importance of the family life, which makes the work life much more agreeable.7 In
this academic context, I'm also greatly indebted to my commission members (David
Veredas, Lieven Baele, Evzen Kocenda, Ansgar Belke, Franziska Schobert), for all
their valuable comments and feedback, which unquestionably improved the quality
of the research. Furthermore, during my years at the university of Ghent, I have been
fortunate to have been surrounded by many talented, funny and warm researchers.
Hence, it can come as no surprise that I have grown greatly fond of Joris Wauters,
Maria Gerhard, Selien De Schryder, Xing Han, Hannes Stieperaere, Dries Heyman,
Nicolas Dierick, Sarah Van Bree, Bart Deﬂoor, Martien Lamers, Jasmien De Winne,
5When I think of him, I immediately hear the following verse of Public Enemy: when the man
(is) in the house and all the bullshit stops.
6I would also explicitly like to thank the whole family Inghelbrecht, as I disturbed many homely
moments with numerous Skype talks
7Both Tanya and Darina are delightful, and I enjoyed the wonderful occasions we spent together
Junior Burssens and Mustafa Disli. In this context, I also speciﬁcally want to thank
Vanessa Bombeeck, Anja Van Gysegem, Nathalie Verhaeghe and Sabine Dekie for
their wonderful logistical support. Finally, I also have to thank Ghent University
for funding my research, as well as the Irish Central Bank for providing me with a
fresh opportunity to continue my career as researcher.
There are many other people whom I have to thank, for many very divergent
reasons, some more noble than others, but all very valuable in their own right. I
am indebted to Gert Peersman and Gerdie Everaert for the brilliant classes they
thought at Ghent University, which inspired me to become a researcher in the ﬁrst
place. The same goes for Carine Smolders, who provided me with the opportunity
to get started on my PhD journey. Liesbet Van den Driessche, thank you for being
so incredibly patient with me, and for dealing with my stubborn character, but also
for providing me with valuable feedback, whenever you could. You are a brilliant
researcher, and you will undoubtedly have an interesting journey in the academic
world. I am much obliged to Benjamin Van Oost, Nelis Naessens, Niels Celie, Saar
Swinters, and Lien Lampaert for providing me with the right level of entertainment
and fun, when I was not behind my desk battling away with a paper, thus allowing
me to unlearn all of the things I learned. Finally, I would like to thank Barbara Van
Oost, Bram Schietecatte, Clara Van Den Broeck, Freek Van Baele, Elise Vandaele,
Erik Veldhuis, Evelyne Vandenberghe, Ina Paitjan, Jeremy Godenir, Jessica Kelly,
Mounia Nouda, Jessie Schietecatte, Leen Segers, Mayenne Nelen, Pieter Dekegel,
Simon Gerdesman, Tatiana Geysen, Tigran Bagdasaryan, Varduhi Nanyan (and
many more whom I undoubtable forget) for simply letting me be myself.8 Finally,
I'm also grateful to (maybe not all, but at least many of) my students, who over the
years kept me grounded with their whimsical (and at times crazy) questions. A lot
of them have become good friends over the years, and I'm excited to see to which
heights they can reach.
Garo Garabedian
January, 2016
8Thank you for letting me being myself, again, song recorded by Sly and the Family Stone in
1969
General Overview of the Dissertation
The dissertation explores the procyclicality of ﬁnancial cycles and the subsequent vulner-
ability of emerging markets, two important aspects in modern day monetary and ﬁnancial
economics which are closely intertwined. During recent years, many prominent institutions
(the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, etc.) have iden-
tiﬁed credit and asset cycles as important factors which can destabilize economies. These
cycles are typically characterized by irrational upswings, followed by virulent busts with
huge conﬁdence losses. The latest ﬁnancial crisis highlights these vulnerabilities. More-
over, the response in many advanced economies has been very aggressive, most recently
even reverting to unconventional policy in order to revitalize markets, hugely inﬂating their
central bank's balance sheets. Through four diﬀerent chapters, I try to demystify several
of the mechanisms which feature in this challenging monetary environment, using diﬀerent
disciplines in economics, ranging from the empirical focus found in macro and ﬁnance, to
the more palpable ﬁeld of behavioural economics.
Chapter 1 investigates the importance of asset prices in monetary policy rules for
emerging markets, and ﬁnds a role for the exchange rate in the interest rate setting behavior
of several Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). However, the reactions
of these central banks are not to the levels or the changes in their exchange rate, but
comprise a nonlinear reaction to the distance of the exchange rate towards the bands which
they have committed to defend. Additionally, the paper incorporates many advances in
estimating monetary policy rules, thus improving the reliability of the estimated coeﬃcients
in comparison to a more traditional framework.
In Chapter 2, I unravel whether aﬀective stimuli can have a nameable impact on our
recollection, and hence shape our sentiments and expectations, even aﬀecting our decision-
making. Such a self-enforcing mechanism can lead to powerful feedback eﬀects during
downturns, when we are surrounded with negative news. This storyline allows a more be-
havioral underpinning of procyclicality, next to the monetary channels which focus mainly
on risk-taking. The empirical setting is based on lab experiments, in which participants are
primed with a certain emotion, and then subjected to memory tests in order to gauge the
recall errors. In the most advanced setting, I also look whether these mnemonic disparities
aﬀect the participants' expectations diﬀerently.
Moving towards a well-known concept in ﬁnance, Chapter 3 explores the importance
of liquidity (or the loss therein) over time. Such losses of conﬁdence on the stock market
are usually animal spirit driven, thus providing a close link with the behavioral outlook
in chapter 2. We introduce a uniﬁed measure of liquidity that incorporates the several
dimensions which are concealed within the concept. Our aggregation method not only
relies on the time-varying correlations between these dimensions, but also incorporates
idiosyncratic signals. The latter focuses on nonlinear and volatile movements. Our uniﬁed
liquidity measure is linked with many well-known ﬁnancial and monetary concepts. More-
over, there are clear signs that purely ﬁnancial shocks in liquidity can have real spillover
eﬀects, and provide forecasting value, above and beyond traditional variables.
Finally, chapter 4 examines the impact of monetary policy spillovers to emerging mar-
kets, in the recent context of advanced economies pursuing expansionary monetary policies,
thus highlighting the interconnectedness (and frailty) of our modern international ﬁnancial
system. I ﬁnd a considerable eﬀect of shocks in EMU monetary policy on the long term
yields of CEECs, while US policy shocks seem to be a more important driving force for
long term yields in Asia and Latin America. In contrast, I ﬁnd little inﬂuence of shocks
in the policy of advanced economies on the bilateral exchange rates of emerging markets.
This holds for all the geographical entities.
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Monetary policy rules in Central and Eastern
European Countries:
Does the exchange rate matter?*
Michael Frömmel1, Garo Garabedian2,Franziska Schobert3
June 2011
Abstract
We estimate monetary policy rules for six Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries (CEEC) during the period when they prepared for membership to the EU and
monetary union. By taking changes in the policy settings explicitly into account and
by splitting up the exchange rate impact into two diﬀerent components we signiﬁ-
cantly improve estimation results for monetary policy rules in CEEC. We uncover
that the focus of the interest rate setting behaviour in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland explicitly switched from defending the peg to targeting inﬂation. For
Slovakia, however, there still seemed to be on ongoing focus on the exchange rate.
Finally, Slovenia and, after a policy switch, Romania exhibit a solid relation with
inﬂation as well.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E58, P20
Keywords: Monetary policy rules, Taylor rules,Transition economies, Exchange rate
regime, CEEC, Inﬂation Targeting
1 Department Financial Economics, Ghent University. E-mail: Garo.Garabedian@UGent.be
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(corresponding author)
3 Centre for Technical Central Bank Cooperation, Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) has drawn
increasing attention from academics and practitioners. While preparing for mem-
bership to the EU and monetary union, the central banks in CEEC were challenged
by high inﬂation in the earlier periods, and then managed to disinﬂate fairly success-
fully. The way this was achieved, however, was considerably diﬀerent: The Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia focused on exchange rate targeting during
the ﬁrst years, but then gradually made their exchange rate system more ﬂexible
and adopted inﬂation targeting as their monetary policy strategy. Romania and
Slovenia never oﬃcially had a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. While Romania adopted
inﬂation targeting only in August 2005, Slovenia oﬃcially followed a monetary tar-
geting strategy for most of the time before adopting a two-pillar-like strategy in
the run-up to monetary union (for the oﬃcial exchange rate and monetary policy
regimes see Tables 1 and 2).
For these six countries, the interest rate setting behaviour of a central bank
can provide important insights into the objectives which are most important in its
conduct of monetary policy. A standard approach is to estimate a Taylor-like interest
rate reaction function. While the empirical literature concludes that the monetary
policy by most successful central banks in large industrial countries can be described
by such a reaction function (Clarida et al., 1998), evidence for emerging economies
and particularly transition economies is comparatively poor.
Regime shifts, however, seem to matter. Kahn and Parrish (1998), for exam-
ple, ﬁnd that signiﬁcant structural breaks in the monetary policy reaction function
occurred, after New Zealand and the UK introduced inﬂation targeting. In both
countries the signiﬁcance of the exchange rate lost importance. Neumann and von
Hagen (2002) disclose the same result for a larger country set. Assenmacher-Wesche
(2006) estimates reaction functions with time-varying coeﬃcients for Germany, the
United Kingdom and the US. These empirical results stress the importance of taking
policy changes into account. Since CEEC are small open economies, one may argue
that besides regime shifts also the exchange rate plays a major role in the reaction
function. Ball (1999) argues that pure inﬂation targeting without explicit atten-
tion to the exchange rate is dangerous in an open economy, because it creates large
ﬂuctuations in exchange rates and output. In this context, the eﬀects of exchange
rates on inﬂation through import prices is the fastest channel from monetary policy
to inﬂation, therefore monetary policy cannot neglect it. The need for considering
the exchange rate will be obvious, if the monetary authorities explicitly target the
exchange rate, as they (initially) did in many CEEC. However, the way the exchange
1
rate enters the reaction function should then be diﬀerent, because monetary policy
has to react on potential violations of the exchange rate band in order to keep it
credible. Thus the reaction is non-linear, as it will get stronger, the closer the ex-
change rate approaches the intervention margins. It will also be non-discretionary,
because the authorities are obliged to react, as long as they intent to sustain the
peg.
In line with, e.g. Peersman and Smets (1999), our emphasis is on positive or
descriptive rather than normative aspects of policy analysis. We investigate the role
of the exchange rate by looking at the interest rate setting behaviour of the central
bank and to which degree it has taken exchange rate developments into account.
The paper thereby sheds some light on the discussion to which extent the interest
setting behavior of these central banks complies with the fear of ﬂoating hypothesis,
as analyzed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). A central bank that changes interest
rates systematically in response to inﬂation and also to exchange rate shocks is
more likely to support evidence on this hypothesis, keeping in mind that the central
bank nevertheless still may use interventions in the foreign exchange market as an
instrument to steer the exchange rate.
This paper adds to the literature in ﬁve ways: First, our analysis covers a longer
sample period than most previous studies. We consider a substantial part of the
transition period from January 1994 till August 2008. Second, whereas most works
only include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and sometimes Slovakia, we add
Slovenia and Romania to the sample. Thus we consider all new EU member states in
CEEC which one may assume to have pursued a more or less independent monetary
policy during a considerable period of time.1
Third, the analysis takes explicitly into account shifts in exchange rate and mon-
etary policy regimes that have occurred in all the countries of the sample. Fourth,
we introduce a non-linear measure of distance to the intervention margins to identify
those interest rate changes that stem from the peg. To our knowledge we are the
ﬁrst taking this eﬀect into account. Fifth, we apply the cointegration methodology
to interest rate rules as suggested by Gerlach-Kristen (2003), which has rarely been
applied to transition economies. These innovations allow us to retrieve more realis-
tic coeﬃcients from our reaction function, and thus our model better describes the
interest rate setting behaviour of the monetary authorities.
The paper proceeds as follows: The following Section 2 reviews the research
on interest rate rules in transition economies. Section 3 introduces our empirical
1This is not the case for the remaining CEEC that joined EU: The Baltic states and Bulgaria
followed very strict exchange rate regimes and partially currency boards. This means they could
not pursue an independent monetary policy.
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approach and our distance measure. Section 4 describes the data and presents the
empirical results, while Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Monetary policy rules in CEEC
Research on monetary policy rules in the context of emerging market economies and
particularly transition economies is of more recent origin and relatively scarce. An
important ﬁnding of Mohanty and Klau (2004) is that central banks in emerging
market economies tend to look beyond inﬂation and focus on other objectives as
well, most prominently on exchange rate changes.
The amount of literature speciﬁcally on monetary policy rules in CEEC is lim-
ited, ﬁrst because time series available are comparatively short. They usually start
in the middle of the 1990s. Second, most CEEC have not followed one single strat-
egy of monetary policy and also gradually made their exchange rates more ﬂexible
(see Tables 1 and 2). Third, it is not quite clear which target values for inﬂation
the CEEC followed, as most countries introduced inﬂation targeting and explicit
inﬂation goals only between 1997 and 2001.
Recently, there have been some attempts to describe the monetary policy in se-
lected CEEC using interest rate rules. Maria-Dolores (2005) and Paez-Farell (2007),
for example, estimate Taylor rules for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slo-
vakia. The latter ﬁnds that there is a reaction to exchange rate movements. Angeloni
et al. (2007) set up interest rate rules for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland,
introducing the US dollar interest rate as a proxy for inﬂationary pressures of global
origin. Yilmazkuday (2008) and Jakab and Vilagi (2008) consider structural breaks
in their estimates of monetary policy rules for CEECs. Moons and Van Poeck (2008)
ﬁnd that the accession countries do not diﬀer substantially from the current EMU
members with respect to the interest rate setting behavior, and that there has been
increased convergence. Remo and Vasicek (2009) apply a DSGE model to Czech
data, and conclude that the focus of the Czech National Bank was mainly on inﬂa-
tion. Finally, Horváth (2009) analyzes the policy neutral rate in the Czech Republic.
The results indicate a substantial interest rate convergence to levels comparable to
the euro area.
Empirical research suggests that a Taylor-like rule is helpful in understanding
monetary policy of the CEEC. However, in most cases inﬂation coeﬃcients are
found to be far below unity, thus violating the so-called Taylor principle. If the
Taylor principle holds, the policy rate should move more than proportional with
increases in the inﬂation rate and thereby raise the real interest rate. If the monetary
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policy rule violates the Taylor principle, it will mean that the central bank does
not react adequately on bringing down inﬂation. This result is counterintuitive,
as the CEEC have experienced a remarkable degree of disinﬂation during the last
15 years. The literature suggests mainly two explanations: Angeloni et al. (2007)
argue that part of the reaction on inﬂation is captured by the coeﬃcient on the
US interest rate included in their equation. An increase in global inﬂation would
then lead to a composed reaction, which is partly due to domestic inﬂation via the
conventional inﬂation coeﬃcient and partly due to foreign inﬂation via the coeﬃcient
on the foreign interest rate. One might similarly argue that the exchange rate
included in the interest rate rule partially takes the reaction on inﬂation, as it
anchors expectations on future monetary policy. Another argument, proposed by
Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) is that the reaction to an increase in inﬂation may be
modest, if the initial interest rate compared to inﬂation was set high enough. Thus
a smaller coeﬃcient means that in the course of the disinﬂation process monetary
policy is getting even more aggressive. The scenario seems to be well applicable
to the CEEC. However, one would at least expect the inﬂation coeﬃcient to be
close to unity during periods of autonomous monetary policy. Besides the above
mentioned empirical research, the treatment of exchange rate changes in monetary
policy rules is also discussed in the theoretical literature. Svensson (2000) compares
strict inﬂation targeting, which implies a vigorous use of the direct exchange rate
channel for stabilizing (CPI-) inﬂation at a short horizon, with ﬂexible inﬂation
targeting, which stabilizes inﬂation at a longer horizon, and thereby also stabilizes
real exchange rates and other variables to a signiﬁcant extent. The reaction function
under inﬂation targeting in an open economy thus responds to more information,
notably to foreign disturbances. The particular importance of the exchange rate for
monetary policy rules in the case of emerging economies is also stressed by Amato
and Gerlach (2002).
Taylor (2001) argues that a monetary policy rule that reacts directly to the
exchange rate, as well as to inﬂation and output, sometimes performs worse than
policy rules that do not react directly to the exchange rate and thereby avoid more
erratic ﬂuctuations in the interest rate. In Taylor (2002), however, he points out
that monetary policy in open economies is diﬀerent from that in closed economies.
Open-economy policymakers seem averse to considerable variability in the exchange
rate. In his view, they should target a measure of inﬂation that ﬁlters out the
transitory eﬀects of exchange rate ﬂuctuations, and they should also include the
exchange rate in their policy reaction functions.
4
3 Methodology
Following Taylor's (1993) seminal paper, it has become common to describe mon-
etary policy by a linear feedback rule linking the interest rate to the output and
inﬂation gap
it = r
∗ + pit + αpi∗t + βy
∗
t
where i is the short-term nominal interest rate set by the central bank, r∗ the
assumed equilibrium real interest rate, pit the actual rate of inﬂation, pi
∗
t the deviation
of the actual inﬂation rate from the (central bank's) target rate and y∗t the percent
deviation of real GDP from its target, the output gap. The condition α > 1, known
as the Taylor principle, implies that the nominal interest rate is raised by more than
one percentage point in response to an increase in inﬂation of one percentage point
in order to increase real interest rates.
In line with Taylor (2002), we apply a monetary policy rule for open economies,
which takes into account the role of the exchange rate. We extend this approach
and model the exchange rate component with two variables: Dst representing the
growth rate of the exchange rate for the whole sample period, and bt, reﬂecting the
exchange rates' position in the band, if the currency is pegged to an anchor currency
it = r
∗ + pit + αpi∗t + βy
∗
t + δ∆st + γbt
To model the impact of the exchange rate we thus use two diﬀerent tools. For
countries without explicit exchange rate targets, the growth rate of monthly ex-
change rates to the euro (before 1999: to the D-mark) is a proxy for the central
banks desire to smooth exchange rate ﬂuctuations.2
For the countries with an explicit exchange rate target during the ﬁrst subperiod,
we also incorporate the band distance at which the market rates are located from
either band edge.3 This measure reﬂects pressure on the exchange rate, as every
time the market rate approaches, or actually exceeds, one of the borders the central
bank is obliged to react by interventions and/or interest rate changes.4Since one
would expect a non-linear reaction  the closer the exchange rate approaches the
intervention margins the stronger the central bank should react  we do not calculate
2We also included real and nominal eﬀective exchange rates, this does, however, not substantially
change the results. Using the exchange rates in levels (instead of growth rates) rather worsens the
results.
3The correlation between ∆st and bt turns out to be low and insigniﬁcant.
4It is not unusual to add variables to capture certain pressures on the macroeconomic framework
that could aﬀect the parameters. For example, Cecchetti and Li (2008) add a measure of stress
in the banking system to the original Taylor equation, which is quite close to our band distance
variable. The rationale behind our band distance measure is thus similar, since it measures pressure
emerging from the pegged exchange rate.
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the distance between the exchange rate and the closer edge, but transform the
distance by an exponential function. As long as the exchange rate is inside the
band (and far away from the edges) bt will be close to zero. However, bt grows
exponentially as the market rate approaches the borders and even explodes when it
has left the band. Moreover, the measure is signed, since the impact on the central
bank's interest rate policy is asymmetric. Thus, our band distance measure is:
bt =
 −exp(lt − st)exp(st − ut)
if |lt − st| ≤ |st − ut|
if |lt − st| > |st − ut|
with lt the lower boundary of the band (the strong edge), ut the upper boundary
of the band (the weak edge) and st the exchange rate. The boundaries used for the
calculation are the oﬃcial bands set by the monetary authorities. In Figs. 14, we
show the evolution of the band distance variable over time, respectively for all the
countries in our sample with a pegged exchange rate. Two interesting features stand
out. First, the exchange rates often have had appreciating pressure and therefore,
were close to the strong edge of the narrow bands. Second, the values increase
dramatically during times of crises, when boundaries are reached or exceeded.
Our band distance measure is closely related to the target zone models based on
Krugman (1991). These models, such as described in Bartolini and Prati (1999),
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005a) or Horvath and Fidrmuc (2008), assume that mon-
etary authorities do not intervene as long as the exchange rate is close to the central
parity, but take policy actions when it is about to leave the band. However, while
Krugman's target zone model describes the behaviour of the exchange rate, we focus
on the policy actions themselves.
We expect that monetary policy in CEEC should exhibit diﬀerent coeﬃcients
over time, reﬂecting the evolution of exchange rate and monetary policy regimes:
The initially tight exchange rate pegs should be reﬂected by a focus on the band
distance, combined with a limited ability to directly target inﬂation. Schnabl (2008)
demonstrates a strong link between exchange rate stability and growth rates for the
CEEC during this episode, thus motivating policy actions beyond direct interven-
tions on the exchange rate market. However, this initial setting should change when
the pegs are abolished and the central banks divert their attention more towards
inﬂation. Nevertheless, some monitoring of the exchange rate may remain, which
should be reﬂected by the smoothing element. The weight for output depends on
the nature of the shocks and the room that the inﬂation target policy has left for
any output goals.
In our analysis we do not incorporate the lagged interest rate as a smoothing
component. Traditional explanations for smoothing interest rate changes include,
6
for example, fear of disrupting capital markets, loss of credibility from sudden large
policy reversals or the need for consensus building to support a policy change (Clar-
ida et al., 1998). As this approach may rather entail an econometric solution in
order to get meaningful results in an environment which suﬀers gravely from au-
tocorrelation, we ﬁnd it more appealing to confront these problems directly, in a
generalized least squares framework. According to Rudebush (2002), the increase
in predictability by adding lagged interest rates may indicate inconsistency between
the rule and the data.
Whereas the variables in the monetary policy rules are often treated as sta-
tionary, we follow Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and apply the cointegration methodology.
Phillips (1986) claims that, if the variables are (nearly) integrated of order one, static
regressions in levels are likely to produce spurious results. In this respect, Rudebush
(2002) shows that such static regressions display an R-squared far larger than the
Durbin Watson statistic, which may hint at a spurious regression. Therefore, re-
sults from monetary policy rules in levels are often regarded as doubtful (Carare and
Tchaidze, 2005). Gerlach-Kristen (2003) states that while interest rates, inﬂation
gap and output gap are likely to be stationary in large samples, in order to draw
correct statistical inference it is desirable to treat them as non-stationary in relative
short samples.5
We apply various unit root tests (Said and Dickey, 1984; Kwiatkowski et al.,
1992; Perron, 1989) to the data. The latter is less sensitive to structural breaks.
The results suggest that interest and inﬂation rates are integrated of order one,
whereas the output gap, the exchange rate growth and the band distance can be
treated as stationary. However, any results should be carefully interpreted, taking
into account that the sample size is small.
For the cointegration analysis we include all variables, even the stationary ones.
This has become common practice in the recent empirical literature (see e.g. Enders,
2004; Asteriou and Hall, 2007).6 We use the bounds testing approach by Pesaran et
al. (2001) which explicitly allows for a mix of I(1) and I(0) variables, as standard sta-
tistical inference based on conventional cointegration tests is no longer valid. First,
the optimal lag length (p) is selected through the Akaike and Schwarz' Bayesian
5See also empirical work: Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2005b) estimate a monetary model of the
exchange rate for the same six CEEC as in our study from 1994-2002 using cointegration In the
same way Fidrmuc (2009) demonstrates for the same CEEC from 1994-2003 that money demand
and all related variables are non-stationary and thus again applies cointegration techniques. This
is however less common for Taylor rules.
6Lütkepohl (2004, p. 89) states: Occasionally it is convenient to consider systems with both
I(1) and I(0) variables. Thereby the concept of cointegration is extended by calling any linear
combination that is I(0) a cointegration relation, although this terminology is not in the spirit of
the original deﬁnition.
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information criteria. Because of the weight on the hypothesis of serially uncorre-
lated error terms for the legitimacy of the test,weset the p-value cautiously.7Next,
we examine the null hypothesis of no cointegration using an F-statistic for the joint
signiﬁcance of the lagged level coeﬃcients in the next equation (where c0 and c1t
represent drift and trend elements and ξt is assumed to be white noise):
∆it = c0+ c1t+
∑p−1
i=1 αi∆it−i+
∑p−1
i=0 βi∆pit−i+
∑p−1
i=0 χi∆yt−i+
∑p−1
i=0 δi∆st−i+∑p−1
i=0 εi∆bt−i + γ1it−1 + γ2pit−1 + γ3yt−1 + γ4st−1 + γ5bt−1 + ξt
If the F-value exceeds the upper bound this indicates the existence of a long run
relation. However, if the F-value is smaller than the lower bound, we cannot reject
the null of no cointegration. Finally, a test statistic in between both critical values
would leave us inconclusive (De Vita and Abbott, 2004). Table 3 unravels the values
of the bounds test and we retrieve a cointegration relation for all the countries in
our sample.8
In line with Gerlach-Kristen (2003), we do not estimate the full error-correction
model, but instead focus on the single-equation approach discussed by Hamilton
(1994). Even though cointegration yields results that are superconsistent, in small
samples there may still occur a potential endogeneity bias. Hamilton postulates
we can correct for this by incorporating past and future changes of the included
variables. We get the following form of the Taylor rule (where we also insert the
disturbance term ηt):
it = c+ αpi
∗
t + βy
∗
t + δ∆st + γbt
+
∑1
k=−1 (αpik∆pit+k + βyk∆yt+k + δsk∆
2st+k + γbk∆bt+k) + ηt
As the diﬀerences included in Eq. (4) only serve as a correction, we refer to the
most important ﬁrst part of the regression in what follows.9 This analysis, similar
to a dynamic OLS technique, is attributed to the seminal work of Stock and Watson
(1993).
Estimating Eq. (4) for the whole sample period is, however, meaningless, since
the monetary policy rule is likely to substantially diﬀer across subperiods. We
therefore introduce dummy variables and allow for the coeﬃcients to shift after the
structural breaks, so that we can diﬀerentiate between the ﬁxed and the ﬂexible
period. We also build in a dummy variable to catch any changes in the intercept.
In this sense, the outer framework remains the same and the comparability between
7When both criteria diverge, we retain the highest lag order.
8We also apply the instrumental variable cointegration test by Enders et al. (2008), which is not
only robust for stationary variables but also allows for dummy variables. This procedure conﬁrms
our results.
9For achieving a uniﬁed framework and in line with Gerlach-Kristen (2003) we set the number
of leads and lags of these elements to one.
8
periods improves. The above tests for cointegration show that it is justiﬁed to use
such a combined framework, because even though the parameters may have shifted
over time, the variables involved still show a meaningful relation in the long run.
This fragmentation of our sample in two separate periods gives us additional insight
in the `fear of ﬂoating hypotheses' (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
The regime switches are deﬁned as the dates when a narrow exchange rate band
is widened to ±15% or completely abolished, according to the oﬃcial exchange
rate regime.10We regard a ±15% band as wide enough in order not to prevent a
central bank from performing an autonomous monetary policy. This is in line with
the observation that some of the countries (namely Hungary) announced inﬂation
targeting in combination with such wide bands. The choice is also supported by the
empirical observation that the band distance turns out to be close to zero for the
periods with a ±15% band (see Fig. 2).
We thus determine the date of the regime switches by focusing on the exchange
rate regime as given in Table 2, instead of the monetary policy changes as given
in Table 1.11This is motivated by the crucial role the exchange rate arrangements
played during the ﬁrst part of the transition period.
As Slovenia and Romania never announced any oﬃcial ﬁxed exchange rate ar-
rangement, we use the ﬁndings by Frömmel and Schobert (2006) and set the shift
date for Romania to 31/12/1998. For Slovenia, we highlight a regime shift from im-
plicit crawling band exchange rate regime before ERM2 membership to an explicit
horizontal band. Due to the wide margins of the ERM2, we regard it as a shift to
an (almost) ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
Since we only distinguish between ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rates and since
the de facto regime switches might diﬀer from the oﬃcial ones, we tested several
alternative break points around our ﬁxed date (but also on the basis of dates re-
trieved through the QuandtAndrews breakpoint test, which lay in the vicinity of
our previous date) and we can state that our framework remains largely robust to
the modiﬁcations.12
10We retrieve the following dates: For the Czech Republic we ﬁnd 27/05/1997 (managed ﬂoat),
Hungary 1/05/2001 (±15% band), Poland 25/03/1999 (±15% band) and Slovakia 1/10/1998 (man-
aged ﬂoat).
11For example, Poland moved already over from exchange rate targeting to inﬂation targeting in
1998, but only moved to a ﬁfteen percent peg from March 1999 onwards. Nonetheless, our focus
remains on the second date as the peg implies central bank intervention when the exchange rate
violates one of its bands. Even though the focus of monetary policy seems to have switched to
inﬂation, its hands may still be tied if it does not alter the peg. The same comment can be made
for Slovakia. Although in both cases (we can conclude from our band distance variable that) the
exchange rate troubles dwindled after the announcements of the new monetary policy.
12The results for these alternative dates and speciﬁcations can be retrieved from the authors
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Through the above discussed changes, Eq. (4) evolves to
it = c+ ψdt + α1pi
∗
1t + α2pi
∗
2t + β1y
∗
1t + β2y
∗
2t + δ1∆s1t + δ2∆s2t + γbt
+
∑1
k=−1 (αpik∆pit+k + βyk∆yt+k + δsk∆
2st+k + γbk∆bt+k) + ηt
where ψi is the dummy for the period i, with i = 1 being the ﬁxed exchange rate
period, and i = 2 the period with ﬂexible exchange rate arrangement and (for most
countries) inﬂation targeting.
Finally, we use a GLS approach13 to correct the standards errors for autocorre-
lation and apply a White correction for heteroskedasticity (MacKinnon and White,
1985).
4 Evaluation
We analyze monthly data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia that covers the period between January 1994 and August 2008,
thus leaving out the current ﬁnancial crisis that may distort our results. Our sam-
ple includes data from the IMF's International Financial Statistics database, the
OECD's statistical compendium, and various central banks.
For the interest rate we either implement the 3 month interbank rate or other
money market rates depending on availability.14
The inﬂation rate is calculated as the annual rate of change in the consumer price.
Considering the inﬂation gap, one has to keep in mind that all of the investigated
countries are involved in a European integration process. These countries thus have
to apply a twin inﬂation target. They do not only face an internal target, which is set
by the domestic central bank, but they also have to comply with an external target
which is embedded in the Maastricht criteria. In many publications and statements
of the CEECs' central banks a distinct focus on the inﬂation diﬀerential to EU
countries can be observed. This strengthens our beliefs that the main attention
should be on the inﬂation gap based on the Maastricht criterion. On a more empirical
level this intuition is supported by Siklos (2006), with the external European target
13We prefer the method described in Johnston and Dinardo (1997), because it gives the possibility
to set up a full GLS model, so we do not lose any observations compared to simply transforming the
variables. Deeper analysis of the (partial) autocorrelation function of the residuals points towards
a AR(1) structure. Besides the dynamic full GLS we also applied a simple OLS version and a
transformed GLS estimation. The results, however, do not substantiallydiﬀer. They are available
from the authors on request.
14More precisely, we incorporate the three months interbank rate for the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland and Slovakia and the money market rate for Romania and Slovenia. As a robustness
check, we also include various other short term interest rates in our analysis without any substantial
change in the results.
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yielding more consistent results than its internal equivalent. Furthermore, there
are several advantages in using the external criterion. First, not all of the countries
adopted an inﬂation target for the whole period, thus there is only limited availability
of internal inﬂation targets. Second, due to several reasons, e.g. the initially limited
reputation of central banks or frequent changes in administered prices in CEEC
or other shocks outside the control of the central bank, the oﬃcial targets might
substantially diﬀer from the actual target or had to be adjusted over time. The
Maastricht target, however, can be regarded as a medium to long-term objective,
and therefore seems to be a more reasonable benchmark for inﬂation.
The output gap is calculated based on industrial production using a HodrickPrescott
ﬁlter (smoothing parameter 14,400). The computation of the rate of potential out-
put presents a diﬃcult task (the same applies to the natural rate of unemployment).
The results strongly depend on the way it has been conceived. If one assumes
the original series to exhibit a deterministic trend, a ﬁlter is the most appropriate
solution, while a stochastic trend demands diﬀerentiation of the variable.
We follow the classical Taylor rule analysis and calculate the output gap based
on a ﬁlter.15Although one may expect to retrieve better results using real-time data
(Orphanides, 2001) this is not possible for our sample of countries, as internal esti-
mates are either not available at all or not publicly available.16
As a benchmark model, we ﬁrst estimate Eq. (4) as a simple open economy
framework with ﬁxed parameters over time. The results are reported in the left-hand
column of each country-speciﬁc segment of Table 4.17 However, the interpretation
demands caution as the coeﬃcients will potentially be distorted and inconsistent
due to the neglected structural break and the time-invariant coeﬃcients. The long
term reaction of the interest rate on inﬂation is above unity only for the Czech
Republic and Slovenia, and at least not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 for Hungary.
So broadly speaking, we can say that three countries satisfy the Taylor principle.18
The coeﬃcient for output seems less convincing as only Slovenia has a signiﬁcant,
but counterintuitive sign. The minor role for output in the CEEC's monetary policy
also corroborates with, e.g. Vonnàk (2007) and Jakab et al. (2006) who state that
15In contrast some authors prefer to work with growth rates, although this may lead to over-
diﬀerentiating (Siklos and Wohar 2005). We also estimated the model with growth rates. This
does not aﬀect the estimation output. The results are available from the authors on request.
16We also tested various speciﬁcations based on unemployment rates (both with HP-ﬁlter and
MA-gap). This did, however, not aﬀect the results. The estimation output is available form the
authors.
17The constants are not reported as they are not easily interpretable in the cointegration based
version of the Taylor rule and serve as an auxiliary variable (Gerlach-Kristen, 2003).
18However, the coeﬃcient is uniformly smaller than 1.5, which is often taken as a benchmark
measure.
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(Hungarian) monetary policy has a rather limited eﬀect on output.
The same applies to the exchange rate growth element, which solely gives mean-
ingful results for the Czech Republic. The parameter which seems signiﬁcant over
all the (ﬁxed exchange rate) countries is the band distance coeﬃcient (although for
the Czech Republic this holds for a higher level of signiﬁcance). This preliminary
setting already depicts a relatively realistic picture of the monetary policy stance.19
Only the equation for Slovakia does not seem to be quite stable.
As a second step, we add the dummy intercept and slice up the variables to mimic
both periods more truthfully, thus estimating Eq. (5). The results are reported in
the right-hand column of each country-speciﬁc section in Table 4. It is interesting
to portrait the regime dependence in the components and intercept dummies and
their overall impact (this uniformly applies for all countries except Slovenia, where
the shift reﬂects a diﬀerent episode).
There is a substantial change in the sliced up coeﬃcients. These diﬀerences are
most obvious for the inﬂation coeﬃcient. The number of countries satisfying the
Taylor principle rises remarkably in the second period (inﬂation targeting and ﬂex-
ible exchange rate). This pattern corresponds to our expectations that the central
banks had more ﬂexibility to monitor the inﬂation target during the second period.
Moreover, the band distance element seems quite robust for the new speciﬁcation
and is unambiguously signiﬁcant for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slo-
vakia during their ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
In contrast, the exchange rate changes ∆st are not signiﬁcant for all countries
but Slovakia. Thus, central banks used the interest rate instrument in order to keep
the exchange rate well inside oﬃcially announced bands, but they hardly used this
instrument in order to smooth exchange rate ﬂuctuations. These relatively high
coeﬃcients for inﬂation during the ﬂexible period also are in contrast with past
studies on the same or similar countries, which ﬁnd insigniﬁcant or low values for
inﬂation. This is in line with the argument by Angeloni et al. (2007) that in a
Taylor rule the reaction to inﬂation is partially captured by other variables, in our
case the band distance.
Similarly, there are some alternations over time for the coeﬃcients of the output
gap and the exchange rate growth. But the importance of these particular elements
generally seems to be quite low over both periods.
As an intermediate summary, we can conclude that the interest rate setting
behaviour of the respective central banks only paid attention to the exchange rate
19The Durbin-Watson statistic and the Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test indicate that the residuals
do not show remaining autocorelation.
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during periods of oﬃcially ﬁxed regimes. This consideration of the exchange rate
is best embodied through the band distance. During periods of oﬃcially ﬂoating
exchange rates, central banks increasingly took a more inﬂation minded approach.
Slovakia is an exception as the coeﬃcient on exchange rate growth is signiﬁcant
during its more ﬂexible exchange rate regime. On a more empirical level, we can also
state that the new speciﬁcation raises the explanatory power for all the countries:
The adjusted R-squared is comparable to speciﬁcations including the lagged interest
rate. Therefore we can assume that our speciﬁcation gives a more realistic ﬁt of the
monetary policy rules for these transition countries.
We add alternative speciﬁcations to the equations in order to include country-
speciﬁc features, and in order to conduct some robustness checks. These results are
listed in Table 5.
For the Czech Republic we build in an extra crisis dummy for the turbulent period
in June 1997. The results show that both inﬂation coeﬃcients become signiﬁcant,
but there is still a substantial rise. Moreover, the second period's exchange rate
component is now correctly signed. Finally, the band distance element remains
robust and for the output values there is little change. All of these changes cause a
higher adjusted R-squared, suggesting that this may be a more accurate description.
Since in the case of Hungary and Poland the introduction of inﬂation targeting
and the abolishment of the peg did not coincide, these countries require additional
considerations. We test a diﬀerent break date (based on the AndrewsQuandt test)
for Hungary. The intuition behind this is that we now set the date endogenously
through our data instead of imposing it externally. 20 The new break date becomes
June 1999, which is comparatively earlier than the oﬃcial date. Furthermore, we
see a more distinct change in the inﬂation parameters, although they both remain
signiﬁcantly indiﬀerent from unity.
For Poland we estimate an alternative speciﬁcation to assert what happens if
we let our observations for the band distance run through for a longer period (than
the oﬃcially stated pegged period which ends in April 2000) as we have indications
that the monitoring of the peg went on a bit longer. Remarkably, the band distance
coeﬃcient seems robust and remains signiﬁcant.
Romania never explicitly announced an exchange rate policy, so no oﬃcial break
date is available. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to assume that a break
occurred in December of 1998. Alternatively, we set the break date through the
Andrew-Quandt test (August 1999). The inﬂation coeﬃcient decreases slightly for
20We did this check for all the countries, but only report the results in case of a considerable
eﬀect.
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the later period. 21
For Slovakia the estimation results improve with the speciﬁcation allowing for the
structural break, however, they remain comparatively unstable. Although the band
distance element satisﬁes our expectations, we cannot ﬁnd any realistic inﬂation
coeﬃcients and the adjusted R-squared is relatively low. The speciﬁcation may
therefore be unﬁt to realistically model the Slovakian data. When we add a band
distance element speciﬁc for the ERM2 period to the regression, this variable is
almost zero (reﬂected by the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for γ2B in Table 5), which could
either be due to the absence of pressure on the Slovak koruna during this period or
due to changes of the central parity at times of pressure. In fact, the latter case is
more likely as the central parity of the Slovak koruna was revalued twice during its
ERM2 membership, and thus relieved pressures from the exchange rate from hitting
the strong edge of the band.
The Slovenian authorities oﬃcially announced a managed ﬂoating exchange rate
regime for the whole period before ERM2 membership. As there was no explicit
change in the exchange rate regime, the speciﬁcation with breaks would not add
any value for this episode. In contrast, we uncover (and model) a policy switch
when the Slovenian currency joins the ERM2-system. Oﬃcially, this was a change
from a managed ﬂoating regime towards a comparatively ﬂexible peg to the euro with
very wide bands. Implicitly, however, it was a more pronounced policy shift from a
de facto crawling band.22 As an alternative speciﬁcation, we turn our attention to
the fact that Slovenia's monetary policy, in contrast to the other countries in the
sample, oﬃcially focused on monetary aggregates. Until 1997 the focus was mainly
on base money and M1, but later it switched to M3 (and in 2001 Slovenia even
adopted a two pillar strategy). We build in these subperiods with several dummy
variables and come to the following conclusion: The inﬂation coeﬃcient is relatively
stable over all periods, the output coeﬃcients become signiﬁcant but are wrongly
signed and the coeﬃcient of the money gap23 is only signiﬁcant in the third period.
Consequently, we cannot retrieve the policy attention for monetary aggregates as it
was oﬃcially stated.
21For checking the robustness we shortened the sample period. This does not aﬀect the results.
22The band distance variable in this setting only applies for the ERM2-period. Since the exchange
rate during did not move close to the margins, the band distance values are negligible and were
thus not included in the estimation.
23The band distance variable in this setting only applies for the ERM2-period. Since the exchange
rate during did not move close to the margins, the band distance values are negligible and were
thus not included in the estimation.
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5 Conclusions
Many central banks in emerging market economies may pay special attention to
exchange rate movements, even though they do not oﬃcially claim to target the
exchange rate. In order to inﬂuence exchange rate developments the central bank
can basically use two instruments: foreign exchange interventions and interest rate
changes. We focus on the later monetary policy instrument by estimating open-
economy monetary policy rules, in order to analyse to which extent central banks
in Central and Eastern Europe have given the exchange rate a special role in their
interest rate decisions.
We estimate monetary policy rules based on a cointegration approach and ex-
plicitly take into consideration shifts in exchange rate regimes. The inﬂuence of the
exchange rate on the interest rate setting behaviour of central banks in CEEC diﬀers
strongly between regimes. During periods of more rigid exchange rate arrangements
the inﬂuence of the exchange rate dominates, i.e. the interest rate policy is mainly
inﬂuenced by the distance to the intervention margins on which the central bank
has to react in order to keep the peg working. During the time periods of more
ﬂexible exchange rate arrangements we ﬁnd a stronger focus on inﬂation, namely,
on the deviation of domestic inﬂation from the inﬂation rate set by the Maastricht
criterion. This is, in particular, the case for the Czech Republic, Poland and Roma-
nia. The inﬂation coeﬃcient for Slovenia also satisﬁes the Taylor principle, whereas
for Hungary the coeﬃcient is below, but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity.
Slovakia remains a special case in the sample. The inﬂation coeﬃcients do not
satisfy the Taylor principle, and it seems that there has been an ongoing focus on
exchange rate movements after switching from a ﬁxed exchange rate regime to a
managed ﬂoat. The interest rate setting behaviour indicates an implicit peg, while
the two revaluations of the central parity also indicate the challenges to the implicit
peg during ERM2-membership.
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Chapter 2
Hard to let go:
The procyclical eﬀect of memory on ﬁnancial
cycles
Garo Garabedian1
July 2014
Abstract
Abstract: Our main goal is to apply the basic idea that emotions are capable
of impacting our memory in the storyline of an animal spirit driven ﬁnancial cy-
cle. We work cross-disciplinary and integrate elements from the ﬁeld of psychology,
neurology and evolutionary biology, in order to better understand the (economical)
phenomenon of self-fulﬁlling and self-enhancing downward (or upward) cascades in
the economy. Our analysis starts oﬀ with an investigation of general socio-economic
variables, and then moves over to a more speciﬁc, ﬁnancial setting. For each of these
domains, we incorporate several recall tests to unravel whether aﬀective stimuli can
have a nameable impact on our recollection, and hence shape our sentiments and
expectations, potentially even aﬀecting our decision-making. Such a self-enforcing
mechanism can lead to powerful feedback eﬀects during downturns, when we are
surrounded with negative news items.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D87, G01, G02, E32
Keywords: Memory, Emotion, Attention, Economic downturns, Financial crisis, Neu-
roeconomics, Behavioral Finance
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1 Introduction
We provide an investigation into the role of emotions in our everyday lives. Our
initial response to the environment is often aﬀective, and although it might seem
unpolished and nebulous, it has the potential to set the tone for our ensuing relations
with the environment (Ittelson, 1973; Zajonc, 1980). Hence, emotions are endowed
with the ability to inﬁltrate our run of the mill choices, even if we are unconscious
about them, or unwilling to recognize them (Cohen, 2005). Seemingly irrational
behaviour might therefore be better understood after evaluating the versatile func-
tions that emotions can perform, or once performed during our evolution (Shiv et
al, 2005).1
In our study, we test the hypothesis whether such ﬂeeting feelings could have a
profound impact on our decision-making, speciﬁcally through the way our memories
are being processed. If emotional events are remembered more poignantly, these
experiences might also inﬂuence our subsequent behaviour more thoroughly, as they
tend to overshadow our judgment when we attempt to make future plans. Such
a mechanism, which transforms aﬀective stimuli into comparatively more salient
memories, could thus be an important element that reinforces the procyclicality of
the economy. For example, when we are in a downward cycle, we are often confronted
with gloomy news items. Since these negative stimuli are more easily remembered,
they lead us to overweigh them in our subsequent decisions. As a consequence, we
are prone to adapt our sentiment and our expectations accordingly, leading to a loss
of conﬁdence which can even enforce the initial crisis to become more virulent. All
these components (emotions, memories, news, expectations, sentiment, conﬁdence
and decision making) seem to be innately connected with each other (creating a
highly endogenous environment), and can thus propagate existing trends, and even
self-enforce them.
Our framework should hence allow us to incorporate emotions into the general
macroeconomic framework. However, we do not provide an all-encompassing theory
on the behavioral or neural background of ﬁnancial cycles, as we merely focus on one
aspect (more speciﬁcally, the way our memory can be aﬀected through emotions).
Hence, we only provide a ﬁrst step towards integrating diﬀerent ﬁelds and adapting
our way of thinking. Moreover, we are not claiming that this is the only channel
(as we do not want to diminish the importance of, or to compete with, the classical
economic channels, as these have their own merit).2
1A similar narrative of looking for explanations of seemingly erratic behavior can be found in
Ramachandran (2011). However, his focus lays more speciﬁcally on psychiatric anomalies.
2Borio (2012), among many others, provides an insightful analysis on the economic causes of
1
Nonetheless, emotions do seem to have the potential to profoundly impact senti-
ment and expectations, which are crucial elements in determining many micro and
macro decisions, and can therefore not be neglected. We provide insight into a novel
channel through which such a pass-through of emotions can be accomplished, by
adapting the quality of our recollections. Such mnemonic beneﬁts are attainable
because aﬀective stimuli have the potential to trigger cognitive and neural processes
that aﬀect the stages of memory encoding and consolidation, with the amygdala as
one of the main protagonists (Hamann, 2001). Hence, we integrate several cross-
disciplinary concepts (derived from the behavioral and neurologic literature) into
our analysis on (economic) decision making.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, we describe
how emotional stimuli can impact the memory, by unraveling the behavioral, neu-
ral and evolutionary mechanisms that accompany this process. Next, section three
investigates the role of emotion in (economic) decision making, and introduces a
procyclical eﬀect of emotion. Our research, in section four, starts initially by ex-
amining whether emotions can truly aﬀect our memory in every day decisions, and
then (in section 5) probes more thoroughly whether emotions can also impact our
decision making (through this enhanced memory heuristic). Finally, in section six,
we conclude and discuss some elementary (policy) implications.
2 Memory and negative emotions
2.1 Basic Mechanism
Our ability to remember speciﬁc events depends prominently on the emotion we ex-
perience during these episodes. Typically, emotional information has a substantial
comparative advantage over neutral information (Anderson, Yamaguchi, Grabski
and Lacka, 2006; Buchanan and Adolphs, 2002; Hamann, 2001; Kensinger, 2009;
Murray and Kensinger, 2012). Kensinger and Schacter (2008) distinguish three
dimensions through which emotion can shape our memory. Firstly, the absolute
number of events which are recalled increases. Secondly, there is a surge in the sub-
jective vividness of these events. Finally, memories seem to contain a more accurate
recount of the details which were encountered. This mnemonic discrepancy prevails
because emotional events engage a diﬀerent and more eﬃcient mechanism when be-
ing processed to our memory, in comparison with the more traditional pathways on
which neutral events depend (Kensinger, 2009; Hyde and Jenkins, 1969).
boom and bust cycles, and provides valuable answers on how to deal with them.
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The memory enhancement eﬀects of emotions have two distinct components.
Emotions may intervene in our memory at two separate phases in time. On the
one hand, they facilitate the encoding process, both by capturing our attention and
by enhancing our perception. We tend to linger longer over these type of stimuli,
thus snatching our focus away from competing (non-emotional) impulses (Brosh et
al, 2013; Reisberg and Heuer, 2004; Sharot and Phelps, 2004). On the other hand,
emotion stimuli have the quality to boost up memory retention by intervening at
the consolidation stage, thereby allowing memories to become more permanent.
However, this improvement can only be accomplished gradually, and should there-
fore only be tangible after an extended period (Hamann, 2001; Kleinsmith and
Kaplan, 1963). Taking into consideration both of these memory-enhancing dimen-
sions, retrieval of emotional events should be comparatively easier than their neutral
equivalents (Kensinger, 2009).
However, emotion does not always enhance our recollections unilaterally over
all aspect of an episode. Some elements are better remembered because of their
emotional salience, while others are easier forgotten (Buchanan and Adophs, 2002;
Kensinger and Schacter, 2008; Reisberg and Heuer, 2004). While emotional salience
allows some elements to be better remembered, others are more likely to be forgot-
ten. As a result, emotion might only enhance the gist of the story, thereby losing
sight of more peripheral details.3 Such a trade-oﬀ may depend on the occurrence
of an attention magnet, without which the memory improvement would be more
ubiquitous (Laney et al, 2004).
However, the precise impact which emotional information can have on the mem-
ory of related neutral details has been subject to much debate. Firstly, Easterbrook's
(1959) cue-utilization hypothesis postulates that the presence of emotional compo-
nents might thwart the recollection of peripheral details, by narrowing the scope of
available attention (through a reduction of available cues which can be processed).
Both positive and negative emotions receive a higher processing priority, thus drain-
ing valuable resources4 (Christianson, 1992; Levine and Edelstein, 2009; Meinhard
and Pekrun, 2003; Reisberg and Heuer, 2004). In contrast, MacKay's priority-
binding theory allows the retrieval of peripheral details to be enhanced through
their binding with emotional items, thus enjoying similar processing gains and tak-
ing advantage of the mnemonic beneﬁt which are materialized by the emotional
3There are several theories that explain which elements of an event might show improvement
in the retention of memories due to emotions.
4An intuitive way of understanding this premised is illustrated through the concept of the
weapon focus, whereby witnesses/bystanders to violent crimes are often incapable of describing
the characteristics of the perpetrator, as a consequence of ﬁxing their attention too much on the
weapon.
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stimuli. Such prioritized binding towards elements of the context might thus have a
beneﬁcial eﬀect for their subsequent retrieval (Hadley and MacKay, 2006; MacKay
and Ahmetzanov, 2005; MacKay et al., 2004). Both theories have been able to
yield empirical validity, depending on the experimental settings. Whether or not
there exists a detrimental eﬀect of emotion on details, might therefore depend on
the subjective value these elements have for the observer.
Kensinger (2007) proposes a ﬁrst solution to this deadlock by distinguishing
between intrinsic and extrinsic contextual details, whereby the former are closely
attached to the emotional item and therefore basking in its superior attention pro-
cessing, whereas the latter are conceptually, spatially and temporally removed of the
emotional stimuli and therefore being pushed aside in a zero-sum fashion (Kensinger
and Schacter, 2006, 2008; Kensinger, Garoﬀ-Eaton and Schacter, 2007). Closely
related is Mather's (2007) distinction between within-item features (enhanced by
arousal) versus between-item features (receiving no mnemonic beneﬁt). Although
there is no perfect match between the two theories, they both share the belief that
emotion leads to focal enhancements in memory, and these focal eﬀects arise be-
cause of the way in which arousing info is attended and bound during encoding and
consolidation (Kensinger, 2009, p. 102). Finally, the Arousal Biased Competition
(ABC) theory (Mather and Sutherland, 2011) rephrases the question in terms the
amount of priority each individual element evokes within the observer, claiming an
enhanced perception for high priority information and a fading perception for low
priority counterparts.
2.2 Neural background
The improvement of our memory for aﬀective stimuli is orchestrated by speciﬁc
neural and hormonal mechanisms. The amygdala and related limbic areas are
quintessential in this process, (and intervene at every stage, from encoding through
consolidation to retrieval) (Hamann, 2001). The amygdala represents a small almond-
shaped cluster of nuclei situated in the medial temporal lobe, adjacent to the hip-
pocampus (Sharot and Phelps, 2004). The amygdala can aﬀect memory by dis-
patching projections (through cables of axons rapped in myelin) to other regions
of the brain involved in memorizing, most prominently the hippocampus (Sapolsky,
2011), but also by inﬂuencing the hypothalamus to release stress hormones related
with the adrenergic system (McGaugh, 2000, 2004).
The more intense the activation of the amygdala is for aﬀective experiences (in
comparison to neutral events), the more pronounced the improvement is which we
can monitor for the episodic memory (Anderson et al, 2006). This correlation be-
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tween increased amygdala processing and eﬃcacious encoding holds both for positive
and negative high-arousal items (Kensing and Schacter, 2008). However, a suﬃcient
level of amygdala activation would be necessary in order to ameliorate the memory
processes and achieve better recollection of emotional events (Canli, 2000).5 Fur-
thermore, the impact of amygdala stimulation during encoding and consolidation on
consequent recollection might hinge on the speciﬁc type of detail, with some aspects
of an experience being remembered well, and others being forgotten (Kensinger,
2007).6
Although the amygdala is crucial in moderating the memory eﬀects for emotional
elements, it can only inﬂuence the mnemonic process through its interaction with
other brain regions, most prominently though the bi-directional connections between
the amygdala and the hippocampus (Anderson et al, 2006; McGaugh, 2004). Both
of these limbic regions exhibit highly correlated levels of activity during the encoding
of emotional content. Moreover, the amygdala, as the most abundantly intertwined
subcortical region of the brain, has the potential to inﬂuence the functioning of the
sensory cortices to achieve the desired level of attention (Kensinger and Schacter,
2008). Finally, the versatile connections of the amygdala also trigger the release of
adrenal stress hormones (for example, epinephrine or cortisol) as well as regulate
the distribution of glucocorticoids (Mackay and Hadley, 2005; Kensinger, 2009).
2.3 Evolutionary Development
An event which surpasses a certain emotional threshold is likely to have a sub-
stantial importance for our existence. From an evolutionary perspective, it would
therefore be expedient, if our memory would be enhanced for such stirring occur-
rences, thereby providing a support for future encounters (Hamann, 2001; Brosh et
al, 2013). Consequently, if emotions signal distress or danger, accentuating them in
our memory could provide a valuable warning system (Stone et al 2005). Hence, the
evolution of our memory mechanism has facilitated the consolidation and retrieval
process of aﬀective information (LeDoux, 1996). As both positive and negative items
could possess importance for our future success, the valence of the aﬀective ﬂavor is
trivial, and both types of stimuli should enhance attention and consequent memory
channels (Kensinger and Schacter, 2008) Moreover, as we are surrounded with an
abundance of external stimuli, it would be indispensable to possess such a mecha-
5This ﬁnding, indicating a minimal arousal threshold, bodes well with the Arousal biased Com-
petition theory, which emphasizes that high priority stimuli succeed best at modulation the memory
processes
6Such a focus would resonate better with Easterbrook's (1959) cue-utilization hypothesis, or
Kensinger's (extrinsic/intrinsic) and Mather's (within/between) conceptualizations.
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nism, which helps us keep focus, most importantly when facing perilous situations
(Mather and Sutherland, 2011).
The development of our prefrontal cortex, and its ensuing ability for our cogni-
tion, has created many new technologies together with an innovative social architec-
ture, both of which are becoming more widespread. These changes have transformed
our environment in such a dramatic manner that evolutionary older mechanisms in
our brain may no longer operate proﬁciently. Typically, emotional segments of our
brain have relied on such highly conserved systems in our brain, which were once
indispensable for our survival. However, due to the changed setting in which they
now operate they can no longer consistently guarantee optimal outcomes (Cohen,
2005). Shiv et al (2005) refer to this phenomenon as the `dark side' of emotions
in decision making, and point to the fact that, albeit the neural network that sus-
tains human emotions has evolved for survival goals, there are conditions in which
a spontaneous emotional reaction could better be subdued.
Whether you are that zebra running for your life, or that lion sprinting for
your meal, your body's physiological response mechanisms are superbly adapted
for dealing with such short-term physical emergencies7 (Sapolsky, 1994, p. 6). The
amygdala has been evolved to provide for an immediate `ﬁght or ﬂight' response and
it was shaped during a period where there was no consequence in befuddling a false
alarm (Bechara, 2005; Ledoux, 1996). If the treat of the lion seemed to be wrong,
the zebra was still unharmed by running away. However, in our current developed
society (and most certainly in the economic world, for example in asset markets)
the amygdala might induce overreactions which could have costly consequences.
Nonetheless, the fact that economist have been able to devise the concept of the
homo economicus (rational agents) could render us optimistic, as its mere creation
should imply that higher cognitive capabilities might allow us to overcome such
intuitive response where necessary (Cohen, 2005). In contrast, we should simultane-
ously be warned against the belief that we can fundamentally change our behavior
by simply wearing such knowledge as a talisman (Cowen, 2009).
3 Methodology
3.1 Emotions in economics
When Bentham (1789) originally presented the concept of utility, his theory was
grounded on the idea that agents conceived values of wealth by comparing the pain
7Both Zajonc (1980) and Bechara (2005) provide similar intuitive examples.
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and the pleasure that certain actions would yield, and thus emotions had a conspic-
uous role in this newly developing ﬁeld of economics (Loewenstein, 2000). However,
neoclassical economist rapidly became disgruntled with utility's theoretical founda-
tions, since emotions had a ﬂawed history, both in psychology and neuroscience,
with major discrepancies in their deﬁnition, value and applicability (Elster, 1998).
Consequently, they purged the concept of utility from its emotional substance, and
derived an ordinal measure in combination with the theory of revealed preference,
thus interpreting utility as an index of preference instead of pleasure (Bechara, 2005).
Hence, it should come as no surprise that the central premise of modern eco-
nomic theory generally neglects the impact of emotions on decision-making. Agents
are assumed to make rational decisions which maximize their utility and are in com-
pliance with their long-term perspectives, updating their beliefs in a Bayesian way
(Cohen, 2005). However, many aspects of our behavior (ranging from consumer
to investor decisions) cannot easily be understood in this framework (Barberis and
Thaler, 2003; DellaVigna, 2009).
If we attempt to scrutinize why agents deviate from the prescribed optimal be-
havior, there are two main strains of thought. Firstly, there is the possibility that
our models are not ﬂawed but merely incomplete, and that we have not yet uncov-
ered all elements which inﬂuence utility. Secondly, and more intimately connected
to our approach, agents might simply be incapable of performing a rational max-
imization of their utility, and therefore economic theory might beneﬁt from being
reintroduced to the concept of emotions (Cohen, 2005). Hence, the latter assump-
tion would imply that decision making is not dispassionate but is instead profoundly
swayed by feelings (Sokol-Hessner et al, 2013). Not surprisingly, the last few decades
have brought a remarkable upswing among economists in their appreciation for emo-
tions.8 However, there is little research on how emotions can aﬀect the recollection
of particular events, and hence inﬂuence their salience and their impact on decision-
making (Peters, 2006). With our current study we try to ﬁll this gap, as we believe
that the occurrence of aﬀect does heavily impact our decision process.
3.2 Procyclical eﬀect of the memory heuristic during ﬁnan-
cial cycles
We have grown accustomed to believe that every decision we take is triggered by a
cognitive process, thus underestimating the impact of visceral factors (Loewenstein,
8Although behavioral economics had initially mainly been inspired by cognitive aspects of psy-
chology and has remained largely untouched by the rekindled attention for emotions (Lerner and
Han, 2009).
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2000). However, we can ﬁnd little proof to maintain this hypothesis. Instead of
comparing all the costs and beneﬁts for various substitutes, we often follow our gut
feeling and simply opt for the most cherished alternative, based on our aﬀective feel-
ings (Zajonc, 1980).9 Whenever we collect information about the diﬀerent options,
this merely serves as a justiﬁcation ex post. Festinger (1964) poignantly remarks
that dissonance merely exists when we do not execute a detailed analysis before the
judgment was made. 10
Emotions have the quality of impacting us instantly, and without any eﬀort.
Additionally, emotions allow a rapid judgment about our surroundings. These tran-
sient feelings wield powerful inﬂuences on evaluative judgments. Moreover, they
allow us to formulate instant answers about issues that are too complex to analyze
thoroughly (Keltner and Lerner, 2010). Hence, emotions seem to trickle into a wide
variety of decisions, ranging from very trivial aspects (consumer choices) to more
important subjects (life satisfaction) (Peters, 2006). The underlying neural systems
of decision making also rely on limbic regions, most prominently on the amygdala
and the insula. This overlap hints at a common neural mechanism underlying both
choice and emotion (Sokol-Hessner et al, 2013).
Feelings are thus automatically being incorporated in our daily judgment as an
inﬂuential source of information (Kahneman, 2003). Even irrelevant emotional states
(or stimuli we are not aware of) can have a substantial impact on subsequent choices
(Han and Lerner, 2009). Therefore we need to unravel in which circumstances
emotions provide a disruptive noise in our decision process, and in which cases they
could actually be useful (Shiv et al, 2005). Our study attempts to answer this
important puzzle, and thus shed light on the impact emotions can have subsequent
(socio-)economic decisions.
We are interested in unraveling the consequences of enhanced memory eﬀects
for aﬀective stimuli in a real life economic context, and applying this knowledge
to better understand the behavioral dynamics, which seem to be implicitly present
in the context of ﬁnancial cycles. Such an investigation has gained substantial im-
portance as ﬁnancial cycles, after a period of great moderation, have become more
prevalent again, leading up to severe asset price and credit boom-bust cycles (Bo-
rio, 2012). We start oﬀ with the observation that downturns and upswings in the
economy are usually accompanied with a plethora of news items, conveying many
emotional stimuli. Usually, such events, which contain a strong emotional content,
9Both Simon (1955) and Gigerenzer (1999) highlight the importance of rules of thumbs or
heuristics in decision making.
10Hastie and Park (1986), similarly, describe a search for supporting evidence after the decision
is made.
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are preferentially remembered, leading to an increase in the salience and availabil-
ity of these experiences in the minds of all types of economic agents (Kensinger,
2007).11 Not only do these aﬀective stimuli grab our attention more ferociously,
they also receive a preferential encoding in our memory (Hamann, 2001). Conse-
quently, we overemphasize these events when we consult our memories, and look into
the past, to form our expectations about the future (Peterson, 2007).12 This process
can lead to changes in our mood, sentiment and conﬁdence level, even inﬂuencing
our subsequent decision-making. For example, during a downturn, the disclosure of
news about plummeting stock prices, might lead to salient and emotional memories,
which are hard to shake oﬀ. Thus leading to an even stronger drop in our sentiment,
which might induce us to react even stronger to the initial signal. As a result, the
memory heuristic can propagate the existing cyclical motion in the economy, and
worsen its eﬀect on many real economic variables, aﬀecting asset prices, investment
and consumption decisions, etc. The resulting ﬁnancial cycle can thus reach deeper
troughs and higher peaks, merely by succumbing to this behavioral bias, thus cre-
ating an additional source of procyclicality. We visualize these linkages through a
simpliﬁed ﬂow chart in ﬁgure 1. The ﬁgure also portrays the ensuing macroeco-
nomic eﬀects and incorporates familiar behavioral elements into the storyline of the
memory heuristic.
3.3 Macroeconomic role of expectations in the pass-through
mechanism of the memory heuristic
A long tradition in macroeconomics highlights the importance of expectations for
aggregate economic behavior, emphasizing that swings in optimism and pessimism
are a predominant factor in driving business cycles (Milani, 2013). Pigou (1927)
reverts to variations in the expectations of entrepreneurs, which he characterized as
faulty judgments of optimism or pessimism, as the main instigator of ﬂuctuations in
the output levels. Similarly, Keynes (1936) introduces the concept of animal spir-
its13, allowing for changes in the expectations which diverged from rational decision
making, to account for the cyclical motions in the economy. Beaudry and Portier
(2013) recognize three ways of integrating sentiment in the macroeconomic frame-
work. Firstly, the cyclical behavior might be fully ascribed to psychological causes.
11We all have witnessed instances where we cannot shake oﬀ certain memories of aﬀective expe-
riences. Here, we examine their consequences on economic behavior.
12Beaudry and Portier (2013, pp. 84-85): if agents are trying to infer the future state of the
economy by looking at current economic activity, this could give rise to important feedback eﬀects
that come close to creating self-fulﬁlling prophesies.
13This notion of animal spirits was recently popularized again by Akerlof and Shiller (2009).
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Such erratic behavior should eventually be corrected by a crash, as there are no
underlying changes in the fundamentals. Secondly, the macro-economy might be in-
trinsically unstable, allowing self-fulﬁlling cycles wherein outbursts of optimism (or
pessimism) provoke a boom (or bust) thus justifying the initial optimism. Finally,
agents might occasionally make errors in their judgment of fundamentals (noise),
whereby the cycles are instigated by the noise in their predictions, thus leading to
news-driven business cycles.
Moreover, recent empirical studies reveal a sizeable impact of sentiment on the
macro-economy, with mood swings being liable for over ﬁfty percent of business cycle
ﬂuctuations in hours and output (Beaudry et al, 2012), and exogenous changes in
sentiment accounting for forty percent of historical U.S. business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Similarly, Angeletos et al (2013) describe an animal spirit shock (closely correlated
with sentiment) as the main driver of business cycles, referring to the adagio: be-
lieve it or not, it's all about beliefs!. The transmission of these shocks through
communication is similar to the spread of fads and rumors, thus leading to boom-
bust episodes (Angeletos and La, 2012). Closely related, Forni et al (2013) unravel
that a large part of the ﬂuctuations in GDP are caused by noise shocks, which ex-
plain up to one third of the variance in GDP, consumption and investment in the
short and medium term, thus allowing a large role for animal spirits. Blanchard et
al (2012) similarly acknowledges an important role for noise shocks in shaping the
short term dynamics in aggregate activity.
Our analysis provides a micro-economic foundation for the role of sentiment in
the cyclical pattern of economic behavior, thus incorporating behavioral elements
into the business cycle literature. Moreover, the above results show the empirical
relevance of understanding what governs our moods, and how this is intertwined with
the current stance of the economy. The above mentioned salience and availability of
emotional (positive or negative) stimuli (during upswing or downturns) which are
induced by our memory heuristic, ﬁt in elegantly into this narrative.
3.4 Adjacent behavioral heuristics
Our analysis is intrinsically linked to several behavioral biases, most notably avail-
ability and representativeness14, and allows a deeper understanding of their under-
lying dynamics.
First of all, our memory heuristic is close in spirit with, and one of the main
14Although there are many other heuristics which can be associated with, or clariﬁed through,
we merely want to focus on those elements which are relevant in the context of ﬁnancial cycles.
Hence, we do not provide an exhaustive list.
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drivers of, the availability bias. This phenomenon may originate as a consequence of
the ﬂuency with which certain ideas come to mind, thus leading to an exaggeration of
the probability attached to emotional or well-documented events (Wärneryd, 2001).
We usually assess the signiﬁcance of a speciﬁc event by the ease and emotional con-
notation with which we can retrieve this event from our memory (Schwarz, 2010).
The visions we have in our mind do not yield a ﬂawless view of the world, because
our outlook on the probability of events is biased by the pervasiveness and aﬀective
quality of the information we are surrounded with (Slovic et al, 1981). Therefore,
when considering the cyclical pattern of economic behavior, it's interesting to incor-
porate the idea of availability cascades (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999).
According to Kahneman (2011), such a cascade usually starts oﬀ with a minor
news item, seizing the attention of a certain subgroup of people, which become
alarmed. Their emotional response sparks oﬀ even more attention, leading to addi-
tional coverage by the media, thus reaching a bigger audience and inciting greater
distress. Moreover, as the media strive to surpass their competitors with the most
conspicuous headlines, the original content is blown out of proportion and the dan-
gers attached to the original news event are greatly exaggerated. Therefore, the
inﬂuence works in both directions, as on the one hand the media outlines the public
interest, but on the other hand the media is also shaped by its audience (Slovic et
al, 1981). Academics who try to moderate the agitated mood are mostly neglected,
or accused of concealing the truth. Due to this self-fulﬁlling sequence of events, a
minor event becomes a salient factor in the minds of many people. At this point,
policymakers are forced to intervene, in order to settle down the public sentiment,
hence absorbing resources from alternative applications, which have now been de-
moted (Kahneman, 2011).15 Our empirical analysis can thus be interpreted as an
application of an availability cascade in economic behavior, unraveling the impact
our memory can have in extending and reinforcing the cyclical patterns in aggregate
activity.
Kunreuther (1978) applies the concept of availability to describe the pattern of
insurance acquisition and safety measures after disasters. Citizens who were suﬀered
from, or were in the vicinity of, a calamity are very alarmed after the events. After an
earthquake, Californians become more careful, acquire insurance, and adopt safety
measures. However, their memories of the event fade away over time, together with
their fears, and they become more careless again. Hence, the dynamics of memory
15Of course, such a news cascade will usually have a fundamental factor that triggered it from
the start. People do not all wake up one morning and decide to panic. However, sometimes minor
events get blown out of proportion so severely, that the minor remedies, which would have suﬃced
at the start, are no longer operational once the cascade has reached full power.
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are useful in understanding the cycles of disaster, worry, and complacency which are
ubiquitous in the literature on large scale emergencies. If we apply this narrative to
the notion of risk taking on ﬁnancial markets, as described by Altunbas et al (2012),
we can again discern an important role for the availability and salience of memories,
thus adding to the literature on the risk taking channel. Investors become (overly)
careful after an eventful ﬁnancial crisis. But over time, once the recollections fade
away, investors become more careless again, hence yielding a procyclical eﬀect of
our memory on ﬁnancial cycles.
A second type of behavioral bias which is closely connected with our memory
heuristic is the representativeness bias. Gilovich (1991, p. 18) illustrates the char-
acteristics of this behavioral phenomenon comprehensibly: Representativeness is a
tendency to assess the similarity of outcomes, instances and categories on relatively
salient and even superﬁcial features, and then to use these assessments and similar-
ity as a basis of judgment. People assume like goes with like. Hence, it refers to the
inclination we frequently succumb to when we tend to distinguish patterns in the
data that is actually completely random. A well-known example is the belief in the
hot hand anomaly in basketball, where spectators (and even experienced coaches)
fondly believe that players score in streaks, thus urging their team frantically to pass
the ball to the player who is being successful at that instance (Tversky en Gilovich,
1989). A similar type of behavior is observed in ﬁnance, where money is often
transferred into funds that have recently outperformed the average benchmark, and
moves away from those that have done badly, thus abetting the existing temporary
momentum eﬀects (Taer, 2010). In other words, we fail to allow for regression
towards the mean, whereby the values return to their long term averages.
The representativeness bias originates from our tendency to overweigh salient
experiences in our future forecasts (Peterson, 2007). Welch (2001) examined the
estimates of professors on the expected annual equity risk premium for the next
thirty years through a number of surveys. He uncovered that recent market price
trends strongly inﬂuenced their future estimates. Hence, also academics seem to be
vulnerable to this instinctive behavior. Barberis (2012) signals that representative-
ness might have played an important in the evolution of the house prices preceding
the recent ﬁnancial crisis, by reinforcing the belief that house prices would keep
going up, because they had been mounting persistently for several years. Repre-
sentativeness thus embodies a possible externality which our memory heuristic can
trigger by inﬂuencing the way we form our beliefs and set our expectations, and
has the potential to invigorate cyclical patterns in economic activity by reinforcing
momentum eﬀects.
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4 Research
In contrast to the existing behavioral or neurologic literature related to the impact
of emotions on memory, we do not test the impact of abstract emotional stimuli
on memory. Classically, subjects are confronted with (pairs of) words (MacKay
et al, 2004), stories (Laney et al, 2004), pictures (Kensinger and Schacter, 2007),
movies (Kensinger, Garoﬀ-Eaton and Schacter, 2007), historical events (Sharot and
Phelps, 2007) with and without aﬀective connotation, after which a recall test or
a recognition test is executed, and the relative performance is analyzed. Typically,
emotional stimuli are remembered more accurately, but also more vividly, both
for positive and negative triggers (Mather and Sutherland, 2007). However, the
improved recollection does not always hold for all the elements of the experience,
and sometimes only the core (intrinsic/within) details receive the mnemonic beneﬁts,
due to a narrowing of the focus (Kensinger, 2009).
Although these experiments provide valuable information (and set out the basic
framework in the ﬁeld of eﬀective memory enhancements), we attempt to adapt this
setting by intervening directly in the lives of our participants, and by confronting
them with personally relevant emotional news facts. Hence, a whole group of people
is similarly aﬀected by a speciﬁc event that concerns them innately, allowing us to
look at the consequences in their recollection, and subsequent behavior. Speciﬁcally,
we examine the impact of (socio-)economic events on the memory, as we believe that
downward trends in the economy can be fortiﬁed through enhanced recollection
for these type of experiences, thus aﬀecting our sentiment and expectations, and
prolonging (and even enhancing) the negative spiral.
We provide three separate experiments, each time focusing on a diﬀerent socio-
economic element, and each time interrogating a diﬀerent group of participants.
The ﬁrst two are similar in nature. At the outset of the experiment, we provide our
subjects information, respectively on their schooling performance or on their labor
market conditions. In both cases, this material is presented as an oﬃcial document,
claiming to have been published by an oﬃcial government body (thus putting more
weight on the aﬀective content). Both groups subsequently perform a recall test
on the information they were received. The performance on this test is compared
with a control group. The latter receives the exact same information, but in their
case this centers around a comparable (but more distant) peer group, which should
leave them neutral. Hence, both of these experiments provide us with a preliminary
understanding on how real life (socio-)economic events can impact a certain group.
In the third experiment the subjects initially perform an investment exercise,
which yields a speciﬁc outcome (returns, standard deviations, etc.). This allows us
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to separate them in diﬀerent subgroups, depending on how they performed on their
investments. We grouped participants based on valence (high, neutral versus low),
as well as based on arousal strength (extreme percentiles versus neutral values). We
examined how these diﬀerent subgroups performed on a memory test, focusing on
diﬀerent ﬁnancial ratios. Consequently, we performed a `delayed' memory test (after
a one month period) in the same setting. This allows us to investigate what the pre-
cise channel is through which the mnemonic beneﬁt is established. If we consider the
consolidation process, we have to allow more time to allow these neural processes to
have their full eﬀect. Additionally, and most importantly, we investigate whether the
aﬀective event (and complementary enhanced recollection) can have a signiﬁcant im-
pact on the sentiment and expectations of the participants. Such a mechanism could
lead to spill-over eﬀects that would even aﬀect their decision-making. Thus, emo-
tional stimuli could inﬂuence real economic choices, simply through the impact they
have on memory. Economic downturns could therefore experience self-enhancing
and prolonging eﬀects, merely through the negative emotions they create.
4.1 Quantifying Eﬀects of Emotions on Memory
Participants
One hundred and three undergraduates from Ghent University16 (60 female and 43
male; mean age = 20.9 years, SD = 0.8) participated in the experiment. The respon-
dents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, either receiving emotional
stimuli (n = 59), or receiving neutral stimuli (n = 44). The subjects were informed
that they had to engage in reading a short segment about school performance, and
subsequently answer some questions concerning this information.
Design and Procedure
The participants were presented a short oﬃcial document (approximately one page)
appearing to have been published by the Committee on Education of the Flemish
community. It contains information on ﬁve diﬀerent topics (copy behavior, gram-
matical level, quality of tasks, English adequacy, team work) each incorporated in a
separate paragraph, with each paragraph containing two diﬀerent numerical values
(except the last two, which merely featured a description). We manipulated the
document so that all of the presented trends were negative, thus giving the readers
a dim view. The participants were randomly divided in two separate groups. The
ﬁrst group simply read about the educational performance of the group to which
16More speciﬁcally, from the department of applied economics
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they speciﬁcally belonged (`negative' emotional information). The second `placebo'
group was confronted with exactly the same text, however, now covering the educa-
tional performance of a related (but more remote) ﬁeld of study, towards which they
should be more indiﬀerent (neutral information). We allowed our subjects to take
in the information during a ﬁfteen minute interval, which was followed by another
ﬁfteen minute waiting period (as we wanted to allow some time for the diﬀerent
neural mechanisms to kick in), before they could precede answering.
We requested information from our respondents on three diﬀerent aspects. Firstly,
we examined the mood of the participants on thirteen diﬀerent topics17 with scales
from one to ﬁve. Secondly, and most importantly for our research question, we asked
the participants to recall numerical values on copy behavior, grammatical level and
the quality of tasks, as we want to examine the inﬂuence of aﬀective versus neutral
news concerning schooling on the memory performance of our participants. Specif-
ically, we ask them to provide the best possible guess on the committee value, but
additionally we also inquire what they think would be a more ﬁtting value, in their
subjective opinion.1819 Finally, we collect socio-economic and demographic infor-
mation20 on our subjects, which can potentially aﬀect our research question, and
thus enter our empirical framework as covariates. More speciﬁcally, we incorporate
age, gender, origin, income, religion, commuter (vs. local student) dummy, and a
credibility dummy (highlighting whether or not the respondent ﬁnds the document
Flemish Committee in line with their beliefs) We also include our mood variables as
covariates, but we apply a principle component analysis to reduce their dimension,
and thus extract four components.21 During this procedure no communication was
allowed an all participants had to perform the tasks individually. The task was
performed in an university aula as we wanted to monitor our subjects during the
task, as it was prohibited to take notes or collaborate with peers.
17Resentment, regret, shame, displeasure, anger, injustice, contempt, pity, conﬁdence, calm,
excitement, impatience, involvement
18Thus, next to the committee value, we also ask the participants to give a subjective value which
they feel might be more appropriate, to gauge whether their own perceptions are in line of those
provided by the commission. Similarly, we ask them to give an estimate of how many students will
pass this year based on the document of the committee and based on their own judgment.
19Included in this segment is also a question on English adequacy, even though they did not
receive any numerical value for this topics. Our motives to include such a gimmick is to test
whether their perceptional diﬀerence/similarity with the Committee would persist over a ﬁctional
category.
20Age, sex, place of residence, study program, family situation, income and religion
21Similarly, we construct simple arithmetic averages, based on the factor loadings.
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Results and discussion
We investigate the recollection error for the diﬀerent numerical values on the edu-
cational performance which were provided in the text, and which the participants
had to process. We gauge the discrepancy with the true values in two ways, ﬁrstly
through the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the recollection and the true
value (referred to as AV), and secondly through the squared value of the same diﬀer-
ence (referred to as SV), the latter assigning higher weights to stronger deviations.22
This initial test revealed that there were indeed signiﬁcant diﬀerences on the AV
measure for recollection precision between the two types of (emotional or neutral)
information, both for the copy information (Memotional = 6.12 vs. Mneutral =
12.09, F(1,102) = 5.644, p<.02) and the content on grammar (Memotional = 6.56
vs. Mneutral = 12.84, F(1,102) = 8.174, p<.006). However, the recollection rates for
the information on the quality of tasks were indistinguishable between both groups
(Memotional = 12.95 vs. Mneutral = 15.34, F(1,102) = 0.49, p=0.5). We achieve
comparable results using our SV measure (table 1). Moreover, both AV and SV re-
sults are conﬁrmed by applying planned contrasts. Similarly, adding our covariates
and performing an ANCOVA analysis did not profoundly change our results.23
This exercise reveals that our participants show considerable diﬀerent mnemonic
patterns for diﬀerent types of information provided to them, with aﬀective infor-
mation achieving the highest mnemonic advantage in comparison to neutral infor-
mation. Interestingly, not all categories show such an improvement, which can be
traced back to an attention narrowing eﬀect for the more emotional aspects of the
text (in casu, copy behavior and grammar content) (Easterbrook,1959; Kensinger,
2009, Mather, 2007) , or linked to the fact that the quality of tasks did stimulate
not comparatively as much arousal (Sutherland and Mather, 2011). However, we
can clearly see the impact on the recollection quality when participants are trig-
gered with negative (vs. neutral information) concerning their own personal school
performance. Hence, even such an artiﬁcial intervention (as we provide external
news elements on something to which they are well-acquainted, and which they live
through every day) can have a lasting and signiﬁcant impact on the way our subjects
remember events.
A comparison between the subjective values, which the participants would have
expected for these diﬀerent topics, and the exogenous values of the commission,
22When comparing the means of the two groups for the diﬀerent categories, this measure would
yield the notorious mean squared error value (MSE) which is classically used to compare such
numerical indicators (for example in the seminal paper by Meese and Rogof, 1983).
23In this context, none of our covariates seemed important for the recollection of emotional or
neutral information. These additional results can be requested from the author.
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allows us to unravel that there are no signiﬁcant between the neutral and the emo-
tional group on any of the topics (table 2). Thus, participants in both aﬀective
conditions seem to perceive the information by the committee as similar. Even for
the ﬁctional category English adequacy (for which we had not provided any infor-
mation) we ﬁnd similar responses in both groups, with the deviations relative to
the commission values being relatively high. Furthermore, our credibility dummy
reveals that not many participants (n=18) ﬁnd the report credible. When we ana-
lyze the diﬀerences concerning the credibility levels among aﬀective groups through
an multinomial logit estimator, again we ﬁnd no signiﬁcance inﬂuence of the un-
derlying group (coeﬃcient = 0.891, p=0.115).24 Hence, these additional tests seem
to highlight that across both groups we could not thoroughly adapt the beliefs of
our participants, in neither aﬀective condition. This makes sense because we merely
provide exogenous information on a topic for which they have already formed their
opinion. As this newly oﬀered information is opposite to their beliefs, they do not
readily incorporate this in their information set. However, despite the lack of cred-
ibility, the aﬀective nature of the events seems to inﬂuence our neural responses, to
such an extent that the subsequent memory enhancement concerning the school per-
formance of our participants is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent compared to a neutral placebo
group.
4.2 Study on impact of aﬀective versus neutral information
concerning labor market performance
Participants
Sixty two alumni25 from Ghent University (27 female and 35 male; mean age =
24.6 years, SD = 1.7) took part in the experiment. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two conditions: receiving emotional stimuli (n = 32) or neutral
stimuli (n = 30). The subjects were told that they had to engage in reading a short
piece on the job market conditions linked with their personal educational proﬁle
(or a related, but more distant educational proﬁle), and subsequently answer some
questions concerning this information.
24Moreover, our credibility dummy seems to be connected to the diﬀerence between the subjective
value and the commission value only for the topic of copy behavior, but not for any of the other
categories.
25More speciﬁcally graduates with a degree in applied economics
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Design and Procedure
The design for this second experiment is very similar in nature to our previous setup.
We presented our participants a short document on the labor market (approximately
one page) which appeared to have been prepared by the OECD. The document
featured ﬁve diﬀerent topics (salary, job satisfaction, days required to ﬁnd a new job,
ﬂexibility, and career opportunities) which were structured in separate paragraphs,
each featuring two numerical values about speciﬁc developments of (discussed) topic
at hand, except for the last two which merely feature a description. Similarly, we had
adapted the content as such to only highlight negative information, overwhelming
our participants with negative news facts about the labor market. We randomly
assign our participant to one of two conditions, which both rely on the same OECD
text, but in the ﬁrst condition the information speciﬁcally relates to labor market
conditions in the sphere of their own personal educational background (negative
emotion condition), while in the second condition the information alludes to labor
market conditions for a similar, but slightly more remote educational background,
which should aﬀect the participants to a lesser extent (neutral condition). The
participants were allowed ﬁfteen minutes to read the OECD report, followed by a
ﬁfteen minute waiting period, after which they answered our questions.
We interrogate our participants on three diﬀerent dimensions. Firstly, we have
the same mood variables which featured in our ﬁrst study, again on a scale from
one to ﬁve. Secondly, we ask our participants to reproduce some of the numerical
values, which were incorporated in the paper. More speciﬁcally, we ask them to
recall numbers concerning the ﬁrst three subjects. Additionally, we request for a
conﬁdence interval of the recollection values, which could be seen as a measure of
vividness. Next to their best guess of the OECD, we ask them to provide the value
which they personally seem most ﬁtting (thus allowing us to scrutinize whether they
follow the vision stipulated by the OECD). In a similar vein, we ask them to express
their views on the representativeness of the report through a percentage, together
with a (correlation) measure which indicates the aﬃnity they feel with the speciﬁc
labor market segment (neutral or emotional) they are confronted with. Thirdly, we
complete our survey with several socio-economical elements concerning age, gender,
commitment, work experience, income level, origin, religion. Combined with the
previously mentioned mood variables, these components can markedly enrich our
analysis.
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Results and discussion
Similarly, we initiate our analysis with the variables which gauge the recollection
error. More speciﬁcally, we compare the diﬀerence between the participants mem-
ory and the presented OECD value, expressed as an absolute value (AV) or as a
squared value (SV), for our two subgroups. Starting oﬀ with the AV measure, we
record signiﬁcantly better recollection values for emotional stimuli both concerning
salary (Memotional = 4.063 vs. Mneutral = 15.167, F(1,61) = 10.730, p<0.003)
as well as job satisfaction (Memotional = 4.314 vs. Mneutral = 14.1, F(1,61) =
11.481, p<0.002). However, there was no mnemonic beneﬁt for the required search
days (Memotional = 15.625 vs. Mneutral = 17.133, F(1,61) = 0.074, p=0.8). In
this context, a complementary measure for the aggregate diﬀerence in recollection
is provided by the total number of correct values for the diﬀerent subparts (Memo-
tional = 0.323 vs. Mneutral = 0.215, F(1,61) = 9.602, p<0.004). All of the above
results hold for the SV measure (table 3), but also remain valid when we include the
covariates (which do not provide any signiﬁcant inﬂuence) and augment our analysis
to an ANCOVA framework.26 Fully in line with our ﬁrst study, emotionally tinted
information leads to signiﬁcantly better performance in the recall tests, in compar-
ison with the benchmark of neutral information, at least for most of the measures
in our framework.
The conﬁdence levels we collected, alongside the recollection values of our par-
ticipants, allow us to control whether the memories for aﬀective stimuli are more
vivid than their neutral counterparts. (Kensinger and Schacter, 2008). However, we
do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant discrepancy in the conﬁdence levels of our two subgroups
across the diﬀerent categories (table 4). Thus, increased accuracy does not go hand
in hand with increased vividness. However, this lack of clarity in the memories of
our respondents seem to be closely linked with the lack of credibility our reports
yield for both types of stimuli. We employ three diﬀerent measures to gauge the
overall level of credibility. Firstly, when we scrutinize the values on representative-
ness, we cannot report any diﬀerences between the groups (table 5). Secondly, the
diﬀerence between the subjective value (which the respondents ﬁnd more truthful)
and the OECD value is undistinguishable between the emotional and the neutral
experience (table 6). Finally, the bond which they feel (measure through the cor-
relation) with each labor market segment (neutral or emotional), is not divergent
between both groups (table 5). Therefore, each element highlights that the subjects
26These additional results can be requested from the author. However, as they do not oﬀer any
additional value, and merely prove the robustness of our methodology, they were not incorporated
in the paper.
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did not voluntarily accept the information as being truthful. However, even without
a true internalization of the given information, there is still a big mnemonic beneﬁt
for aﬀective information over neutral stimuli.
Much in line with the results of our ﬁrst study, we can only interpret the analysis
on the eﬀect of news concerning the labor market as a recall test, because there is no
real impact on the respondents' decision making. The new aﬀective information is
not readily incorporated in the existing information set, as the provided information
is relatively secluded from the real life situation, which our participants know and
live every day. Despite this lack of coherence with one's own beliefs, it is fascinating
to still witness such a remarkable divergence in the mnemonic performance as a
consequence of the aﬀective ﬂavor which is added to the story.
Summarizing, although both experiments provide strong evidence on the mem-
ory enhancement of real life aﬀective experiences (concerning schooling and labor
market), we could not yet establish the existence of possible feedback eﬀects, as
these preliminary investigations did not allow us to markedly aﬀect the beliefs of
our participants. However, in our last experiments, we investigate a situation where
the participants are confronted with the results of their own behavior, and thus al-
low us to endeavor a more thorough investigations into the consequences mnemonic
improvements (due to the aﬀective nature of certain news events) can have on our
everyday lives.
5 Pass through of mnemonic eﬀects to economic ex-
pectations
5.1 1 Basic experiment: an investigation of investor behavior
Participants
One hundred and thirteen undergraduate students (40 female and 73 male; mean age
= 21.8 years, SD = 0.934) from Ghent University participated in this experiment.
All respondents were enrolled in the course of investment analysis and (divided in
small groups) they all took part in an investment exercise over a short term horizon
(of several months), where they had to choose assets out of ten general classes (taking
into account all of the practical ﬁnancial considerations). After the completion of
their task, they received a short report, which highlighted the performance of their
investment choices through various ﬁnancial ratios (return, standard deviation, beta
coeﬃcient, sharp ratio and Jensen's alpha). The students also received more general
feedback on the return, risk, and performance measures of the various available
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asset classes, and the individual correlations between these asset classes. At the
time they received their results, we intervened with our experiments, asking those
students that are willing to participate27 to follow the subsequent procedure. First,
we allowed ﬁfteen minutes for the participants to take in the information, describing
the outcome of their investment choices. They were instructed that they would have
to answer some questions about their individual performance. Next, we incorporated
a ﬁfteen minute waiting period, to allow all of the information to be absorbed.
Design and Procedure
Based on their personal beliefs about the investment outcome, we allowed the stu-
dents to indicate where they considered themselves on a hypothetical distribution
that incorporates all the student performances: below the tenth percentile, below
the twenty-ﬁfth percentile, at the median (benchmark), above the seventy-ﬁfth per-
centile, or above the ninetieth percentile. Such a representation allows us to separate
the participants in two distinct ways (each having their own beneﬁts). Firstly, we
have the option of constructing three groups, separating the underperformers (at the
low end of the distribution, combining the worst performing groups, hence induc-
ing negative emotions), the median performers (benchmark for neutral emotions),
and the best performers (at the high end of the distribution, taking together the
two best performing groups, yielding positive emotions).28 We refer to this ﬁrst
method as the `high-low separation'. Secondly, we create an alternative segmen-
tation method by grouping together the extreme positive and negative percentiles
(which should induce the highest arousal), similarly grouping together the positive
and negative quartiles devoid of the above extreme results (which should still induce
arousal, however, potentially less than the former percentiles), and ﬁnally again the
benchmark of median results (representing neutral stimuli). We refer to this second
method as the `extreme value separation'. Therefore, the groups are allowed to be
fabricated endogenously (simply as a result of the exercise) and are based on their
own subjective interpretation (which in real life (economic) decision-making would
also be the leading inducer) and not on objective or artiﬁcially administered crite-
ria. Moreover, our framework allows us to speciﬁcally investigate which eﬀects the
valence and the arousal strength of emotional stimuli can induce, two elements that
feature prominently in the literature.
In line with the previous experiments, we divide our questionnaire in three cate-
gories. Firstly, we asked our respondents about their state of mind after receiving the
27The participation to our experiment was kept voluntary. Hence, only seventy percent of the
total number of subscribed students took part in our study.
28Allowing us to test diﬀerences between negative, neutral and positive stimuli.
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investment results, through fourteen mood characteristics, scaled from one to ﬁve.29
Secondly, we perform the recollection tests for several of the ﬁnancial ratios (returns,
standard deviation, beta coeﬃcient and Jensen's alpha) concerning the personal in-
vestment results. In this section, we also inquire whether their results are due to
exogenous factors or whether they are the result of an implicit strategy. Moreover,
we obtain information about the subjects' assessment on the overall riskiness of their
endeavor. Finally, we collect socio-economic and demographic information30, which
could again enrich our further analysis.
Results and discussion
We apply the same procedure as in our previous experiments to calculate the recol-
lection error, respectively as the deviations between the recalled value and the true
outcome from their investment choices, expressed in absolute value (AV) or as a
squared diﬀerence (SV). Our analysis centers on the following three variables: the
return on the investments, the standard deviation, and the total amount of cor-
rect answers across all the categories (return, standard deviation, beta coeﬃcient
and Jensen's alpha).31 Starting oﬀ with the high-low separation and our deviations
expressed as AV, we unravel signiﬁcantly lower recollection errors concerning the
return values for our emotional subgroups in comparison with our neutral bench-
mark (Mhigh = 0.028 and Mlow= 0.017 vs. Mneutral = 0.070, F(2,105) = 3.048 ,
p=0.05). The planned contrast analysis conﬁrms that the emotional subgroups are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (p=0.64), while the diﬀerence between the
emotional stimuli and the neutral benchmark was signiﬁcant (p<0.04). However,
we cannot ﬁnd this emotional memory enhancement for the category of the stan-
dard deviations (Mhigh = 0.103 and Mlow= 0.111 vs. Mneutral = 0.128, F(2,87)
= 0.118 , p=0.89). Similarly, planned contrasts do not hint at the recollection rates
being distinguishably diﬀerent between the emotional stimuli (p=0.89), nor between
the emotional and the neutral stimuli (p=0.64). Hence, the attention of our stu-
dents might be captivated by the return values, which are perceived as being more
important. Young investors usually tend to focus too much on the yield they can
gather, and as a result become more oblivious towards other meaningful ﬁnancial
29We now also add the variable `amazement' to our thirteen previous mood characteristics.
30Age, gender, marital commitment, income and religion
31We do not report the separate results for the beta coeﬃcient and Jensen's alpha, as there is a
considerable amount of missing observations for the recollection values of the participants for these
categories. In contrast to the previous experiments, we did not enforce the participants to answer.
Hence, the blank values correspond with respondents who by no means could remember the true
value. Consequently, the amount of correct answers, gives us a more comprehensible estimate
on what the overall recollection rates were for all of our participants (not just a subgroup that
answered a particular domain).
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characteristics, potentially leading to several behavioral biases (Feng and Seasholes,
2005). Accordingly, this could lead to a case of attention narrowing, as originally
highlighted by Easterbrook (1959). Finally, the overall percentage of correct val-
ues is signiﬁcantly higher for both of the emotional experiences in comparison with
their neutral counterpart (Mhigh = 0.538 and Mlow= 0.535 vs. Mneutral = 0.362,
F(2,111) = 3.343 , p<0.04). More speciﬁcally, the contrasts unravel that the emo-
tional stimuli of diﬀerent valence do not diﬀer for this segment (p=0.96), while they
do diﬀer for the diﬀerent aﬀective perceptions (p<0.02).
When we perform a similar exercise for our extreme value separation, we get rel-
atively comparable results. However, now the interpretation is somewhat diﬀerent,
as we compare alternating strengths of the stimuli, and no longer diﬀerences in the
valence. Firstly, the recollection of the return values is remarkably better for both
strengths of the emotional stimuli (M10 = 0.023 and M25= 0.022 vs. Mneutral
= 0.070, F(2,105) =2.936, p=0.05). The planned contrasts exhibit signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between the emotional and the neutral stimuli (p<0.04), but not between
both types of aﬀective experience (p=0.94). Recollection rates for the standard
error, again are poor for all the categories alike (M10 = 0.098 and M25= 0.115
vs. Mneutral = 0.128, F(2,87) = 0.153 , p=0.86). The contrasts exhibit no in-
dividual diﬀerences between the aﬀective counterparts (p=0.77), nor between the
emotional and the impartial condition (p=0.63). Finally, the all-inclusive category,
given by the total number percentage of correct values, again allows us to diﬀer-
entiate between emotional and neutral memory enhancement (M10 = 0.501 and
M25= 0.557 vs. Mneutral = 0.362, F(2,111) = 3.353 , p<0.04). Consistent with our
previous results, the contrast between the neutral and the emotional event is signif-
icant (p<0.02), while this is not the case for the diﬀerent arousal types individually
(p=0.48).
Thus, nor the valence nor the arousal strength of the stimuli to which our par-
ticipants were exposed seem to have a meaningful impact on their recollection per-
formance. The only characteristic that eﬀectively and consistently seems to matter
for the mnemonic achievements is the aﬀective content of the experience. Using our
SV measure (table 7 and 8), or applying an ANCOVA framework to incorporate
our covariates, conﬁrms the above results.32 We conclude our experiment with two
remarkable observations on the high-low separation that ﬁt well with our previous
intuition. Firstly, when we inquire with our participants whether the result is due
to exogenous eﬀects, or due to their own strategic behavior33, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
32This ﬁnal robustness check can be obtained from the author.
33Expressed as zero being fully exogenous and one being completely a result of the chosen
strategy.
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diﬀerence between the valence of the stimuli (Mhigh = 0.727 and Mlow= 0.257 vs.
Mneutral = 0.523, F(2,109) = 8.536, p<0.001). Moreover, the planned contrasts
reveal that the diﬀerence is relevant for the diﬀerent types of valence (p<0.0001),
but not for the aﬀective versus neutral distinction (p=0.75). Secondly, when we
ask our respondents whether their investment decisions were risky or safe34, again
we discover a signiﬁcant diﬀerence across the valence (Mhigh = 1.970 and Mlow=
2.657 vs. Mneutral = 2.378, F(2,110) = 7.258 , p<0.002), with contrasts clarify-
ing that whether or not the stimuli exhibit emotional content is not aﬀecting this
outcome (p=0.65), but the valence does play an important role (p<0.0001). We
presume that there is an ex post evaluation of the investment outcomes which is
driving both of these ﬁndings. Whenever the results are perceived to be negative,
this induces cognitive dissonance, incentivizing the participants to look for explana-
tions that could take away the responsibility for these bad outcomes (Zajonc, 1980).
Thus, these additional tests emphasize that the emotional content of the stimuli in
this experiment does eﬀect the state of mind of our participants, which allows us to
investigate the consequences of these stimuli both on their expectations, as well as
on their subsequent behavior.
5.2 Delayed Memory Test and feedback to economic expec-
tations
Participants
Our participants belong to the same group of undergraduate students of the Uni-
versity Ghent, enrolled in the investment course. However, the respondents do not
perfectly match the earlier group. We now have one hundred and thee participants
(30 female and 73 male; mean age = 21.9 years, SD = 0.941). However, they have
all experienced the same types of stimuli, which are connected to the investment
results, and hence they are valid to be incorporated in our analysis.35
Design and Procedure
We examine whether the mnemonic beneﬁts of the emotional stimuli previously in-
duced by the investment outcome linger on after a one month period. This allows us
to infer whether the inﬂuence on the memory is merely a short term phenomenon by
aﬀecting our attention, or whether emotion can also aﬀect deeper memory processes
34On a scale from 1 to four, with one being risk free and four being very risky.
35As we are simply interested in comparing the quality of the groups that experience diﬀerent
stimuli, such a perfect match is not mandatory for our framework. Moreover, it can be interpreted
as an additional robustness check that we can reproduce our results with a slightly diﬀerent sample.
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at the consolidation stage and thus have long term consequences (Hamann, 2001;
Sharot and Phelps, 2004). For this purpose, we use the same separations (high-low
and extreme value) as in our previous test, but now we only focus on the recollec-
tion value on returns (which appeared to appropriate the most attention from our
respondents in our earlier analysis).
Additionally, we ask our participants to give their expectations about the yield
they could potentially achieve on the stock market in 201436, as well as their
prospects for GDP growth in Europe in 2014.37 This allows us to investigate whether
there are spillover eﬀects to their real life economic expectations, which are at the
core of their decision making process.38 Hence, we can scrutinize whether the diﬀer-
ent aﬀective stimuli do not only enhance memory, but also aﬀect our expectations
(through a prolonged focus on the positive or negative results). This segment there-
fore sheds light on our initial hypothesis whether neural properties, which dictate
how the brain handles emotional input and which have evolved historically, can
have implications on our economic sentiment, and thus contain a procyclical qual-
ity, which can propagate downturns or upswings in the economy.39
Results and discussion
Initiating the analysis with our high-low separation and considering our AV measure
for the recollection error, the memory eﬀects of emotional stimuli also hold for the
long run (Mhigh = 0.258 and Mlow= 0.341 vs. Mneutral = 0.491, F(2,100) = 3.402,
p<0.04). More precisely, the contrasts reveal that the diﬀerence between the means
is only signiﬁcant for the emotional content of the stimuli (p<0.02), but not for
the valence of the stimuli (p=0.4).40 We can therefore infer that emotional stimuli
have long-term mnemonic beneﬁts in our experimental setting, which implies that
the emotional stimuli also aﬀect the consolidation stage and not merely capture our
attention.
Turning to the expectations of our participants about the future outcomes, we
can start by saying that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the expectations about
the yield (Mhigh = 0.055 and Mlow= 0.047 vs. Mneutral = 0.051, F(2,100) = 0.365
, p=0.7), not when we compare emotional and neutral stimuli (p=0.96), nor when
36Yearly nominal (without correcting for inﬂation) excess (above risk free market rate) return
37Both forecasts are expressed by the respondents as a percentage.
38We only investigate this in the long run, as it might take some time to incorporate such external
stimuli in our expectations and hence in our decision making process.
39Although we mainly focus on the eﬀects of negative emotion, the reverse eﬀect could be through
during prosperous economic intervals (which might lead to bubbles).
40This result also holds for the extreme value separation (table 9), the SV measure, and the
ANCOVA framework for both (the latter can be obtained from the other).
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we consider the valence of the stimuli (p=0.4). This result could potentially be
induced by the fact that the period during which the exercise was performed was
quite bear, so that all of the participants (even those getting mildly positive results)
got aﬀected similarly beyond and above our investment exercise stimuli. Another
explanation could be that the expectation about yield are inﬂuenced by many other
factors, which in this case seem to blur out the enhanced eﬀects of the memory.41
However, we do ﬁnd a remarkable and signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the expectations
which the participants have about the future GDP rates (Mhigh = 0.039 and Mlow=
0.023 vs. Mneutral = 0.017, F(2,100) = 7.417, p<0.04). The contrasts reveal
that this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant when we compare (positive) emotional stimuli with
our neutral benchmark (p<0.003), and also between positive and negative stimuli
(p<0.04). Furthermore, the diﬀerence between the successful investors as opposed
to the median or unsuccessful investors also has economic signiﬁcance, with yearly
GDP forecasts for the former being on average two percent higher than the latter
groups. The economic signiﬁcance seem less ostensible when we compare the median
and unsuccessful investors.
Intuitively, it might be appealing to interpret the outcomes for the diﬀerent types
of investors (based on the outcome of the exercise) as proxies for the macroeconomic
environment in which they are typically found, which makes sense if one is willing
to accept that during upswings there are comparatively more positive stimuli, and
vice versa. This would imply that the prosperous investors should have rosier fore-
casts than the less successful groups (similarly as we uncovered), but also that the
investors with negative results would have dimmer views than their neutral coun-
terparts (which we could not retrieve). However, we have to keep in mind that all
of the investors in our experiment were confronted with the same economic condi-
tion, which was characterized by stagnant growth and a bear stock market. Hence,
investors with negative or neutral results may not have had any incentives to funda-
mentally adapt their expectations, which could explain the relative small divergence
in their forecasts (at least in economic sense).42
Nonetheless, this is a remarkable outcome, as the memory enhancement of emo-
tional items, seems to have long reaching consequences, potentially aﬀecting our
expectations and hence inﬂuencing the type of economic decisions we might take.
Even after one month the group of students which was aﬀected positively merely
41However, for each separate class, the deviations of these expectation of the respective means,
does seem to signiﬁcantly diﬀer over the diﬀerent classes. So memory enhancement could poten-
tially aﬀect future volatility.
42As opposed to the divergence with the forecasts of the fruitful investors, for whom the stimuli
provided a good motive to adapt their beliefs.
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through the results they obtained in a simple classroom investment exercise (with
no monetary consequences whatsoever) led to signiﬁcantly rosier GDP expectations
than their counterparts which had witnessed neutral or negative results in their
exercise. Consequently, considering the fact that in real life we encounter actual
monetary outcomes, and we are comparatively much more surrounded with repe-
titious news items (which endogenously increase during upswings or downturns),
this eﬀect could be even more pronounced, and could thus prolong or even enhance
certain cyclical episodes through our sentiment and our expectations.
6 Conclusions
Emotions have served an adaptive role during our historical evolution, and still pro-
vide an indispensable mechanism to provide swift responds (Ledoux, 1996). More-
over, they allow us to cope with complex situations in a proﬁcient manner (Simon,
1955) by using simple heuristics (Kahneman, 2009). However, their strength also
harbors their weakness, as their immediacy, swiftness and simplicity could provide
a disruptive force when confronted with some of the aspects (ranging from ﬁnancial
decisions to dietary choices) which are imbedded in the complex social architecture
we are surrounded with nowadays (Shiv et al, 2005). We could therefore beneﬁt
considerably from a better understanding on the way emotions may inﬂuence our
cognition, and ultimately also our choices in many walks of life. In our study, we
examine one such possible pass-through eﬀect from emotions to decision making,
in the context of ﬁnancial markets. We build on the existing knowledge that aﬀec-
tive information is processed, and hence remembered, comparatively more eﬃciently
than neutral events. If emotional stimuli lead to more salient memories, these have
the potential to impact our expectations and our sentiment more profoundly. These
neural linkages could, in turn, aﬀect our decision making, creating a procyclical ef-
fect, thus providing an emotional reinforcement for upswings or downturns in the
economy.
We perform three experiments to analyze whether emotional stimuli can en-
hance the memory capacities, but also whether they trickle down into the beliefs,
and possibly into the decision making framework of the participants. Our stud-
ies are speciﬁcally set in a socio-economic setting (schooling, labor market, and
ﬁnancial investments), and allow us to test whether we can extend the existence
literature to real life applications. In the ﬁrst two studies, we confront our partic-
ipants with information on everyday topics which have been manipulated in order
to diﬀerentiate between groups receiving neutral or emotional stimuli. This allows
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us to test whether these adaptations lead to mnemonic diﬀerences dependent on the
aﬀective nature of the events. The preliminary recall tests illustrate a signiﬁcantly
improved recollection for aﬀective information, both for the content on schooling
and for the information on the labor market. This provides an initial intuition that
the laboratory experiments which feature prominently in the existing literature, can
be applied to real life situations. However, these tests did not yet allow us to dig
deeper and examine the consequences of the aﬀective information on subsequent
sentiment, decision making and behavior.
For the purpose of examining whether emotions can trickle through in our de-
cision making, we next apply our framework to a group of respondents that have
participated in an investment analysis. This allows us to investigate a setting where
individuals are confronted with the outcome of their own decisions. Hence, this
content has a stronger impact on their beliefs, and subsequent expectations. But
more importantly, we ﬁnd that participants who had encountered positive results,
also have more rosy views about the future GDP than their neutral or negative
counterparts. This means that the emotional content (even without a real monetary
loss) can impact our memory, and in turn this can inﬂuence our expectations. For
example, during a downturn the salience of negative stimuli can lead to a drop in
conﬁdence, which can prolong and enhance the crisis, thus yielding a self-fulﬁlling
and enhancing eﬀect. In a downward spiral, which is often infected with negative
news, such a mechanism could have devastating eﬀects.
Of course, we are not claiming that this is the most important, nor that this
is the only channel through which negative episodes could get more pronounced.
However, we do provide a novel and valuable way of incorporating emotions into the
theoretical framework of business cycles. As such, we provide an explanations to the
underlying mechanisms which could be operating when there are informational cas-
cades (Bikhchandani et al, 1992) or when agents refute to herding behavior (Cipriani
and Guarino, 2008). Moreover, many authors (ranging from Keynes to Minksy and
Kindleberger) have hinted at the potential of such animal spirits aﬀecting, and this
could be one of the channels through which they could operate. Hence, our analysis
should warn policy makers that their eﬀorts in containing crisis situations (or vice
versa asset bubbles) also has an inseparable emotional aspect, next to the purely
economic rationale.
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Figure 1: Pass Through and Procyclicality of Aﬀective Stimuli
Dynamical ﬂows and connections running from emotions to economic decision mak-
ing, clarifying the pass-through mechanism of the memory heuristic and its procycli-
cal consequences
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Table 1: Recollection errors for the squared value method, in study 1.
Df Anova F Anova Sig. M(emo) M(neutral) Contrast
Copy 101 3.965 0.049 151.340 359.090 0.061
Grammar 101 6.696 0.011 99.140 368.930 0.027
Task 101 1.672 0.199 358.000 656.020 0.250
Table 2: Diﬀerence between the subjective value of the participants and the exoge-
nous value of the Commission, in study 1.
Df Anova F Anova Sig. M(emo) M(neutral) Contrast
Copy 101 0.200 0.656 12.800 11.750 0.656
Grammar 101 1.886 0.173 13.410 10.570 0.173
Task 101 0.013 0.911 9.320 9.110 0.911
English 101 0.847 0.360 12.360 14.640 0.360
Table 3: Recollection errors for squared value method, in study 2.
Df Anova F Anova Sig. M(emo) M(neutral) Contrast
Salery 61 6.725 0.012 63.063 536.233 0.018
Job Satisfact 61 6.641 0.012 47.250 426.633 0.018
Search Days 61 0.433 0.513 951.188 556.267 0.513
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Table 4: Conﬁdence levels, in study 2
Df Anova F Anova Sig. M(emo) M(neutral) Contrast
Salery 61 3.369 0.071 51.406 64.733 0.069
Job Satisfact 61 0.263 0.610 50.156 53.900 0.610
Search Days 61 0.000 0.998 67.188 67.167 0.998
Flexibility 61 0.997 0.322 35.645 28.517 0.322
Table 5: Representativeness and bond with labor market segment, in study 2
Df Anova F Anova Sig. M(emo) M(neutral) Contrast
Represent 61 1.972 0.165 50.313 59.400 0.160
Bond segm 61 0.764 0.386 58.969 53.833 0.391
Table 6: Diﬀerences between the subjective value of the participants and the exoge-
nous value of the Commission, in study 2
Df Anova F Anova Sig. M(emo) M(neutral) Contrast
Salery 61 0.115 0.736 13.094 11.967 0.736
Job Satisfact 61 0.366 0.547 9.375 7.967 0.547
Search Days 61 1.763 0.189 26.875 20.033 0.189
Flexibility 61 0.056 0.814 9.643 9.000 0.814
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Chapter 3
A Uniﬁed Market Liquidity Measure
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Abstract
We introduce a novel method (based on Illing and Liu (2006) and popularized by Holló
et al. (2012) through the CISS measure) to aggregate diﬀerent groups of liquidity mea-
sures (percent-cost proxies, cost-per-volume proxies, etc.), in order to accommodate for the
`diﬀerent dimensions of liquidity' (Amihud et al., 2005) through a single `uniﬁed' market-
wide aggregate liquidity metric. The weights for the multiple dimensions are time-varying
and depend on three components: the correlation between groups, the pressure conveyed
through the measure (threshold), and their conditional variance. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of our market liquidity measure in various ways. Most importantly, our liquidity
measure succeeds in tracking the most important historic episodes of ﬁnancial stress and
has a close relation with many crisis indicators. Moreover, our uniﬁed liquidity measure
shows the expected macroeconomic and ﬁnancial relationships mentioned in the literature,
and even has some predictive power for future growth rates of traditional variables. Fi-
nally, our methodology allows to gauge the individual importance of each liquidity group
over time. Our results unveil the spread and eﬀective tick liquidity groups as the main
protagonist during turbulent ﬁnancial periods.
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1 Introduction
Liquidity is a well-known concept in ﬁnancial1 and monetary2 economics. It has a
strong intuitive appeal and its disappearance, causing panic3, can often be linked
with well-known crisis events. Moreover, liquidity has played a prominent role in
the asset pricing literature over the past decades.4 Investors should worry about
a security's performance and tradability both in market downturns and when liq-
uidity dries up (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005, p. 405). However, despite its intu-
itive appeal, liquidity is an unobservable, endogenous and multidimensional concept
(Amihud et al., 2005). Hence, the shapes and guises which liquidity can take on are
numerous, time-varying and often impalpable. These three features are central in un-
derstanding our novel approach in constructing a comprehensive, all-encompassing
market liquidity measure.
Firstly, due to the fact that we are considering a latent variable, a precise and
concise deﬁnition is impossible, and the literature is littered with multiple, often
vaguely-deﬁned notions of liquidity (De Nicolò and Ivaschenko, 2009). Hence, it
can only be approximated through the measurement of liquidity-related quantities
or proxies (Hallin et al., 2011). But because of its elusive and slippery nature
(Kyle, 1985; Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003) these empirical measures can be markedly
disparate (Næs et al., 2011), often relying on diﬀerent methodologies.
Secondly, closely linked with the previous characteristic, liquidity is a multidi-
mensional concept (Fong et al., 2014; Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; Amihud et al.,
2005). Most acquainted are the three quintessential dimensions advanced by Kyle
(1985), namely depth, resilience and tightness, which all add up to a general feeling
of liquidity. These traits describe the ability of trading a substantial amount of
assets, quickly, at low cost, and at a reasonable price (Brennan et al., 2012; Harris,
2003).5 However, underlying the ease of converting an asset into cash (the ease
of trading a security) are many diﬀerent cost components and potential frictions
(Hallin et al., 2011; Amihud et al., 2005), some of which are explicit and easy to
1e.g. Sadka (2006); Mitchell et al. (2007); Roll et al. (2007); Chordia et al. (2008); Han and
Lesmond (2011); Avramov et al. (2015).
2e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (2012); Pedersen (2009); Bruno and Shin (2014).
3See Keynes (1936, p. 160) on the soothing eﬀect of liquidity on ﬁnancial markets: For the fact
that each individual investor ﬂatters himself that his commitment is `liquid' (though this cannot
be true for all investors collectively) calms his nerves and makes him much more willing to run a
risk.
4e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986); Bekaert et al. (2007); Chordia et al. (2009); Asparouhova
et al. (2010); Lee (2011); Brennan et al. (2012); Lou and Shu (2014).
5Gorton (2012, p. 48) points that market are liquid when all parties to a transaction know that
there are probably not any secrets to be known: no one knows anything about the collateral value
and everyone knows that no one knows anything. In that situation it is very easy to transact.
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measure, while others are more subtle. These costs include the bid-ask spread,
market-impact costs, delay and search costs, and brokerage commissions and fees
(Amihud and Mendelson, 2006). A more comprehensive list is included in Table
1. The search for the true meaning of liquidity has resulted into an intricate and
multi-layered concept, reminiscent of Polycephalic creatures in ancient mythology.
Hence, it is unfeasible for one single measure to capture all of the layers conveyed
within liquidity (Amihud et al. 2005; Hallin et al. 2011). As a result, low correlations
between diﬀerent individual measures do not necessarily entail that one is inferior
to the other. Instead, they could simply be gauging diﬀerent dimensions (Liang
and Wei, 2012). Moreover, there is evidence that even diﬀerent frequencies capture
diﬀerent phenomena (Vayanos and Wang, 2012). Unsurprisingly, we notice little
consensus on the eﬃcacy of many of the commonly used liquidity proxies. Many
authors simply apply a whole spectrum of liquidity measure in their analysis to ad-
vance a broader view of liquidity (Lam and Tam, 2011; Keene and Peterson, 2007),
as each proxy is considered to have its speciﬁc strengths and weaknesses, instead of
being mere substitutes (Lesmond, 2005; Vayanos and Wang, 2012).
Finally, adding to the complexity, liquidity is endogenous. It arises as the out-
come of trading patterns in ﬁnancial markets. Hence, liquidity depends on the total
volatility of the ﬁnancial system (Chordia et al., 2011). Pagano (1989, p. 269) warns
that Thinness and the related price volatility may become joint self-perpetuating
features of an equity market, irrespective of the volatility of asset fundamentals.
More broadly, the concept of liquidity is closely entwined with its macro-ﬁnance sur-
roundings through many diﬀerent concepts, including sentiment (Baker andWurgler,
2006), optimism (Tetlock, 2007), the economic environment (Hameed et al., 2010;
Næs et al., 2011; Rösch and Kaserer, 2013), monetary policy (Goyenko and Ukhov,
2009) and the state of the economy (Watanabe and Watanabe, 2008). Moreover,
it has leading and lagging relations with credit ratings (Odders-White and Ready,
2005; Avramov et al., 2009), and strong interlinkages with the interbank market
(Nyborg and Östberg, 2014). Hence, when we apply the Lucas critique (1976) to
ﬁnancial markets, and more speciﬁcally to the multi-layered concept of liquidity,
diﬀerent economic environments (with disparate shocks hitting the economy) can
inﬂuence the importance and even the ability of the liquidity measures to provide a
clear picture of the underlying threats.
We want to address these unique features head on, and introduce a novel mul-
tidimensional market liquidity measure which reunites the individual strengths of
diﬀerent groups of liquidity measures. Thus, our main goal is to construct a mea-
sure that embodies the investor's general feeling about the liquidity (based on all of
2
the potential underlying costs, frictions and asymmetries) of the US stock market.6
We build on the recent developments made on ﬁnancial crisis indicators (Oet et al.,
2011; Holló et al., 2012). Firstly, we construct eight separate groups of individual
liquidity measures by taking together measures that characterize similar dimensions
of liquidity. Next, we apply the portfolio approach (Illing and Liu, 2006) in order
to aggregate these groups of liquidity. We allow for the time-varying correlations
to determine the individual importance of every class of liquidity, as similarities
over the various measures indicate that several dimensions are picking up the same
signal. Up to this point, we merely provide an alternative aggregation method by
applying the portfolio approach instead of more classical common factor or principal
component methodologies (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Hallin et al., 2011). How-
ever, we expand the existent methodology, not solely relying on the commonality
across liquidity groups, by also allowing for idiosyncratic elements to aﬀect the mul-
tidimensional or uniﬁed liquidity measure through a time-varying weighting scheme,
whenever a speciﬁc group hints at extreme pressure relative to its peers. Because of
the discordant backgrounds of each liquidity measure, it is not unimaginable that
a single or several speciﬁc measures pick up a signal that the others ignore. Only
incorporating the diﬀerent dimensions as weighted by their correlations would im-
ply that we neglect such signals (as is the case with the common factor or principal
component methodology). Finally, we adjust our time-varying weights, by making
the assumption that volatile liquidity groups attract more investor attention than
tranquil groups, which would increase the importance of the former.7
Our multi-layered liquidity measure succeeds well in identifying episodes of ﬁ-
nancial crisis and recessions over a long sample period from 1957 to 2013. It is
closely linked with several well-established crisis indicators, and produces compara-
ble signal-to-noise ratios. Moreover, the novel measure exhibits a close relation with
various ﬁnancial and macroeconomic variables. We can additionally unravel real
spillovers from liquidity droughts, even assigning some forward looking power (in
the spirit of Næs et al. (2011)) for our liquidity measure above and beyond classical
forecasting variables. These features are relatively more robust and signiﬁcant than
for the existing liquidity proxies, thus reinforcing our belief that it is important to
6We decide to perform our aggregate method on the market as a whole, because of the increasing
importance of commonality in liquidity across stocks (Chordia et al., 2000; Huberman and Halka,
2001; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Kamara et al., 2008; Brockman et al., 2009; Rösch and Kaserer,
2013), and because of its importance in a macroeconomic framework. However, our approach can
readily be extended to the aggregation of diﬀerent liquidity measures on a stock-speciﬁc level. The
latter construct would be useful to incorporate in an asset pricing framework.
7We apply two methodologies, one by using the class speciﬁc volatility as a shrinkage factor,
and another by augmenting the weighting scheme with the volatility values. Both techniques seem
quite robust.
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take into account all of the liquidity dimensions. Moreover, our measure is easily
applicable and can be computed for long samples, as well as for many countries.
Whereas our analysis primarily consists of an aggregation method apt to handle
the speciﬁc challenges surrounding liquidity, it also allows for a comprehensive in-
spection of the importance of the constituent liquidity groups over time, and more
speciﬁcally during episodes of ﬁnancial stress. We uncover that the spread and et-
ick groups are the main protagonist during these turbulent periods. Depending on
the type of crisis, one (or both) of these groups appears in combination with the
amihud, roll and fong measure. Moreover, with the exception of the fong group,
these are exactly the groups that perform well in unraveling the univariate relations
with macroeconomic, ﬁnancial, and crisis variables. In contrast, the ﬂow, return and
volume group seem to be more valuable in understanding liquidity during tranquil
times. Hence, unifying these separate properties of each liquidity group allows for
the construction of a proxy which is better equipped to handle diﬀerent states of
the economy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores some strands of closely
related literature, whereas section 3 describes the construction method of our mul-
tifaceted or uniﬁed liquidity measure. Next, we examine how our liquidity measure
behaves over the business cycle and during ﬁnancial stress in Section 4, including
its interlinkages with macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables. Within this section
we also gauge the importance of the separate liquidity groups. Finally, Section 5
provides some concluding remarks.
2 Literature
Our approach is similar in vein to a number of recent studies. Liu (2006) intro-
duces a new measure that encompasses several dimensions of liquidity, including the
mostly ignored aspect of trading speed. He uncovers high correlation between his
novel measure and more traditional measures, which he interprets as evidence for its
multidimensional property. A more explicit way of combining diﬀerent attributes
can be found in Holden (2009), where integrated models (combining manifold at-
tributes) and multi-factor models (linear combinations of simpler models) have the
potential of diversifying away imperfectly-correlated error terms.
Next to the outright construction of new measures, several authors have at-
tempted principal component and common factor analyses, to crystallize the diﬀer-
ent features of liquidity into one single measure. Lesmond (2005) employs a factor
analysis to unveil whether a single liquidity factor is being captured by any, or all,
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of four traditional unidimensional liquidity estimators, as he is doubtful that an
individual measure can capture all of the potential liquidity features. Due to con-
cerns about scale diﬀerences between the liquidity estimators, he applies a maximum
likelihood factor.
Accordingly, in the context of market liquidity, Korajczyk and Sadka (2008)
attempt to assess an overall market liquidity measure based on several liquidity
measures via principal component methods. Their study focuses on combining in-
formation from various sources to form a common facet of asset liquidity. Similar
in vein, but technically divergent is the analysis of Hallin et al. (2011). Through a
Generalized Dynamic Factor Model (with block structure to provide a data-driven
deﬁnition of unobservable market liquidity and to assess the complementarity of two
observed liquidity measures) they succeed in identifying commonality over diﬀerent
liquidity measures.
Even though all of the above mentioned techniques have their particular mer-
its, we have to advance several remarks concerning their adaptation to this speciﬁc
setting. Firstly, several of these methodologies yield an unobservable systematic
liquidity measure, and leave no room for any measure-speciﬁc idiosyncrasy. They
count heavily on the commonality over the diﬀerent liquidity measures as the sole
feature which concerns the investor. Such an approach is quite restrictive, as for ex-
ample the return of a speciﬁc stock could also be inﬂuenced by a purely idiosyncratic
liquidity measure8, which should therefore be kept in the equation.9
Secondly, these methodologies only provide a purely statistical (black box) solu-
tion for performing the aggregation exercise. There is no economic intuition behind
the assemblage of the diﬀerent pieces. Moreover, the selection of the included vari-
ables seems to be done on an ad hoc basis, only including a limited number of
liquidity proxies, which precludes a complete account of all the potential liquidity
dimensions, in addition to the diﬃculty of reaching an agreement on which measures
to incorporate.10
Lastly, many of these studies commence by standardizing the raw liquidity mea-
sures, which are then aggregated through arithmetic averaging, principal component
8A individual liquidity measure is considered to be idiosyncratic if it diverges from the common
trend laid out by the other liquidity measures, but still contains valuable information.
9Up to a certain point, our methodology (applying time-varying correlations) provides an al-
ternative aggregation method to the more traditional principal component and common factor
techniques, and similarly focuses on the systematic components. However, we extend this pro-
cedure and also allow for idiosyncratic forces within the constituent liquidity groups to have an
impact. We further reﬁne this application by weighting this idiosyncratic information set by the
volatility.
10In contrast, our portfolio approach provides a more transparent way of performing the aggre-
gation exercise. Moreover, we try to incorporate the full array of liquidity measures.
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technique and common factor analysis. Holló et al. (2012) warn that standardized
variables might be sensitive to irregular observations, as many customary liquidity
measures violate the assumption of being normally distributed. Applying the prin-
ciple component analysis might further exacerbate the problem, as this technique is
also vulnerable to the presence of outliers.11
The recent state of the art liquidity literature also performs horse races in order
to single out the most accomplished liquidity measure, as opposed to lumping all of
the liquidity measures together in order to accommodate for the diﬀerent liquidity
dimensions.12 Interestingly, these studies provide valuable insight in the adequacy
of low frequency proxies in capturing the features of intraday data, thus legitimizing
the use of low frequency measures. However, there are also some drawbacks to this
methodology.
Firstly, high frequency data is only available for a relatively short period of
time in the US13, and is simply unobtainable for most other countries (Corwin and
Schultz, 2012; Hasbrouck, 2009). In contrast, their low frequency counterparts can
be formulated dating back eighty years in the US, and are available for various du-
rations across countries around the world (Holden, 2009). When considering asset
pricing tests, or similarly when performing macroeconomic analysis, researchers need
to rely on long time series, to ameliorate the power of their tests (Amihud et al.,
2005). More speciﬁcally, the limited availability of the high frequency data might
raise questions about the stability of the results while performing these horse races.
When comparing short timespans, the results might be driven by the underlying
forces and shocks in the economy which can change over time (Lucas Jr, 1976).
Hence, diﬀerent periods might reward alternating winners, as other dimension be-
come more important, or fade away over time.
Secondly, high-frequency benchmarks have a similar multidimensional nature
comparable to its low frequency equivalent. Hence, performing the horse races only
allows comparison within every dimension, resulting in a within-dimension winner, in
contrast to an overall (across-dimensions) superior measure.14 Our multidimensional
11We rely on conversion into order statistics using an empirical cumulative distribution function,
which also provides the advantage of delivering stationary and more consistent series of the diﬀerent
liquidity groups.
12Most well-known examples are Holden (2009), Goyenko et al. (2009) and Fong et al. (2014).
Moreover, Hasbrouck (2004) and Corwin and Schultz (2012) also compare their measures with
high-frequency benchmarks.
13In the US market, transaction data provided by the Institute for Study of Securities Markets
(ISSM) and TAQ databases are only available since 1983 (Chordia et al., 2009; Goyenko et al.,
2009).
14For example, Holden (2009) employs the percent eﬀective spread and the percent quoted
spread as high-frequency benchmark. Goyenko et al. (2009) relies on two spread benchmarks
and three price impact benchmarks. Fong et al. (2014) suggests four high-frequency percent-cost
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aggregation method might therefore also be useful (to unveil the latter) for the
intra-daily measures.
Finally, the use of high frequency data has its own speciﬁc micro-structural
problems ranging from inventory concerns to ﬁnding a suitable aggregation interval
for order ﬂows (Chordia et al., 2011).
3 Statistical Design
3.1 Basic Setup and Data
Albeit many authors refer to the multiple dimensions of liquidity, there are few
attempts at integrating this feature in an all-encompassing measure. Most of the
state of the art literature refutes to running horse races in order to ﬁnd the ﬁrst
best liquidity measure amongst its competitors. In contrast, we present a novel
uniﬁed market liquidity estimator which crystallizes the disparate liquidity groups
into a single value, and thus embodies the investor's general feeling about liquidity
in the US stock market. We build on the recent advances made on ﬁnancial crisis
indicators (Oet et al., 2011; Holló et al., 2012), and apply an advanced portfolio
approach (Illing and Liu, 2006) to perform the aggregation of the separate liquidity
groups.
Constructing our uniﬁed market liquidity measure consists of diﬀerent steps.
Initially, we standardize the rudimentary liquidity measures by converting them
into order statistics using their empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF).
Next, the twenty-one individual liquidity measures are grouped according to their
dimension. This results in eight separate liquidity groups. Finally, we reach our uni-
ﬁed market liquidity measure by taking into account the time-varying correlations
between the diﬀerent groups, but simultaneously allowing for (volatility-adjusted)
time-varying weights across groups. More precisely, we implement two extensions
to the traditional portfolio approach which better ﬁt to the needs of the liquid-
ity context under examination. Firstly, we augment our model by incorporating
time-varying weights based on the relative liquidity pressures for each dimension of
liquidity. This allows us to take into account the idiosyncratic signals of speciﬁc
liquidity groups. Secondly, we adjust our time-varying weights to take into account
the volatility of the particular group. The underlying idea is that highly volatile
liquidity measures grab more attention, and hence have more impact. Practically,
benchmarks and one high-frequency cost per volume benchmark. Corwin and Schultz incorporates
TAQ eﬀective spreads. Hasbrouck (2004) simply refers to estimates derived from detailed trade
and quote data.
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we apply two variations on this theme which have a very similar relative impact.
On the one hand we apply a `shrinkage factor' to dampen the tranquil episodes,
and on the other hand we incorporate an `augmentation factor' reinforcing volatile
outburst. Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the diﬀerent steps. The next
subsections explain and motivate each step in detail.
3.1.1 Data
In our analysis, we incorporate twenty-one liquidity proxies representing eight dif-
ferent spheres of liquidity, based on spread measures, Roll measures, (zero) returns
measures, Fong measures, eﬀective tick measures, Amihud measures, volume mea-
sures and order ﬂow measures.15 All measures are expressed as such to denote
illiquidity, and all measures are constructed on a monthly frequency. For this pur-
pose, we use daily data from the CRSP database, ranging from 1957 to 2013.16 We
include series on prices (high, low, bid and ask), shares outstanding, shares traded
and volume. An extensive survey on the construction of every individual liquidity
measure can be found in Table 2. We create market aggregates for each proxy by con-
structing market capital weighted averages of the stock-speciﬁc liquidity measures
for the ﬁve hundred stocks represented in the S&P500 in that particular month.17
3.1.2 Ordering
The rudimentary liquidity measures are standardized by converting them into order
statistics using their empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF). This pro-
cess is particularly critical for liquidity proxies because of diﬀerences in the unit of
measurement as well as in their scale (Lesmond, 2005; Vayanos and Wang, 2012).
Moreover, this transformation makes the liquidity measures robust to the inﬂux of
new information (Holló et al., 2012). We apply several alternative ordering tech-
niques. Firstly, the ordering is done based on the full sample. Next, we apply
subsamples based on changes in the underlying minimal tick size of the US stock ex-
change.18 Finally, we apply a rolling window method in which the ordering for each
15Of course, our list of liquidity proxies is not exhaustive. However, we have good reasons to
limit our set to these variables, as it allows for long data series (hence leaving out Chordia et al.,
2009), is robust for diﬀerent trading periods (therefore excluding the LOT measure) and is robust
at least on monthly (preferably on a daily) basis (for that reason excluding Hasbrouck, 2009).
16Initial date is chosen accordingly, as the required series for all S&P500 ﬁrms are only available
from that point onwards.
17We perform robustness tests with equally weighted alternatives, but this does not change our
results in a meaningful manner.
18We get three subsamples: the ﬁrst from the start of the sample up to June 1997 (change in the
tick size from one sixteenth to one eight; the ﬁrst time in history that an exchange had modiﬁed
the minimum tick size); the second from July 1997 till February 2001 (change in tick size from
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day is based on the last ﬁve years preceding that day (which shortens the sample to
1962-2013, as we lose the ﬁrst ﬁve years of observations). This last approach accom-
modates the idea that investors have short memory. When gauging the particular
impact of a liquidity measure, they would therefore mainly look at the short term
window of the past ﬁve years.19 Moreover, this `short memory' feature alleviates the
potential problem of event reclassiﬁcation which is prevalent with measures whose
empirical setup thoroughly banks on stable distributional features, as is customary
in limited samples (Holló et al., 2012). Additionally, we achieve a more sensible
representation of liquidity over time by evaluating the variable in relation to its im-
mediate environment. After all, over long samples, many liquidity measures show
dramatic drops simply due to their construction method (often due to an increase in
the activity on the stock market in recent decades), indicating that recent illiquidity
pressures are negligible in comparison to historic ones. However, for the present day
investor these (seemingly understated) liquidity events embody very real treats.
Finally, this local evaluation leads the variables not only to be consistent, but
also stationary. Table 3 highlights that standard unit root tests cannot reject the
hypothesis that several liquidity groups based on the full sample ordering technique
contain unit roots. More speciﬁcally, the returns, fong, etick, amihud and volume
groups appear to be non-stationary.20 However, these groups all exhibit stationary
time series when we apply a more local ordering, through breakpoints or with a
ﬁve year rolling window. The latter has the additional advantage that we do not
have to exogenously administer the breakpoint dates, which can provide additional
diﬃculties as additional data is added to the time-series.21 Hence, for the remainder
of the paper, we use the rolling window ordering method.
3.1.3 Liquidity Groups
In a next step, the measures for the eight separate liquidity groups, denoted by li,t,
are then formed by taking the simple arithmetic mean of the individual measures
one sixteenth to one cent on the NYSE; this happens for all stocks in April 2001, but the choice
between the two dates does not change the results); the ﬁnal from March 2001 onwards till the end
of the sample (Bessembinder, 2003; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000). Corwin and Schultz (2012)
apply a comparable division in their analysis of the correlation between liquidity measures, and
Holden (2009) similarly does so in the construction of the eﬀective tick measure.
19Admittedly, the time frame of ﬁve years could be seen as arbitrary. However, the measure is
robust for a time frame of ten years. The only diﬀerence is that the liquidity groups exhibit less
volatility, and thus feature comparatively less idiosyncratic pressure with the ten year alternative.
20With the Perron test this is limited to the etick, amihud and volume group.
21Moreover, as breakpoints diﬀer across countries, this methodology does not allow a uniform
approach for cross-country comparison.
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zi,j,t belonging to each group (i = 1, . . . , 8):
li,t =
1
n
n∑
j=1
zi,j,t
with n the number of individual measures belonging to each group and t the time
period. Index j refers to the individual measure of a speciﬁc liquidity group. The
formation of the groups is based on the underlying dimension. A more detailed
account can be obtained in Figure 1.
3.2 Time-Varying Correlations (Portfolio Approach)
We reach our multidimensional or uniﬁed market liquidity measure Lt by applying
the portfolio approach to the eight groups, i.e.
Lt = (wt ◦ lt)Ct(wt ◦ lt)′
where Ct denotes the matrix of time-varying cross-correlations (measured with ex-
ponentially weighted moving averages with a decay factor of .94), lt the vector of
liquidity group measures and wt the vector of weights attached to the liquidity
groups, which are set equally up to this point.22 The rationale behind this approach
is that every market liquidity measure can theoretically be broken down into a sys-
tematic component and its idiosyncratic counterpart (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008).
On the one hand, the diﬀerent liquidity groups might represent imperfect proxies of
the same true underlying concept of liquidity (Amihud et al., 2005; Lesmond, 2005).
On the other hand, they might gauge diﬀerent dimensions of liquidity that are inter-
connected with each other (thus measuring closely related concepts). By using the
portfolio approach, an individual liquidity group aﬀects our uniﬁed liquidity measure
to the extent that they are correlated with the other liquidity groups. When sev-
eral groups simultaneously indicate a dry spell in liquidity, we want them to receive
relatively more weight, as this would point towards several dimensions picking up
the same signal or characteristic.23 This is accounted for by our matrix Ct. Hence,
up to this point, we simply provide an alternative to the more traditional principal
component and common factor analysis (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Hallin et al.,
22wt ◦ lt represents the Hadamard-product, i.e. element-by-element multiplication of the vector
of weights and the vector of liquidity group measures.
23Amihud et al. (1990, pp. 65-66) already acknowledged that components of illiquidity cost are
highly correlated, as stocks that have high bid-ask spreads also have high transaction fees and high
search and market-impact costs, and are thinly traded. When the bid-ask spread widens, it signals
that immediacy of execution is more costly, that is, asset liquidity is lower.
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2011), solely relying on the systematic liquidity elements to perform the aggregation.
Table 4 provides some summary statistics for the time-varying correlations of
each speciﬁc group measure with the seven other group measures. Panel A high-
lights values for the mean, standard deviation and the interquartile ranges (IQ).
Panel B shows sample averages for the full sample period (n = 624), but also diﬀer-
entiates between the crisis periods24 (n = 111) and tranquil times (n = 513). The
interquartile values in Panel A show that correlations shift considerably over time.
Panel B reveals though that the timing does not exactly correspond with the crisis
periods. Possibly the correlations only change after such events. Overall, the results
justify the use of time-varying cross-correlations in our methodology.
3.3 Time-Varying Weights
3.3.1 Methodology
Up to this point, we have mainly followed the approach by Holló et al. (2012).
However, we customize the existing approach to better ﬁt the needs of the liquidity
context that we are examining. As our groups consist of imperfect proxies that gauge
the same concept from diﬀerent viewing points (fundamental and distinct aspects
of illiquidity, as pointed out by Vayanos and Wang (2012)), it is possible that a
single or several speciﬁc measures pick up a signal that the other groups (because
of their speciﬁc construction method) do not pick up on. Merely incorporating the
diﬀerent dimensions as weighted by their correlations would imply that we interpret
this signal as noise, and hence would be weighted less relative to the other groups.
However, if this signal is strong, it could be hinting at an important feature that the
other groups are not able to pick up on. We would therefore also like to account for
these idiosyncratic signals, in our weighting scheme. For this purpose, we enhance
our model by incorporating time-varying weights based on the relative illiquidity
pressures in every group.25 The weighting function wi,t of group i at time t is
modeled as an exponential function of the deviation of the group-speciﬁc liquidity
24Crisis periods are deﬁned as historic ﬁnancial stress events (as explained in Section 4.1), com-
bined with the recession periods during the sample from January 1962 up to December 2013.
25The CISS methodology only incorporates ﬁxed weights for the full sample, based on the impact
of each group on the economy. However, this could introduce endogeneity issues in the identiﬁcation
of the importance of every group.
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value li,t at time t minus an arbitrary threshold T 26:
wi,t =
exp(li,t − T )∑8
i=1 exp(li,t − T )
.
This function ensures that higher deviations (which point at stronger signals or
higher pressure) get higher weights. We force the weights to sum to one over the
diﬀerent groups, and are therefore only interested in the relative pressures which are
present in our system of liquidity groups. If all the groups are similarly exceeding
their threshold, they simply receive equal weights.
3.3.2 Volatility Adjustment
We also include another explicit aspect of investor behavior based on the literature
about limited attention (Kahneman, 1973) and the use of heuristics (Gigerenzer,
2008).27 Closer to our story, there are several studies examining limited attention
in the stock market (Corwin and Coughenour, 2008; Huang and Liu, 2007). With
the full spectrum of information, we cannot expect an individual investor to pick
up all the relevant signals to make his decision. We suspect that signals that are
more volatile will also attract more attention.28 More speciﬁcally, investors will be
aﬀected more by episodes of high relative idiosyncratic pressure in a speciﬁc group, if
this relative pressure reveals itself in an irregular, unexpected manner. For example,
if the illiquidity pressure in the group is comparatively high, this would yield a high
weight in the previous setting. But if it has been that high for the past ﬁve months,
then the investor would be accustomed to that stance, and would have already
taking the necessary precautionary steps, thus being less aﬀected by it lingering. In
contrast, a similar amount of pressure, brought about virulently, with high volatility,
will bring about a more pronounced impact. Attention grabbing liquidity groups
may have a similar impact as attention grabbing stocks (`all that glitters'), when
there are many to choose from (Barber and Odean, 2008). We therefore adjust
our weighting function to take into account the volatility of the particular group.29
26As our liquidity proxies are between zero and one, imagine a threshold of 0.75, where values
above the threshold are weighted more strongly (see formula). However, as we force the respective
weights over all the groups to sum to one, we simply examine relative values, and the outcome
becomes independent of the chosen threshold.
27We do not want to construct an abstract theoretical construct that relates to the real life
investor experience, as for example Goyenko et al. (2009) remark that there is little evidence that
any liquidity measure is related to the investor experience.
28Including a threshold and integrating a volatility metric is reminiscent of option pricing models,
something already noticed by Copeland and Galai (1983).
29The downside is that the weights of the groups do not sum up to one, due to the shrinkage,
so we lose some comparability with the previous weighting schemes. However, this approach is
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Using volatility as a weighting factor for diﬀerent groups is not uncommon. For
example Gerdesmeier et al. (2011) apply weights based on the volatility of diﬀerent
asset classes in setting up their early warning indicator. Practically, we apply two
variations on this theme which have a very similar relative impact. Firstly, we apply
a `shrinkage factor' to dampen the tranquil episodes:
wsi,t =
exp(li,t − T ) ∗ σ2i,t∑8
i=1 exp(li,t − T )
where σ2i,t is the volatility (measured with exponentially weighted moving averages
with a decay factor of .94) of liquidity measure li,t of group i at time t. Secondly,
we built an alternative version where volatility interacts with the liquidity measure
itself, leading to a volatility augmented approach:30
wai,t =
exp(li,t − T ) + (σ2i,t ∗ li)∑8
i=1
[
exp(li,t − T ) + (σ2i,t ∗ li)
] .
According to this model, volatility outbursts are reinforced for higher levels of illiq-
uidity. Both volatility-adjusted weighting functions wsi,t and wai,t allow us to ac-
count for the heuristic approach many investors rely on.31
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
To get a full understanding of the diﬀerent weighting functions, we look closely
at the dynamics of our uniﬁed liquidity measure and the underlying time-varying
weighting schemes. Table 5 reports the average values for our uniﬁed liquidity mea-
sure based on the four diﬀerent weighting schemes, namely ﬁxed weights w, basic
time-varying weights wi,t, volatility shrinkage time-varying weights wsi,t and volatil-
ity augmented time-varying weights wai,t. We present the average values over the
full sample period, but also diﬀerentiate between crisis periods and tranquil times
(as explained in Section 3.2). As the diﬀerent construction methods do not allow a
clear-cut comparison across methodology for the absolute values, we merely focus
on the relative changes (expressed as percentage) in the average illiquidity values
for the diﬀerent weighting options. Moving from the full sample to the tranquil
subsample, illiquidity values based on wi,t, wi,t, and wai,t exhibit comparable ﬂuc-
tuations whereas the drop for their wsi,t based counterpart is comparatively larger.
intuitively appealing and yields the most powerful results.
30With the additional advantage that this methodology allows the weights to sum to one again.
31An additional feature for future work could be to allow the threshold to change for up and
down markets.
13
This diﬀerence is even more pronounced when we switch from the full sample to
the turbulent sub-period. While this increase is above ﬁfty percent for the wsi,t
methodology, it only amounts to thirty-three percent with the other options. This
suggests that the preferred volatility shrinkage methodology succeeds best at captur-
ing the expected pattern of higher relative illiquidity values during crisis times (and
conversely lower values during tranquil times) in comparison with its full sample
counterpart. For the remainder of the paper, we focus on this speciﬁc application
of our uniﬁed liquidity measure, unless we mention it explicitly.
A more detailed understanding of the driving forces for the above mentioned
shifts can be obtained by looking more closely at the dynamics in the underlying
time-varying weighting schemes. This allows us to unravel how our uniﬁed liquidity
measure is built up (for the diﬀerent alternatives), and how the importance of the
diﬀerent groups can shift over time. In Table 6 we can clearly distinguish three
diﬀerent trends among the weights of the constituent groups. Firstly, for some
groups these weights markedly increase during the crisis timespan, and decrease
(slightly) during the tranquil period. This is most pronounced for the spread, etick
and amihud group, and holds to a lesser extent for the roll group. Secondly, the
opposite trend, where the weights decrease noticeably during crisis and increase
(moderately) in tranquil times, is present for the returns group, and to a lesser
extent for the fong and volume group. The third group merely consists of the order
ﬂow, which is visibly unaﬀected but the diﬀerent subsamples. These results are
further reﬁned in Section 4.4 where we analyze in detail which groups contribute
more/less during well-known historic episodes of ﬁnancial stress.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Identifying Financial Stress
4.1.1 Financial Stress Events
Since the eighties, we have witnessed several market crisis which were closely asso-
ciated with liquidity spirals, focusing the attention of researchers and policymakers
towards understanding the dynamics of liquidity (Brennan et al., 2012; Liang and
Wei, 2012). Figure 2 displays our uniﬁed market liquidity measure together with
the NBER recessions and a list of episodes that are linked with ﬁnancial pressure.32
Many of the upswings in illiquidity systematically coincide with market downturns,
32The list is based on Hubrich and Tetlow (2015), who document ﬁnancial events aﬀecting the
US Economy from 1986 till 2012, which we expand for our full dataset.
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consistent with the existing literature (Chordia et al., 2001; Jones, 2002; Amihud
and Mendelson, 2006; Næs et al., 2011). Chronologically, we can discern following
major events.33 Firstly, we can discern a brief episode of domestic political unrest
in 1970, matched with a spike in illiquidity. The second major hike in the multi-
dimensional liquidity measure corresponds with the oil embargo in November 1973.
Moreover, illiquidity remained relatively high in the seventies (Chordia et al., 2001;
Jones, 2002). Thirdly, the early eighties witnessed a double dip recession. During
the aftermath of the second oil crisis, a recession was triggered due to Paul Volcker's
shift in monetary policy (Rotemberg, 2013), which was followed with a debt crisis
in Latin American. Fourthly, we highlight the stock market collapse in October
1987, during which the ﬁnancial markets were highly illiquid (Grossman and Miller,
1988; Brennan et al., 2012). The crash was partly attributable to a decline in in-
vestors' awareness of the general market liquidity in comparison to pre-crash level
(Amihud et al., 1990). Fifthly, after witnessing spurts of illiquidity during the Iraq
invasion (and ensuing recession) as well as during the Mexican Peso crisis, we reach
the Asian crisis in 1997, shortly thereafter succeeded by the collapse of Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) combined with the Russian debt crises. Both of these
events can be separately discerned by means of our liquidity proxy (Chordia et al.,
2001; Lesmond, 2005). Sixthly, a remarkable feature about the tech bubble burst
in 2000 is that the illiquidity levels already skyrocketed just before the recession
really kicked in. Finally, the most recent ﬁnancial crisis witnessed a twenty percent
drop in stock markets around the world in the second week of October 2008 due
to the scarceness in liquidity (Brennan et al., 2012). Concerns about liquidity kept
global equity markets tumbling until March 2009. Hence, shortage or abundance of
liquidity can ravage or buttress stock markets (Liang and Wei (2012)).
The behavior of liquidity during ﬁnancial distress highlights that market liquid-
ity evaporates when it is most necessary, during market turmoil and in periods of
crisis. Market risk and liquidity risk seem therefore to be closely connected, with
investors simultaneously being hit by both factors (Rösch and Kaserer, 2013). Our
multifaceted liquidity measure succeeds well in capturing these rich dynamics and
succeeds proﬁciently in identifying historical episodes of ﬁnancial stress.
Table 7 shows that our constructed liquidity measure also has some rapport with
other well-known crisis indicators. Certainly, during the past decades, market crises
seem to have been closely associated with ﬁnancial pressures and liquidity spirals
(Liang and Wei, 2012). The regression results reported underpin what we presented
33We merely want to provide the reader some examples, as we do not want to dissect this
anecdotal analysis in too many details.
15
visually in Figure 2. However, this relation does not hold uniformly over all the
incorporated crisis measures. Whereas liquidity seems to be connected to certain
elements of the Cleveland Financial Stress Index (CFSI), namely the contribution
of the interbank or funding markets (CFSI-IB-FUND) and the interbank liquidity
spread (CFSI-IB-LIQ), this relation cannot be retrieved with the overall CFSI it-
self.34 However, our uniﬁed market liquidity measure does show kinship with the
concepts of the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI), the Kansas City Fi-
nancial Stress Index (KCFSI)35, Smoothed U.S. Recession Probabilities (REC P),
the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (SLFSI), Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business
conditions index (ADSBCI)36 and the Financial Stress index measured by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF FSI).37
4.1.2 Signal-to-Noise Ratio
Even though our uniﬁed liquidity measure is merely constructed with the goal of
capturing all of the dimensions of liquidity simultaneously and hence not primarily
set up to retrieve ﬁnancial stress events, we can use the close association between
such events and the disappearance of liquidity as a general indication of its perfor-
mance.38 In order to uncover the historic dates necessary for the calculation of our
signal-to-noise ratios, we follow Christensen and Li (2014) in describing a ﬁnancial
stress event as the moment when the ﬁnancial stress index (FSI) exceeds an extreme
value:
fin stresst =
1 if FSIt > µFSI + kσFSI0 otherwise
where µFSI is the sample mean of the FSI and σFSI the sample standard deviation.
However, as we do not want to be reliant on a single ﬁnancial stress index, we apply
this methodology to several well-known FSI's.39 In order to detect the stress events,
34Similarly, there is no signiﬁcant relation with the Flight-to-Safety measure constructed by
Baele et al. (2015).
35Albeit, only at a higher signiﬁcance level.
36All these ﬁnancial stress indicators and (business or ﬁnancial) condition indices were obtained
from the FRED database, which is provided by the St. Louis Fed.
37Gibson and Mougeot (2004) also ﬁnd evidence that the time-varying liquidity risk premium in
the U.S. stock market is associated with a recession index.
38However, the occurrence of illiquidity with such stress events does not necessarily have to be
simultaneous. The dynamics in liquidity could have a leading or lagging pattern, depending on the
type of event, and underlying causes.
39We employ the following stress indices: the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI),
the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI), the Cleveland Financial Stress Index (CFSI),
the International Monetary Fund U.S. Financial Stress Index (IMF FSI); in combination with
the following condition indices: the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI), the Bloomberg
Financial Conditions Index (BFCI), the Citi ﬁnancial conditions index (CFCI) and the Aruoba-
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we set k = 1.5, similar to Christensen and Li (2014).40 In our analysis, we focus
on the signal-to-noise ratio, as well as the number of ﬁnancial stress events which
were distinguished correctly, and similarly the number of no stress events unraveled
appropriately. When we analyze the data, the following four situations can be dis-
cerned, as described in Panel A of Table 8: a ﬁnancial stress event signaled by our
measure (A), a ﬁnancial stress event not signaled by our measure (C), a no ﬁnan-
cial stress event miscorrectly signaled as stress event (B), and a no ﬁnancial stress
event correctly not being signaled (D). The signal-to-noise ratio can then be sum-
marized by [B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)], the number of crisis events signaled correctly by
[A/(A+C)], and the number of non-crisis events signaled correctly by [D/(D+B)].
Panel B of Table 8 compares the signal-to-noise ratio for our uniﬁed market
liquidity measure with those for two established ﬁnancial conditions indicators,
more speciﬁcally the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) and the Aruoba-
Diebold-Scotti business conditions index (ADSBCI).41 The values are similar to the
NFCI index, and slightly worse than the ADSBCI. We can therefore conclude that
our measure performs comparatively well.42 We have to keep in mind that our liq-
uidity construct only takes into account one very speciﬁc market, namely the stock
market (S&P500 stocks), it merely incorporates a very limited amount of data series
on these stocks, and it is not designed with the aim of detecting crisis events, but
solely with the purpose of unraveling illiquidity. In contrast, the ﬁnancial conditions
index looks at very many diﬀerent markets, and combines the information of many
data series, speciﬁcally in order to optimally detect the speciﬁc conditions of the
economy.
Panel C of Table 8 examines the signal-to-noise ratios for the several diﬀerent
weighting methods underlying our liquidity measure. The liquidity measure with the
volatility adjusted weights (wsi,t and wai,t) perform relatively better than their more
basic counterparts.43 Hence, this provides additional evidence that the volatility
corrections are valuable extensions in constructing a sensible liquidity measure.
Diebold-Scotti business conditions index (ADSBCI). We identify the stress events based on each of
these indices and then evaluate an observation to contain ﬁnancial stress when the average exceeds
.5, hence when at least half of the available indices for that observation hint at stress.
40Alternatively, Illing and Liu (2006) set k = 2, whereas Cardarelli et al. (2009) apply k = 1.
However, these adjustments do not change the identiﬁed crisis moments profoundly.
41We limit our comparison to the ADSBCI and the NFCI, as these have long-running data series.
42As a robustness test, we perform a similar exercise with dates based on anecdotal evidence, as
given by the important historical ﬁnancial stress events discussed in Section 4.1.1. For our uniﬁed
measure and NFCI the results are still comparable. In contrast, the ADSBCI is slightly superior
in this setting. These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
43Similarly, we perform this exercise with the anecdotal dates. The results are comparable, with
the distinction of the wsi,t now also being superior to wai,t, thus reaﬃrming our choice as the
preferred metric.
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4.2 Link with Financial and Macroeconomic Variables
In this section, we examine the basic comovement of our uniﬁed market liquidity
measure with a large number of ﬁnancial and economic variables (as conducted in
Baele et al., 2015; and speciﬁcally for liquidity measures in Brennan et al. (2012)).
We learn that our measure behaves in accordance to general ﬁnancial and macroeco-
nomic theory and intuition. We ﬁnd similar interlinkages for the alternative weight-
ing methods of our uniﬁed liquidity measure, albeit these relations are considerably
less pronounced, uniformly exhibiting lower R2 values for all of the subcategories.
The results are summarized in Tables 9 to 11.
When looking at the comovement of illiquidity with conﬁdence indicators (see
Panel A of Table 9), we retrieve the expected negative relation, where higher illiquid-
ity coincides with lower levels of conﬁdence (Baker and Stein, 2004). This relation
holds for the business tendency survey, consumer opinion survey and inventory sen-
timent index. The sign is diﬀerent for the inventory sentiment index, as an increase
in this index leads to a greater degree of discomfort with current levels of inventory.
Similarly, we would expect illiquidity to match with higher uncertainty. However,
we cannot retrieve a signiﬁcant relationship in this context (see Panel B of Table 9).
A number of empirical studies have found that thin speculative markets are
ceteris paribus more volatile than deep ones (Pagano, 1989, p. 269). More re-
cently, Brennan et al. (2012) unravel that their market wide illiquidity proxies are
signiﬁcantly positively correlated with TED spread as well as with implied market
volatility measure (VIX).44 In a similar vein, Nyborg and Östberg (2014) report that
the market share of volume for more liquid stocks expands with Libor-OIS spread,
above and beyond what can be explained by the VIX.45 Correspondingly, on a stock
speciﬁc level, Han and Lesmond (2011) report a robust positive correlation between
idiosyncratic volatility and liquidity. The same type of interdependence between
liquidity and total volatility is highlighted in Chordia et al. (2009). We detect a
similar positive relation between illiquidity and the market speciﬁc variants of im-
plied volatility, with the highest adjusted R-squared for the market indices most
closely related to the construction of our uniﬁed market liquidity index (see Panel A
of Table 10). The same story holds for the TED spread, as well as for the diﬀerent
modalities of the option adjusted spreads (ranging from AAA to higher yielding
spreads), as visualized in Panel B of Table 10.
When we examine the relation of our market liquidity measure with measures
indicating the capacity of the economy, we get a mixed picture (see Table 11).
44Both values are typically associated with funding liquidity (Asness et al., 2013)
45The market share of volume of more liquid stocks is also increasing in the VIX itself.
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Whereas the linkages between illiquidity and the growth proxies are robust and
even forward-looking (see next section), the evidence for particular variables seem
weaker. For example, with the coincident index, there seems no clear-cut association.
However, for capital utilization and (on a higher signiﬁcance level) for labor market
conditions, we do retrieve a closer relation. A potential reason for the weaker bond
might be that these variables are more sluggish, and we should thus build in richer
dynamics to get the true linkages. House prices have played an important role
during ﬁnancial crises (Case and Shiller, 2003), and are quintessential in identifying
ﬁnancial cycles (Borio, 2014). Hence, it is no surprise that higher illiquidity seems
to coincide with lower levels of house price inﬂation. Evaluating the connection with
monetary policy46, we can discern that higher illiquidity is associated with higher
short term interest rates. Moreover, higher illiquidity levels concur with a ﬂattening
yield curve. When incorporating monetary aggregates in our analysis, we rely on the
concept of real money gap, based on the construction method by Calza et al. (2003),
and implemented by Hofmann (2009) and Drescher (2011). As such, we retrieve the
real money gap proxy from a recursive long-run M3 demand function. Illiquidity
seems to be negatively connected with the real money gap.47 Because ﬁnancial crises
usually coincidence with ﬂights to home and ﬂights to safety, we also examine the
relationship with exchange rates. Both for the US-Euro as for the US-UK exchange
rate, there seems to be a ﬂight to home eﬀect, where higher illiquidity levels concur
with higher relative values for the US dollar. The same eﬀect is measurable through
the real trade-weighted exchange rate (towards a broad range of currencies).48
4.3 Impact on Future Economic Growth
Both De Nicolò and Ivaschenko (2009) and Næs et al. (2011) hint at the potential
of illiquidity to aﬀect the real economy. More speciﬁcally, illiquidity is presumed
to have a forward looking eﬀect on a country's growth opportunities. Hence, we
incorporate an update of the empirical exercise featured in Næs et al. (2011), and
look at the forecasting abilities of illiquidity on future economic performance, in
a multivariate setting, with a number of control variables.49 In Table 12, we con-
duct an in-sample forecasting exercise where we gauge the eﬀect of illiquidity on
the one-quarter ahead industrial production growth (Panel A), as well as on the
46Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) advance that monetary policy shocks can impact stock and bond
market illiquidity.
47Our results are robust for estimates of the monetary overhang and the change in p-star.
48The sign is diﬀerent, as this measure is expressed conversely to the other exchange rate mea-
sures, i.e. the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar.
49We incorporate the term spread, excess market return and corporate bond yield as control
variables.
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one-quarter ahead industrial production gap measure, constructed using a HP ﬁlter
(Panel B).50 Our results are comparable with Næs et al. (2011), as we detect that
higher illiquidity levels lead to lower growth levels.51
To further investigate the causality of the relation, we apply Granger causality
tests, to analyze whether the impact on future growth rates is generated by illiquid-
ity, and not vice versa. Table 13 reports p-values for the Granger Causality tests
between brackets. A value below .05 implies proof in support of Granger causality.
We ﬁnd consistent evidence for our uniﬁed liquidity measure Granger causing output
growth, while the reverse causality is not present.52 When looking at the control
variables, the excess market returns and the term spread (on a higher signiﬁcance
level) Granger cause output growth, while output growth also Granger causes the
latter, but not the former. No causality is found with the spread measure.
We get a similar outcome when performing a simple Vector Autoregressive es-
timation with 5 lags (based on the lag selection criteria), and a choleski ordering
consisting of our uniﬁed market liquidity measure, year-on-year money growth, fed-
eral funds rate, month-on-month CPI inﬂation, and year-on-year industrial produc-
tions growth. A shock in illiquidity leads to a lower rate of growth in industrial
production. The impulse response functions are summarized in Figure 3.
To complement our previous in-sample analysis in Table 12, we perform a small
out-of-sample forecasting exercise for economic growth. Table 14 presents the out-of-
sample forecasting performance for future economic growth over diﬀerent horizons,
respectively 3, 6 and 9 months. We estimate our forecasting models through a rolling
window technique (Næs et al. (2011)). The initial estimation sample is set to 45
years (1962-2007) in order to obtain stable estimation parameters. The out of sam-
ple estimation covers the period 2008-2013. We evaluate our model, which includes
term spread, excess market return, corporate bond yield and our uniﬁed liquidity
measure, and compare this to a benchmark model without liquidity. We report the
relative mean squared forecasting error and the relative out-of-sample R-squared
value for our four diﬀerent uniﬁed liquidity measures. Despite the full-ﬂedged crisis
period, the model which incorporates liquidity performs markedly better at fore-
50We use industrial production as proxy for output, since we conduct our analysis on a monthly
level.
51Our uniﬁed market liquidity measure seems even capable of explaining a markedly higher
proportion of variation of future growth values than its unidimensional counterparts, indicating
that incorporating our novel methodology might improve on capturing the existent macroeconomic
relations. These results can be requested from the authors.
52This causal relation is absent for the uniﬁed liquidity measure with the basic time-varying
weighting function, and the causality even reverses (with output growth Granger causing illiquidity)
for the ﬁxed weight alternative. This further supports our model using time-varying weights
combined with the volatility shrinkage.
20
casting out of sample, than a model that neglects liquidity.53 Moreover, the results
are comparatively robust for the diﬀerent forecasting horizons (h = 3, 6, 9).
4.4 Evaluation of Individual Groups
4.4.1 Importance of Constituent Liquidity Groups
We link back the properties of our multidimensional liquidity measure to its founding
elements in Table 15 by analyzing the correlation of our measure with the individual
group measures (Panel A), together with the results for the unconditional variance
decomposition of our measure into the underlying group measures (Panel B). Panel
A indicates that the most important associations can be found with the etick group,
followed by the spread, roll, fong and order ﬂow groups (which are comparable). The
return and volume group generally have low correlations with our uniﬁed liquidity
measure. Panel B reports the results for the unconditional variance decomposition.
Firstly, we convey the unconditional variance decomposition making abstraction
of the covariance terms (`Var1' and `Var2' provide two separate options in this
context54). However, we also calculate the unconditional variance decomposition
including the covariance terms (`Cov'). All three techniques give a general idea on
the inﬂuence of each underlying group on our multidimensional liquidity measure.
In this exercise, the etick, roll and spread group seem to be the most important.
Admittedly, our framework lacks a theoretical framework, a feature it shares with
most of the empirical work on liquidity, and with the widespread crisis measures
which provided us with the inspiration to take on this exercise (Vayanos and Wang,
2012; Chordia et al., 2009). A theoretical foundation could provide valuable insights,
not only for our understanding of the ﬁnancial concept, but also in its interlinkages
with the macroeconomic world, especially in the ﬁnancial and monetary world we
have come to live in (Borio, 2014). However, in this particular setting, we merely
aspire to create a measure, which takes into account all of the dimensions of liquidity
(allowing a sensible aggregation), and which is not susceptible to any fad or fashion
concerning the particular measures.
4.4.2 Contributions of the Constituent Liquidity Groups to Stress Events
This section analyzes the contributions of the constituent liquidity groups for speciﬁc
historic crisis moments. A supplementary feature of our methodology is that it does
53This improvement is most pronounced for our preferred volatility shrinkage methodology.
54Whereas for the latter methodology the weights are treated as being exogenous; this is not the
case for the former.
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not only allow to aggregate the diﬀerent liquidity groups into a uniﬁed measure, but
also allows us to gauge the individual importance of each group over time, and more
speciﬁcally during periods of ﬁnancial stress.55 To give a comprehensive overview, we
group the historic stress events based on their most important contributing liquidity
groups. This classiﬁcation allows us to discern some general characteristics that
these events might have in common. The results are reported in Figure 4. Each
panel groups stress events of a speciﬁc type which relates to a certain category of
liquidity group measures.
Firstly, in Panel A, we focus on the category that contains the spread, etick,
amihud groups as its main protagonists, and which entails the following dates: The
1966 credit crunch (10/1966), the peak during the ﬁrst oil shock (10/1974) and the
Iraq invasion (08/1990).56 These periods were characterized by some sort of foreign
contamination (increase in spending due to the Vietnam war, the Yom Kippur war,
and the Iraq Invasion). Similarly, they all witnessed a credit crunch57 and are related
to a stock market crash (only 1990 saw a mini crash). Moreover, these speciﬁc
episodes of ﬁnancial stress were preceded by a tightening of the Federal Reserve
rate. Finally, we can discern no (1966) or only a slight (1990) recession, except for
1974 when there was a severe recession.58
The second class (Panel B) most prominently features the spread, etick, fong
group, and portrays the peak of the 1970s crisis (06/1970), the peak during the
1980s crisis (04/1980)59 and the Tech Bubble burst (03/2000). Interestingly, there
was a credit crunch both in 1970 and 1980 (1982), but not in 2000, as this event
seems to have a slightly diﬀerent physiology than its peers. Additionally, there was
a stock market crash in 1970 and 2000, however, not in 1980 or 1982. Furthermore,
each of these crisis periods tends to occur after a tightening of the Federal Reserve
rate. Finally, there was no banking crisis, nor a major recession.60 Admittedly, this
speciﬁc class of events shows close resemblance with the ﬁrst cluster, both for the
features of these events (credit crunch, Fed tightening, stock market crash; only the
55Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) provide an extensive historical account of such ﬁnancial stress
events. We further reﬁne and extend this list using similar tables provided in Brave and Butters
(2010) and Bordo and Haubrich (2013). Hence, our analysis mainly builds on their classiﬁcation
and interpretation of these events.
56The peak during the Russian crisis (08/1998) could also be added to these events, but only
has the spread and amihud group as its main protagonists.
57Albeit for 1998 the not full blown credit crunch might explain a divergent pattern.
58Both the event in 1974 and in 1990 are also associated with a banking crisis (although this
was minor for 1974).
59The peak of the 1982 crisis (08/1982) can be closely linked to this event and has similar
dynamics.
60Except 1982, which actually witnessed both a banking crisis and was characterized as a severe
recession.
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foreign component disappears), as well as for the most important groups it contains
(the spread and etick group now simply go together with the fong group, instead of
with the Amihud group). Hence, both can be seen as subclasses of a more general
class of events.
For the third category (Panel C), the lion's share of the contributions can be
attributed to the spread and roll group. This composition seems useful to describe
the 1987 stock market crash (10/1987), the decline of LTCM (05/1998)61 and AIG-
Lehman (09/2008). We can observe a minor62 or a more full-ﬂedged (during the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis) stock market crash. We cannot ascertain any underlying recession
for earlier crises (1987 and 1998), in comparison to their more recent counterpart
(which featured a major recession, banking crisis and housing bust). A subcategory
of these events, more speciﬁcally focusing on their aftermath, can be constructed by
grouping together the aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash (corresponding with
its peak in illiquidity, 01/1988), together with the aftermath of the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis (the TALF announcement, 11/2008; the stress test announcement 02/2009).
The composition (see Panel D) is logically very similar to the above mentioned
events, only with the addition of the etick group. Hence, this cluster again shows a
close association with the ﬁrst two groups, where the etick and spread groups are
similarly playing a prominent role, but this time together with the roll group.
Finally, in Panel E, we describe a more dispersed category which contains the re-
turns, fong, etick, and order ﬂow group63, which is useful for describing the 1977 dol-
lar crisis (10/1977), the second oil shock (01/1979) and the Mexican crisis (12/1994).
All three events can broadly be described as an external crisis (the dollar declines
against major currencies in 1977, the second oil shock in 1979, and huge losses
on the Mexican stock market in 1994 leading to rebalancing portfolios). However,
there were no severe disruptions of the ﬁnancial markets, and no real domestic stock
market crash. Moreover, we cannot observe any tightening of the Federal reserve
rate. Finally, there was no recession associated with these events.64 Hence, we could
potentially describe these events as being the least impactful.
The most prominent liquidity groups in our analysis of historical crisis events, are
the spread group, closely followed by the etick group. Both groups seem to feature
61Similarly, the closely linked events of the Asian Crisis (07/1997), and the Hong Kong specula-
tive attack (10/1997).
62In 1987 there was black Monday, as well as the savings and loans crisis; while in 1998 the US
witnessed a mini crash due to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, together with the demise of LTCM, which
brought the country almost on the verge of a liquidity crash.
63The only class of events where the return group or the order ﬂow group come into play.
64At least not preceding the respective crisis events. For example there were interest rate hikes
starting from 10/1979.
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prominently at times when the ﬁnancial stress skyrockets. These protagonists are
often combined with the roll, fong and amihud group, which tend to be useful
at portraying speciﬁc subclasses with their own characteristics.65 In contrast, the
ﬂow, returns and volume group seem to be less important liquidity categories when
examining these crisis events speciﬁcally. We can discern a similar pattern when
we perform the same analysis for the recession periods as a whole, instead of the
mere crisis dates. Hence, our conclusions are more broadly applicable than for the
historic snapshots analyzed above.
Of course, these categories can, to a certain extent, be considered as being anec-
dotal or somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, many characteristics of these ﬁnancial pres-
sure episodes can be debated upon, and have been the focus of numerous academic
studies. However, our only purpose is to show that speciﬁc liquidity groups are
more important during ﬁnancial stress periods than others, and that there are some
similarities over time between diﬀerent stress events. For this objective, our current
distinction between the diﬀerent types of crisis events or their underlying causes
should be suﬃcient.66 Finally, our results might be mainly driven by the construc-
tion method of our uniﬁed liquidity measure. Logically, as portrayed in Table 6, the
most prominent groups during ﬁnancial stress events are also the groups that exhibit
the largest increase in weights when comparing the full sample with the sub-period
of stress (and conversely the groups least prominent during the crisis events, are
those which exhibit the largest increase in their weights when comparing the full
sample with the tranquil period).67 However, we ﬁnd proof that our conclusions
are not solely model-dependent. The univariate regressions for the eight liquidity
groups (which will be discussed in Section 4.4.3) show us that the liquidity groups
which have strong interlinkages with many conﬁdence and uncertainty; spread and
volatility; crisis; productivity; monetary and exchange rate variables (which can be
mainly retrieved with the spread and etick group, but to a lesser extent also with
the roll and amihud group) coincide with the protagonist liquidity groups during the
ﬁnancial stress events, as mentioned in our pie charts.68 Hence, the contributions
65Due to presence of the two dominant groups, these subclasses tend to have many similarities.
66We acknowledge that the groups can be formed diﬀerently. However, this would not funda-
mentally change the conclusion of this section. The same holds for diﬀerent identiﬁcation methods,
criteria and deﬁnitions of the ﬁnancial stress events.
67The only special case is the fong group, which features prominently in at least two of the
crisis categories. An explanation can be that the fong group (which has increasing weights during
the tranquil period in comparison to the full sample) succeeds in capturing liquidity movements
during tranquil periods, but also plays its part in certain crisis events. Both aspects might also
explain its prominent role in the variance decomposition or the decomposition based on the group
contribution.
68But also perform best in signaling ﬁnancial stress moments, when looking at their signal-to-
noise ratios or the amount of correct crisis events they signal.
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of the diﬀerent groups into our uniﬁed model, simply reﬂect their intrinsic qualities,
and our model seems to perform the aggregation in a desirable fashion. We can
therefore conclude that speciﬁc groups are better equipped at capturing the more
volatile episodes in liquidity, while others are more useful to model its relative tran-
quil counterparts. Hence, if we would solely focus on a subgroup of them, we would
have to sacriﬁce on the richer dynamics we can portray within our framework.
4.4.3 Univariate Regressions for Constituent Liquidity Groups
Similarly to our analysis in Section 4.2, we again look at linkages between the liq-
uidity measure (but now for the underlying groups) and the following four main
categories: conﬁdence and uncertainty indices; spread and volatility measures; crisis
indicators; productivity and monetary/exchange rate variables. The main results
are summarized in Tables 16 to 19. We report the R-squared for the univariate re-
gressions. Moreover, whenever the coeﬃcients have a counterintuitive sign, we add
brackets to the R-squared value.
The spread and the etick group perform best at untangling the univariate re-
lations, posting comparable and at times higher R-squared values than the uniﬁed
measure.69 However, the spread group is not able to unravel the monetary interlink-
ages, while the etick group shows little or no connections with the option-adjusted
spreads and productivity subcategories. The performance of the roll and amihud
group is more mixed. Whereas the former unveils a close relation with the option-
adjusted spreads, variants of implied volatility as well as with some crisis indicators,
the latter succeeds for the monetary, and some of the implied volatility and crisis
variables. However, both perform worse in detecting relationships with many of
the other categories. Finally, the fong, volume and order ﬂow groups exhibit many
counterintuitive signs and feeble relations with the investigated categories, which
should normally be closely linked to liquidity. A possible explanation might be that
these groups mainly seem important for liquidity during tranquil times, and hence
are not able to catch the richer dynamics necessary to unravel such connections.
69For several of these categories, the spread and etick group show an even higher R-squared value
than for our uniﬁed liquidity measure. Hence, a hasty conclusion might be to dismiss the uniﬁed
measure (and its more complex aggregation methodology) and simply use one of the (adequately
performing) constituent groups as well. However, this cannot be seen as a surprising result. As
the uniﬁed liquidity measure is merely the sum of the underlying groups. Hence, its performance,
de facto, has to be comparable with its building blocks. It cannot suddenly outperform them. In
contrast, it will often be outperformed by many of its constituent elements, as it incorporates all
of the diﬀerent qualities (for example, necessary to identify illiquidity both during stress events
and tranquil times). However, whereas the underlying groups perform inadequately in at least
one or several of the categories we are investigating, the uniﬁed measure ﬁnds all of the expected
monetary, macroeconomic, ﬁnancial and crisis linkages consistently over all of the domains.
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Moreover, their relationship with the investigated categories might have changed
over time, leading to the lack of coherent interlinkages. Because of its multidimen-
sional properties our novel market liquidity measure succeeds better in catching a
much broader array of dynamics with its macroeconomic surroundings than its uni-
dimensional siblings, where interlinkages are more conﬁned to certain subcategories.
5 Conclusions
Liquidity is an unobservable, endogenous and multidimensional concept. Hence, it
is unfeasible for one single measure to capture all of the layers conveyed within liq-
uidity. We want to address each of these challenges directly, and introduce a novel
multidimensional market liquidity measure which uniﬁes the individual strengths of
the constituent liquidity groups. Albeit there are many authors that refer to the
multiple dimensions of liquidity, there have been few attempts at integrating this
feature in an all-encompassing measure. Most of the state of the art literature re-
futes to running horse races, in order to ﬁnd the ﬁrst best liquidity measure amongst
its competitors. In contrast, our novel liquidity measure incorporates all of the in-
dividual groups through a mechanism of time-varying correlations and time-varying
weights. We augment the latter with a volatility component to reﬂect the eﬀects
of limited investor attention. For this purpose, we build on the recent advances
made on ﬁnancial crisis indicators (Oet et al., 2011; Holló et al., 2012), and apply
several extensions on the portfolio approach (Illing and Liu, 2006) to perform the
aggregation of the separate liquidity groups.
Looking back over the sample period, our uniﬁed liquidity measure is capable
of tracking episodes of ﬁnancial strains. It is closely linked with several prominent
crisis indicators. Moreover, it exhibits a close relation with its macro-ﬁnancial sur-
roundings. Additionally, we can detect spillovers to the real economy from liquidity
droughts. These features are relatively more robust and meaningful than for the ex-
isting liquidity proxies, thus reinforcing our belief that it is important to take all of
the liquidity dimensions into account. Finally, next to aggregating our constituent
liquidity groups, our methodology also allows closer inspection of the importance
of these groups over time, and speciﬁcally during crisis periods. The protagonists
during these latter periods are mainly the spread and etick group.
Given the importance of illiquidity during downturns (due to the increasingly
ﬁnancial nature of our economy) and the endogenous nature of the concept, it is
necessary to have such an all-encompassing measure, with respect to all of the
existing layers and dynamics. Moreover, our measure is easily applicable and can
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be computed for long samples, as well as for many countries.
Interesting paths for future research would be to examine the performance of
our multilayered liquidity measure in an asset pricing framework, by also construct-
ing its counterpart on an asset-speciﬁc level. The same adaptations could be also
done for high frequency data. Moreover, it would be useful to further examine
the rich dynamics of liquidity with the macroeconomics surroundings, potentially
building a more general theoretical framework. Moreover, our adaptation to the
well-established portfolio approach could be useful for other markets as well, be-
sides the stock market, and hence can be suitable for constructing more elaborate
crisis or early warning indicators.
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Table 1: Overview of underlying costs and frictions reﬂecting the diﬀerent dimen-
sions of liquidity
This table reports several typologies for the costs and frictions underlying the concept of
liquidity.
Year Author Background Measures Measures/Explanation
1985 Kyle
Resiliency Time dimension
Tightness Cost
Depth Volume
2005 Lesmond
Direct trading costs Bidask spread
(tightness) (quoted or eﬀective)
Indirect trading costs Costs based on price
(depth,resiliency) behavior (price impact)
From ﬁrm-level data
Occurrence of zero returns
2005 Amihud et al.
Exogenous transaction costs
Demand pressure,
Inventory risk
Private info
Diﬃculty locating
counterparty
Imperfect competition
2006 Amihud;Mendelson
Price-impact costs Bid-ask spread, Depth
Search and delay costs
Direct trading costs Exchange fees, Taxes,
Brokerage commissions
2009 Holden
Proxy for eﬀective spread
Proxies for price impact
2012 Vayanos;Wang
Price impact Coeﬃcient of returns
on signed volume
Price reversal (-) Autocovariance returns
Participation costs
Transaction costs
Funding constraints
Asymmetric info
Imperfect competition
Search frictions
2013 Fong et al.
Percent-cost Price concession required
to execute trade
Cost-per-volume Price concession per
currency unit of volume
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Table 2: Eight liquidity groups representing the diﬀerent dimensions in our analysis
This table reports all of the diﬀerent groups which are incorporated in the multidimensional
liquidity measure. The table provides the most important formulas for their construction.
Reference Proxy
1. Spread Group
Korajczyk, Qspreadi,t =
1
ni,t
∑ni,t
j=1
Aski,j−Bidi,j
mi,j
Sadka mi,j = (Aski,j +Bidi,j)/2
(2008) Espreadi,t =
1
ni,t
∑ni,t
j=1
|pi,j−mi,j |
mi,j
(Both spreads also calculated with high and low prices)
Corwin, S = 2(e
α−1)
1+eα with α =
√
2β−√β
3−2√2 −
√
γ
3−2√2
Schultz where is β sum (over 2 days) of squared daily log(high/low)
(2012) γ is squared log(high/low) but where high (low) is over 2 days
De Nicolò, Lt =
2
(∣∣∣∑i,j∈K,i 6=j covt(Ri,Rj)−∣∣∣+∑i,j∈K,i 6=j covt(Ri,Rj)+)∑
s∈K var
t(Rs)+2
(∣∣∣∣∑i,j∈K,i 6=j covt(Ri,Rj)−
∣∣∣∣+∑i,j∈K,i 6=j covt(Ri,Rj)+
)
Ivaschenko
(2009)
2. Roll Group
Roll S = 2
√−cov(∆Pt,∆Pt−1)
(1984) 1n
∑n
t=1∆Pt∆Pt−1 − ∆¯P 2 (Harris, 1990)
Holden

√
−Cov
(
∆P ∗∗t ,∆P ∗∗t+1
)
µˆ when  Cov(∆P
∗∗
t ,∆P
∗∗
t+1) < 0
0 when Cov(∆P ∗∗t ,∆P ∗∗t+1) > 0
(2009) ∆P ∗t = art.Pt−1with art : adjusted returns
∆P ∗t = zt.Pt−1
art − rf = α+ β (rmt − rf ) + zt
Corwin and schultz (2012) provide extensions on how to treat
positive covariances (hence 2 versions of each Roll measure)
3. Zero Return Group
Lesmond, Ogden, Zeros = Number of days with zero returnNumber of trading days in month
Trzcinka
(1999) Zeros PV = Number of positve volume days with zero returnNumber of trading days in month
4. Fong Group
Fong, Holden, FHT ≡ S = 2σN−1 (1+Z2 )
Trzcinka σ : Std(returns),z : Zeroreturndays/totaldays
(2013) N−1 : Inverse function of cumulative distribution function
5. Eﬀective tick (etick) Group
Holden based on observed probabilities of special trade prices
(2009) correspondent to the jth spread (Nj)
dependent on fractional 1/8, 1/16 system or decimal
which are then transformed to constrained probabilities
Fj =
Nj∑J
j=1 Nj
36
Reference Proxy
6. Amihud Group
Amihud (2002) 1TradingDays
∑
Abs(DailyReturns)/DailyDollarvolume
Goyenko, SpreadProxy/DailyDollarvolume
Holden, in casu: High− low SpreadMeasure/DailyDollarvolume
Trzcinka (2009)
Sarr Hui-Heubel ratio:
Lybeck (2002) LHH = [(Pmax − Pmin) /Pmin] /
[
V/S ∗ P¯ ]
V : total dollar volume, S: number of instruments outstanding
P : Average closing price of instrument
Breen, rARi,t = θt + φtri,t +BHKtsign(r
e
i,t) ∗ volt + t
Hodrick, rARi,t = θt + φtri,t +BHKtsign(r
e
i,t) ∗ turnt + t
Korajczyk (2000)
Liu (2006) (V olumezeroPreviousXmonths+ 1/PreviousXmonthsTurnoverDeflator ) ∗ 21XNoTD
21X
NoTD : Standardizes amount of trading days in a month to 21
7. Volume Group
Dollar V olume
Datar (1998) SharesTraded/SharesOutstanding
8. Order Flow Measures
Pastor, rei,t+1 = θt + φtri,t + γtsign(r
e
i,t) ∗ volt
Stambaugh rei,t+1 = θt + φtri,t + γtsign(r
e
i,t) ∗ turnt
(2003)
Table 3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test: Testing stationarity of the eight diﬀerent
liquidity groups
This table reports the test statistic and the accompanying p-value (between brackets) of the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, performed for our eight liquidity group measures, according
to the three ordering techniques (as explained in Section 3.1.2). `FS' refers to the full
sample ordering technique, `BP' to the subsamples or breakpoint ordering technique, and
`5y RW' to the 5-year rolling window ordering method.
Spread Roll Returns Fong Etick Amihud Volume Flow
FS -4.64 -5.37 -2.15 -1.97 -1.48 -1.54 -1.47 -3.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.30) (0.54) (0.51) (0.55) (0.02)
BP -5.40 -6.89 -7.08 -3.49 -3.55 -3.69 -3.12 -5.65
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
5y RW -5.05 -7.30 -5.27 -4.82 -5.14 -6.56 -5.63 -23.27
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 4: Summary statistics for the time-varying correlations over the eight diﬀerent
liquidity dimensions
This table reports summary statistics for the time-varying correlations among the eight
liquidity group measures. Each column refers to the correlation of the speciﬁc group
measure with the seven other group measures. Panel A highlights values for the mean,
standard deviation and the interquartile ranges (IQ). Panel B shows sample averages for the
full sample (`fs'), as well as for two sub-periods where we discern tranquil times (`tranq'),
versus ﬁnancial stress periods (`crisis'). Additionally, we convey the relative changes of
the subperiods in comparison to the full sample.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Spread Roll Return Fong Etick Amihud Volume Flow
Mean 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.83
Stdev 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.06
IQ0 (min) 0.56 0.67 0.43 0.54 0.45 0.63 0.46 0.59
IQ1 0.77 0.80 0.74 0.80 0.73 0.79 0.73 0.80
IQ2 (med) 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.84
IQ3 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.88
IQ4 (max) 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.94
Panel B: Subsample analysis
Spread Roll Return Fong Etick Amihud Volume Flow
fs 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.83
tranq 0.81 0.84 0.80 0.84 0.80 0.83 0.79 0.84
%∆ -1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
crisis 0.85 0.82 0.75 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.81
%∆ 4% -1% -6% -4% 2% 0% 0% -3%
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for uniﬁed liquidity measure over diﬀerent weighting
methods
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for our uniﬁed liquidity measure, respectively
based on equal weights (w) and based on three diﬀerent weighting schemes as explained in
Section 3. wi denotes the basic time-varying weighting scheme, while the other two include
a volatility adjustment, respectively the shrinkage method (wsi) and augmented method
(wai). We report the results for the full samples (`fs'), as well as for two sub-periods where
we discern tranquil times (`tranq'), versus ﬁnancial stress periods (`crisis'). Additionally,
we convey the relative changes of the subperiods in comparison to the full sample.
w wi wsi wai
fs 0.21 0.28 0.12 0.35
tranq 0.19 0.26 0.11 0.33
%∆ -7% -7% -11% -7%
crisis 0.27 0.37 0.18 0.46
%∆ 33% 33% 52% 33%
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the weights
This table summarizes the average value of the weights used in our uniﬁed liquidity mea-
sure, based on the three diﬀerent weighting schemes as explained in Section 3. wi denotes
the basic time-varying weighting scheme, while the other two include a volatility adjust-
ment, respectively the shrinkage method (wsi) and augmented method (wai). We report
the results for the full samples (`fs'), as well as for two sub-periods where we discern tran-
quil times (`tranq'), versus ﬁnancial stress periods (`crisis'). Additionally, we convey the
relative changes of the subperiods in comparison to the full sample.
Panel A: Spread and Roll
spread wi wsi wai
fs 0.13 0.08 0.14
tranq 0.13 0.07 0.13
%∆ -4% -11% -8%
crisis 0.16 0.13 0.20
%∆ 20% 57% 40%
roll wi wsi wai
fs 0.13 0.07 0.13
tranq 0.13 0.07 0.13
%∆ 0% -2% 0%
crisis 0.13 0.08 0.13
%∆ 1% 13% 4%
Panel B: Returns and Fong
ret wi wsi wai
fs 0.12 0.06 0.12
tranq 0.13 0.07 0.13
%∆ 5% 9% 8%
crisis 0.09 0.04 0.07
%∆ -23% -45% -41%
fong wi wsi wai
fs 0.15 0.11 0.19
tranq 0.16 0.12 0.20
%∆ 3% 4% 5%
crisis 0.13 0.09 0.14
%∆ -15% -21% -26%
Panel C: Etick and Amihud
etick wi wsi wai
fs 0.12 0.06 0.11
tranq 0.11 0.05 0.10
%∆ -4% -13% -9%
crisis 0.14 0.10 0.16
%∆ 21% 61% 43%
amih wi wsi wai
fs 0.11 0.04 0.09
tranq 0.11 0.04 0.09
%∆ -2% -11% -4%
crisis 0.12 0.07 0.11
%∆ 12% 54% 20%
Panel D: Volume and Order Flow
vol wi wsi wai
fs 0.10 0.04 0.09
tranq 0.11 0.04 0.09
%∆ 2% 3% 4%
crisis 0.09 0.03 0.07
%∆ -9% -18% -19%
ﬂow wi wsi wai
fs 0.13 0.08 0.13
tranq 0.13 0.08 0.13
%∆ 1% 0% 2%
crisis 0.13 0.08 0.12
%∆ -4% 1% -9%
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Table 7: Univariate regressions for uniﬁed liquidity measure: Crisis indicators
This table reports estimated intercept and slope coeﬃcients from regressions of our uni-
ﬁed liquidity measure (constructed with the volatility shrinkage weighting method) on a
number of widespread crisis indicators. We employ the following crisis indicators: the
Cleveland Financial Stress Index (CFSI), the contribution of the interbank or funding
markets (CFSI-IB-FUND), the interbank liquidity spread (CFSI-IB-LIQ) and the liquidity
spread (CFSI-LIQ) to this index, the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI), the
Flight-to-Safety measure constructed by Baele et al. (2015) (FTS), the Kansas City Fi-
nancial Stress Index (KCFSI), Smoothed U.S. Recession Probabilities (REC P), St. Louis
Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI), the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business conditions index
(ADSBCI) and the International Monetary Fund U.S. Financial Stress Index (IMF FSI).
The sample size depends on the available data series (and is mentioned in the left column).
P -values are denoted between brackets. The last column shows the adjusted R-squared.
Crisis Indicators αˆ βˆliq adjR2
CFSI -0.106 1.515 0.005
(n=268) (0.626) (0.502)
CFSI-IB-FUND 4.528 17.150 0.255
(n=267) (0.000) (0.000)
CFSI-IB-LIQ 0.790 8.777 0.325
(n=267) (0.000) (0.000)
CFSI-LIQ 2.313 -4.665 0.074
(n=267) (0.000) (0.041)
NFCI -0.804 7.112 0.213
(n=492) (0.000) (0.000)
FTS 0.012 0.169 0.008
(n=386) (0.550) (0.351)
KCFSI -0.645 6.722 0.151
(n=287) (0.020) (0.070)
REC P -0.108 1.850 0.213
(n=559) (0.008) (0.000)
STLFSI -0.715 8.131 0.265
(n=241) (0.003) (0.004)
ADSBCI -0.415 3.555 0.069
(n=624) (0.007) (0.014)
IMF FSI -2.611 22.701 0.185
(n=349) (0.000) (0.001)
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Table 8: Signal-to-noise ratio
This table reports the results for the signal-to-noise ratio analysis. Panel A summarizes
the methodology, based on Christensen and Li (2014), to calculate signal-to-noise ratios, as
explained in Section 4.1.2. Panel B reports the signal-to-noise ratio, as well as the number
of crisis respectively non-crisis events signaled correctly (in %), for our uniﬁed liquidity
measure Lt, the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI), and Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti
business conditions index (ADSBCI). Panel C reports the same statistics for our uniﬁed
liquidity according to the four diﬀerent weighting schemes, as explained in Section 3.
w refers to the constant weighting scheme; wi denotes the basic time-varying weighting
scheme; the other two include a volatility adjustment, respectively the shrinkage method
(wsi) and augmented method (wai).
Panel A: Four situations
Financial stress event No Financial Stress event
Signal A B
No signal C D
Panel B: S/N for uniﬁed measure
S/N ﬁn stress correct No ﬁn stress correct
Lt 0.13 0.34 0.95
NFCI 0.16 0.37 0.94
ADSBCI 0.05 0.56 0.97
Panel C: S/N for diﬀerent weighting schemes
S/N ﬁn stress correct No ﬁn stress correct
w 0.12 0.10 0.99
wi 0.11 0.15 0.98
wsi 0.13 0.34 0.95
wai 0.09 0.34 0.97
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Table 9: Univariate regressions for uniﬁed liquidity measure: Conﬁdence and uncer-
tainty measures
This table reports estimated intercept and slope coeﬃcients from univariate regressions of
our uniﬁed liquidity measure (constructed with the volatility shrinkage weighting method)
on conﬁdence measures (Panel A) and uncertainty measures (Panel B). The sample size
depends on the available data series (and is mentioned in the left column). P -values are
denoted between brackets. The last column shows the adjusted R-squared.
Dependent Variable αˆ βˆliq adjR2
Panel A: Conﬁdence Measures
Business Tendency Survey 100.653 -5.700 0.071
(n = 624) (0.000) (0.008)
Consumer Opinion Survey 100.592 -5.228 0.051
(n = 624) (0.000) (0.010)
Inventory Sentiment Index 61.426 11.165 0.045
(n = 198) (0.000) (0.014)
Consumer Sentiment 88.030 -26.366 0.013
(n = 430) (0.000) (0.251)
Panel B: Uncertainty Measures
Economic Policy Uncertainty 101.737 24.454 0.000
(n = 348) (0.000) (0.772)
Equity Market Uncertainty 69.894 256.980 0.029
(n = 348) (0.000) (0.136)
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Table 10: Univariate regressions for uniﬁed liquidity measure: Volatility and spread
Measures
This table reports estimated intercept and slope coeﬃcients from univariate regressions of
our uniﬁed liquidity measure (constructed with the volatility shrinkage weighting method)
on volatility measures (Panel A) and spread measures (Panel B). The sample size depends
on the available data series (and is mentioned in the left column). P -values are denoted
between brackets. The last column shows the adjusted R-squared.
Dependent Variable αˆ βˆliq adjR2
Panel A: Volatility Measures
CBOE 10Y Treasury 5.387 19.785 0.259
(n=132) (0.000) (0.001)
CBOE DJIA Vol Index 15.333 60.974 0.206
(n=195) (0.000) (0.005)
CBOE Russel 2000 Vol Index 16.521 119.575 0.400
(n=120) (0.000) (0.000)
CBOE SP500 14.769 101.461 0.428
(n=73) (0.000) (0.001)
Panel B: Spread Measures
TED Spread 0.291 3.320 0.204
(n=336) (0.000) (0.000)
ML AAA O-A Spread 0.403 5.078 0.235
(n=204) (0.015) (0.044)
ML BBB O-A Spread 1.359 8.592 0.177
(n=204) (0.000) (0.064)
ML CCC O-A Spread 8.799 35.888 0.121
(n=204) (0.000) (0.060)
ML High Yield II O-A Spread 4.236 18.981 0.141
(n=204) (0.000) (0.079)
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Table 11: Univariate regressions for uniﬁed liquidity measure: Macroeconomic and
monetary variables
This table reports estimated intercept and slope coeﬃcients from univariate regressions of
our uniﬁed liquidity measure (constructed with the volatility shrinkage weighting method)
on a series of macroeconomic and monetary variables.. The sample size depends on the
available data series (and is mentioned in the left column). P -values are denoted between
brackets. The last column shows the adjusted R-squared. The values used for money are
equilibrium values obtained through estimation of recursive money demand function. The
last column shows the adjusted R-squared.
Dependent Variable αˆ βˆliq adjR2
Panel A: Output
Coincident Index 2.209 -0.183 0.000
(n=408) (0.000) (0.966)
Capacity Utilization 1.955 -17.083 0.061
(n=552) (0.014) (0.014)
Labor Market Conditions 4.184 -34.965 0.047
(n=449) (0.031) (0.070)
Panel B: Housing Prices
CS HP Real ∆YOY 3.111 -23.670 0.069
(n=408) (0.009) (0.013)
Panel C: Interest Rate
Interest Rate FFR 3.176 19.790 0.125
(n=624) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel D: Interest Rate Spread
Term Spread 10Y-FFR 1.655 -5.420 0.041
(n=624) (0.000) (0.014)
Term Spread 10Y-2Y 1.419 -4.408 0.083
(n=451) (0.000) (0.001)
Panel E: Money (equilibrium values)
M3 Real Mgap 0.0225 -0.1185 0.0674
(n=598 ) (0.000) (0.006)
Panel F: Exchange Rate (ﬂight to home eﬀect)
ER US Euro ∆YOY 9.275 -87.839 0.264
(n=168) (0.000) (0.000)
ER Real TW Broad ∆YOY -3.739 37.634 0.088
(n=408) (0.017) (0.003)
ER US UK ∆YOY 4.141 -42.205 0.057
(n=408) (0.038) (0.037)
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Table 12: Multivariate regressions for uniﬁed liquidity measure: Future economic
growth
This table reports univariate regressions capturing the eﬀect of the multidimensional liq-
uidity measure on future industrial production growth (in the spirit of Næs et al., 2011).
We test the speciﬁcation for one-quarter-ahead industrial production growth (Panel A), as
well as for a one-quarter-ahead industrial production gap measure (constructed with a HP
ﬁlter) (Panel B). The sample size depends on the available data series (and is mentioned
in the left column). P -values are denoted between brackets. The last column shows the
adjusted R-squared.
αˆ βˆliq γˆterm spread γˆexcess mkt ret γˆMoody
′s spread adjR2 adjR2 (excl. liq)
Panel A: ∆IP 3m ahead
9.066 -25.829 0.531 0.038 -4.020 0.264 0.144
(0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.429) (0.000)
Panel B: IPGap3m ahead
2.611 -10.167 -0.343 -0.042 -0.899 0.199 0.085
(0.001) (0.003) (0.029) (0.043) (0.024)
Table 13: Granger causality test, accompanying in-sample forecast of ∆IP
This table reports the Granger causality tests which complement the in-sample forecasting
exercise. Firstly, we perform a Granger causality test for our liquidity measure based on
equal weights (w) and based on three diﬀerent weighting schemes. wi denotes the basic
time-varying weighting scheme, while the other two include a volatility adjustment: wsi
is based on the shrinkage method; wai is based on the augmented method. Additionally,
we apply a Granger causality test for the control variables which are incorporated in our
in sample forecasting exercise. TS denotes the term spread between 10 year and 3 month
rate; EMR represents the excess market return; SPR is the corporate bond yield versus
10 year rate. We test the null hypothesis that market illiquidity (or the control variable)
does not Granger cause industrial production growth, and whether industrial production
growth does not Granger cause market illiquidity (or the control variable). We report the
F-value and p-value (in parentheses) for each test. We choose the optimal lag length for
each test based on lag length selection criteria .
LIQ9∆IP ∆IP 9 LIQ
w 1.31 2.88
(0.26) ( 0.01)
wi 1.81 1.80
( 0.11) ( 0.11)
wsi 2.96 1.61
(0.01) (0.16)
wai 2.07 1.52
( 0.07) ( 0.18)
CON 9∆IP ∆IP 9 CON
TS 2.32 4.49
(0.07) (0.00)
EMR 7.83 1.86
(0.00) (0.14)
SPR 1.64 1.88
(0.18) (0.13)
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Table 14: Out-of-sample forecasting performance for future economic growth
This table presents the out-of-sample forecasting performance for future economic
growth over diﬀerent horizons, respectively 3, 6 and 9 months. The forecasting models are
estimated through a rolling window technique (Naes et al, 2011). The initial estimation
sample is set to 45 years (1962-2007). The out of sample estimation covers the period
2008-2013. Our forecasting model includes the term spread, the excess market return, the
corporate bond yield and our uniﬁed liquidity measure, and is compared to a benchmark
forecasting model without liquidity. RMSE is the mean squared forecasting error of our
model including the uniﬁed liquidity measure, relative to the mean squared forecasting
error of the benchmark model exluding the uniﬁed liquidity measure. ∆R2OS is the out-
of-sample R-squared value relative to the benchmark. We report the results for the
uniﬁed liquidity measure based on the four diﬀerent weighting schemes. w refers to
the measure based on equal weights. wi denotes the basic time-varying weighting scheme,
while the other two include a volatility adjustment: wsi is based on the shrinkage method;
wai is based on the augmented method.
RMSE (h = 3) ∆R2OS RMSE (h = 6) ∆R
2
OS RMSE (h = 9) ∆R
2
OS
w 0,95 0,10 0,96 0,07 1,00 -0,01
wi 0,93 0,14 0,93 0,13 0,98 0,04
wsi 0,83 0,30 0,85 0,29 0,92 0,15
wai 0,91 0,18 0,88 0,22 0,92 0,16
Table 15: Uniﬁed liquidity measure: Correlation with liquidity groups and variance
decomposition
This table shows the impact of each liquidity group in the uniﬁed liquidity measure. Panel
A reports the average correlations of our uniﬁed market liquidity measure with the groups
employed for the construction of the measure. P -values for the correlation test are reported
between brackets. Panel B reports the results for the unconditional variance decomposition
of the multidimensional liquidity measure into the underlying liquidity group measures.
Firstly, we convey the unconditional variance decomposition making abstraction of the
covariances ('Var1' and 'Var2' provide two separate options in this context). However,
we also calculate the unconditional variance decomposition including the covariance terms
('Cov'). All three techniques gives a general idea on the inﬂuence of each underlying
subgroup on our multidimensional liquidity measure.
Spread Roll Returns Fong Etick Amihud Volume Flow
Panel A: Correlation with liquidity group measures
Lt 0.349 0.339 0.193 0.355 0.722 0.298 -0.150 0.321
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: Variance decomposition
Var1 0.192 0.097 0.146 0.239 0.149 0.060 0.056 0.061
Var2 0.178 0.097 0.132 0.299 0.135 0.042 0.034 0.082
Cov 0.183 0.122 0.081 0.191 0.320 0.087 -0.064 0.079
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Figure 4: Decomposition of uniﬁed liquidity measure and ﬁnancial crises
• This ﬁgure shows the contribution of the individual liquidity group measures to
our uniﬁed liquidity measure for speciﬁc historic stress events. Each panel groups
stress events of a speciﬁc type which relates to a certain category of liquidity group
measures.
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Abstract
We investigate the impact of monetary policy spillovers to emerging in the recent context of
advanced economies pursuing expansionary monetary policies. We unravel many channels
through which such international transmission could occur. Moreover, the buildup of ma-
turity and currency mismatches has regained importance as emerging market non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms have picked up the original sin of issuing foreign denominated debt, thus leading to
many hidden vulnerabilities in the international ﬁnancial system. Therefore a shift in the
expansive stance of advanced central banks could trigger considerable capital ﬂows. In our
empirical analysis we measure the impact of US monetary policy on emerging markets in
Central and Easter Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), as well
as in Latin America (Chile and Mexico) and in Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia). We ﬁnd
considerable eﬀect of shocks in EMU monetary policy on the long term yields of CEECs,
while US policy shocks seem to be a more important driving force for long term yields in
Asia and Latin America. Moreover, we unravel a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the transmis-
sion of shocks before and after the ﬁnancial crisis, with the latter being signiﬁcantly more
prolonged.
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1 Introduction
In addition to traditional trade linkages among countries, the recent global ﬁnancial
crisis has highlighted the critical role of growing ﬁnancial and institutional interde-
pendences in explaining business cycle ﬂuctuations. More speciﬁcally, we can discern
connections between the occurrence of boom and bust cycles in diﬀerent geograph-
ical context over time. Each successive crisis seems to be related. Kindleberger
(2008, p. 7) already described this process very vividly: One of the themes of this
book is that the bubbles in real estate and stocks in Japan in the second half of the
1980s, the similar bubbles in Bangkok and the ﬁnancial centers in the nearby Asian
countries in the mid-1990s, and the bubble in US stock prices in the second half of
the 1990s were systematically related.
Moreover, we can unravel similar patterns in diﬀerent types of crisis, whether
the culprit can be found in the banking sector, the government sector, the external
balance, etc. The boom period is typically characterized by capital inﬂows, over-
conﬁdence, abundance of credit, overvaluation of assets (housing or stock), underes-
timation of risk, and overleveraging. In the meantime, macroeconomic imbalances,
such as current account deﬁcits and currency appreciations, are building up (Brun-
nermeier et al., 2012). We can thus unravel an important interaction between credit
creation and the perception of risk, which enhances the procyclicality of credit ﬂows
which further excavates the frailty of the international ﬁnancial system. The implo-
sion of the bubble in one country leads to an increase in the ﬂow of money to another
country; consequently, playing an important role in explaining imbalances of that
country. More integrated ﬁnancial markets have increased the return opportunities
for mobile capital; which in turn makes more countries prone to another crisis. Min-
sky (1982, p. 5) highlights this phenomenon as: The economic instability so evident
since the late 1960s is the result of the fragile ﬁnancial system that emerged from
cumulative changes in ﬁnancial relations and institutions over the years following
World War II.
In our analysis we focus on the impact of recent unconventional monetary policy
in the US and the Euro Area on emerging markets. More speciﬁcally, we gauge
the impact of US and EMU long term government yields on their counterparts
in four Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). We ﬁnd that policy
shocks from advanced economies have comparatively more impact on long term
yields than their domestic policy yields. We also examine whether these spillovers
have increased over time by comparing a pre and post crisis sample. We ﬁnd that
most eﬀects are persistent. However, the duration and strenght of the spillovers
seems to increase during the unconventional monetary policy phase of the advanced
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economies under investigation. As a robustness check, we apply our methodology
to two Latin American and two Asian countries, where we ﬁnd similar results.
2 Literature
Increased ﬁnancial globalization can have conﬂicting impacts on emerging markets.
On the one hand, foreign investors generally acquire more ﬁnancial products with
longer maturities, thus broadening the maturity structure of local bond markets
(Barroso et al, 2015). Moreover, the deepening of EME ﬁnancial markets, leads to
improved price discovery and has the potential to limit the price impact of capi-
tal ﬂows (Raﬁq, 2015). On the other hand, short term (sentiment driven) ﬂows to
emerging markets can cause excessive pressures on their currency, and lead to un-
warranted credit expansion, thus exposing its ﬁnancial fragility (Agosin and Huaita,
2011). Additionally, heightened levels of global ﬁnancial integration are shaping an
environment where many developing countries are importing ﬁnancing conditions
from several prominent advanced economies, despite the exchange rate they admin-
ister. Rey (2015, p. 2) admonishes us for a world with powerful global ﬁnancial
cycles, characterized by large common movements in asset prices, gross ﬂows and
leverage. It is also a world with massive deviations from uncovered interest parity.
Under such conditions, the possibility arises that the conditions chosen in several
prominent advanced economies can be transmitted around the globe.
When credit cycles and capital ﬂows are thus governed by worldwide phenomenon
they can prove unfathomable for the country-speciﬁc conditions in many emerging
countries, thus leading to procyclical eﬀects, with abundance of credit during good
times and extreme draughts during downturns (Rey, 2015). We can therefore unravel
interconnectedness between the monetary policy of advanced economies and global
ﬁnancial conditions in many emerging countries, through changes in risk aversion
and uncertainty (Bekaert et al, 2012; Bruno and Shin, 2014). Minsky (1982, p. 118)
similarly argues that the structural characteristics of the ﬁnancial system change
during periods of prolonged expansion and economic boom and that these changes
cumulate to decrease the domain of stability of the system.
2.1 Monetary Policy Transmission to Emerging markets
Chen et al (2014) apply a global vector error correction model (GVECM) to investi-
gate the eﬀects of reductions in the US term and corporate spreads, thus uncovering
a more prominent role for the latter. Additionally, spillovers to emerging economies
vary signiﬁcantly, but are larger in size than for developed economies. While aid-
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ing their recoveries, pass through of US monetary policy had procyclical eﬀects in
Brazil, China, etc. in the post crisis period. Relying on a recursive VAR analysis,
Rey (2015) advocates that monetary conditions are diﬀused from advanced ﬁnancial
centers to the rest of the world through gross credit ﬂows and leverage. Fluctuat-
ing exchange rates are not capable to shield against the global ﬁnancial cycle when
capital ﬂows move freely, thus shrinking the trilemma to a mere dilemma.
Miyajima et al (2014) examine the impact of a very low US term premium on
comparatively small open Asian economies using panel VAR model. Pass through of
US monetary policy to Asia primarily seems to occur through low local bond yields
and swift growth of domestic bank credit. While national monetary authorities can
retain control over their short term policy rates in this context of ﬁnancial intercon-
nectedness, however, they do concede control over the long term rates, which are
important factors in consumption and investment decisions. Asia, Jain-Chandra and
Unsal (2012) ﬁnd similar results for Asia by incorporating a dynamic factor model
and an SVAR model. More speciﬁcally, they unravel a weaker role for domestic
short term interest rates during surges of capital inﬂow. Correspondingly, Bowman
et al (2014) acknowledge that US policy shocks that drive down US sovereign yields
have a kindred eﬀect on the sovereign yields in most EMEs, sometimes even outsiz-
ing the domestic impact. More speciﬁcally, this vulnerability of EMEs is driven by
country-speciﬁc variables, most prominently by interest rates, cds spreads, inﬂation
rates, current account deﬁcits and banking systems.
In contrast to the previous studies, Ahmed and Zlate (2013) focus on the deter-
minants of capital ﬂows to emerging markets. Unconventional US monetary policy
expansion does not seem to aﬀect the total net inﬂows of capital into EMEs. There
has only been a shift in the composition toward portfolio ﬂows. Furthermore, most
other determinants of EME ﬂows keep their relevance with the addition of variables
associated with unconventional policy regime.
2.2 Emerging market economy corporate debt
In previous decades, emerging markets in Latin America and Asia were often tempted
by the original sin, and simultaneously borrowed extensively in the international
capital markets (with the debt denominated in foreign currency), while upholding
rigid exchange rate regimes. Most of these debts remained unhedged, and left these
economies vulnerable to exchange rate and sovereign risk. In such a setting, any
change in the appetite of investors leads to capital reversals, hot money pouring out
of the emerging economies, often initiating full-ﬂedged crises. (Acharya et al, 2015)
Conversely, since 2000 numerous emerging markets succeeded in issuing long-
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term debt denominated in their national currency instead of dollars, thus shirking a
currency mismatch. However, these last years, have reacquired the taste for foreign
denominated debt. The main culprit in these international bond markets this time
are not the governments, but emerging market corporations, many of which are con-
straint by their local markets (Turner, 2014). More speciﬁcally, we have witnessed a
sharp hike in the external borrowing of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms through oﬀshore issuance
of debt instruments (Avdjiev et al, 2014), the majority of which went through sub-
sidiaries of the local ﬁrms  which are situated abroad. This foreign denominated
debt, which is mostly expressed in dollars, is one of the main drivers of domestic
credit growth in emerging markets (Cabballero et al, 2014) (footnote: There is a
strong link between oﬀshore borrowing and credit growth in Latin America and East
Asia, which strengthens cross-border ﬁnancial Linkages (Lane, 2015) ). Moreover,
these securities are not hedged by proceeds in foreign currency, thus creating a cur-
rency mismatch on the consolidated balance sheets of these non-ﬁnancial emerging
market ﬁrms (Shin, 2013). These ﬂows are mainly driven by carry trade strategies
(Bruno and Shin, 2015; Hofmann). Simultaneous with the oﬀ shore issuance of
debt, we can discern an increase in corporate deposits in the local banking system
which can potentially be withdrawn in the occurrence of ﬁnancial stress events, thus
exposing the ﬁrms involved also to a maturity mismatch. (Acharya et al, 2015).
All these vulnerabilities lead to a Financial systems which can be at serious risk
when Fed begins to raise rates. More importantly, supervisors in these emerging
markets, or even globally, are not endowed to face these challenges, as their focal
points, which were crucial during previous crisis, are not as useful to detect the
current risks, most of which remain undetected with the current measuring systems
(Cabballero et al, 2014). However, even the current ﬂows leave a mark on the local
ﬁnancial system, because the higher rate of international borrowing will coincide
with a greater holding of cash as deposit with the banks or short-term securities
with the shadow banks (Shin, 2013).
Finally, the increased integration of emerging markets in the international debt
markets has led to yields on debt instruments of these markets in local currency
dropping in chorus with those of advanced economies, even co-moving more aligned
to each other (Turner, 2014).This adds further to the vulnerability of emerging
economies to a reversal of the current expansionary monetary policy stance of ad-
vanced economies. (Turner, 2014).
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2.3 Tapering Talks
The prospects of lower interest rates in many advanced economies have motivated
investors to search for yields on international ﬁnancial markets. Hence, it should
come as no surprise that the relative resilience of emerging markets to the recent
episodes of ﬁnancial stress and their subsequent rapid recovery has lured in many
foreign investors.1 ﬁnd that foreign ﬂows into many developing economies have
skyrocketed during this post-crisis period, translating into sharp increases in credit,
unwarranted hikes in the prices of many asset classes and pressures towards an
appreciation of their currency (Calderon and Kubota, 2012). This process coincided
with a swift build-up in leverage creating contributing to the ﬁnancial fragility of
markets which have historically been fragile, and only recently have begun setting
up the necessary macroprudential framework.
These vulnerabilities became painfully clear in the summer of 2013 when a ﬂood
of volatility submerged the global ﬁnancial markets, following some signals that
the U.S. Federal Reserve would slow down its large scale asset purchase program
and move into a less accommodative monetary policy stance 2 (Mishra et al, 2012).
This environment severely disrupted emerging markets, aﬀecting asset prices and
currency values, and even raising doubt about the growth prospect of emerging
markets. These corrections came to many commentators as a surprise and was
surprisingly large in size (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2014)
Some patterns can be discerned in the reaction of emerging markets during the
2013 taper-tantrum episode. Finally, albeit monetary policy spillovers were clearly
present well before the taper-tantrum, the size of emerging market asset price and
capital ﬂow shocks was markedly higher during the latter episodes, particularly
for bond yields and exchange rates (Sahay et al, 2014). Secondly, in contrast to
the initial reaction which was similar across most emerging markets, we soon saw
clear disparities between the way individual countries were aﬀected, which prevailed
during the whole period (Calderon and Kubota, 2012). Thirdly, emerging markets
that exhibited more healthy economic fundamentals suﬀered less from the increased
volatility (Ahmed et al, 2015; Rai and Suchanek, 2014). For example, current
account balances, inﬂation rates, growth prospects, and central bank reserves were
important protagonists in the market reactions to U.S. monetary policy shocks.
However, Eichengreen and Gupta (2014) refute the idea that strong fundamentals
are causing the cross-country disparities, and hint at size of ﬁnancial markets as the
most discerning characteristic. Investors would thus favor large and liquid platforms
1Many authors Bruno and Shin, 2014; Obstfeld, 2012; Borio and Disyatat, 2011
2This episodes got labelled as the tapering talk
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as these allow relatively costless and swift movements of capital (Sahay et al, 2014).
Finally, conditions worsened most dramatically in countries that had witnessed large
capital inﬂows and more severe exchange rate appreciation during the earlier phase
expansionary monetary policy by the Fed reserve (Ahmed et al, 2015). In contrast,
countries that relied on their internal policy to limit these trends, also experienced
the smallest setbacks. Hence, macroprudential policy can function as a buﬀer against
such international spillovers (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2014)
This episode also emphazises an important lesson for monetary policy in ad-
vanced economies which focuses mainly on their internal goals, and has little at-
tention for global eﬀects of their policies. Hence, for the feature, central banks in
advanced economies should revert to clear and eﬀective communication in order to
limit such volatile episodes (Draghi, 2013). As both the US and the EU are facing
future exists from quantitative easing programs, we will learn soon enough whether
they will also have picked up the lessons from the tapering tantrum.
3 Empirics
3.1 Data and preliminary tests
We collect our data from datastream, together with the respective national central
banks, as well as the FRED database provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Saint Louis and the EMU statistical data warehouse.3 We use monthly data and
our sample runs from 2000 till 2015. If we deviate from these general settings, we
report this explicitly. Our analysis focuses on four geographically dispersed emerging
markets. More speciﬁcally, we investigate US monetary policy spillovers into four
Central Eastern European Counties, (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland). As a robustness check, we also look at pass-through to two Latin American
countries (Chile and Mexico) and two Asian countries (Indonesia and Malaysia).
With many advanced economies stuck in a liquidity trap due to the ﬁnancial
crisis, the long term yield has attracted much attention as a potential channel for
monetary policy transmission. Figure 1 shows the trends in long term government
bond yields for nine Central Eastern European Countries (Bulgaria, The Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Croatia), to-
gether with their US and EMU counterpart. Similar to Turner (2014) we see an
increased alignment of these yields due to a hightened integration of these CEECs
in the international ﬁnancial framework. Such comovement in these yields expose
3We assemble data on prices, output, money, interest rates, government bonds, asset prices,
conﬁdence indicators and volatility indices
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the vulnerability of these CEEC to monetary policy in advanced economies. Accord-
ing to Obstfeld (2014), long term interest rates provide one of the most powerful
channels for international transmission. If advanced economy policy can be passed
through via bond markets, the mere focus on short term interest rates and exchange
rate can lead us to misinterpret the policy stance for the CEEC under investigation
(Miyajima et al, 2014).
When we compare the common factor in the govnerment bond yield for several4
of these CEECs with the US term premium5, there seems to be a connection over
time, visualized in ﬁgure 2. The correlation between both series amounts to 0.57.
However, compared to Miyajima et al, 2014, who applies a principle component
methodology for several Asian countries, the ﬁt between both series looks to be
relatively more loose. Based on this anecdotal ﬁrst evidence, we wonder whether
the ﬂexible exchange rate might perform its task as stabilizer more eﬃciently in
these CEECs (Barosso et al, 2015) thus making domestic shocks more important, or
whether EMU government bond spillovers could be distorting the above described
relation.
Whereas Fratzscher (2012) claims domestic monetary policy shocks in emerging
market economies have been trivial in comparison to the spillovers from US monetary
policy shocks, Barroso et al (2015) question this and assert that despite the inﬂuence
of international spillovers, domestic policy should be the primary focus, due to
the shock absorbing abilities of a ﬂoating exchange rate. In order to answer this
question more rigourously, we perform a Granger Causality test. More speciﬁcally,
we check whether EMU, US long term government yields and domestic policy rates
Granger cause the domestic long term government yield in each of the CEECs under
investigation. Figure 3 reports p-values for the Granger Causality tests between
brackets. A value below .05 implies proof in support of Granger causality. We can
conclude that long term yields in the mentioned CEEC are mainly driven by their
European equivalent (except for Poland). The domestic policy rate merely seems
important for the Czech Republic (and on a higher signiﬁcance level in Hungary and
Poland), while the US yields only signiﬁcantly Granger cause the Czech yields (and
on a higher signiﬁcance level the Hungarian yields). However, in order to look at
the speciﬁc magnitude and duration of the shocks resulting from advanced economy
monetary policy spillovers we revert to a Vector autoregression set up, as is common
4For this exercise we focus on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia , lithuania and Poland, as
these countries have the longest timeseries available for their government bond yields
5Provided by the New York Federal Reserve
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in the related literature.6
3.2 Methodology
For the estimation procedure, we follow Miyajima et al (2014), and apply a vector
autoregressive (VAR) estimation procedure to gauge the relationship between the
emerging market variables and the US monetary policy:
Yt = A0 +
∑p
i=1AYt−i +BZt + t
The Y-vector incorporates our endogenous variables: industrial production (ip),
consumer prices (cp), the short term interest rate (ir), the domestic government bond
yield yield (gov) and the bilateral nominal exchange rate against the US dollar (er).
The US monetary spillovers (US) are captured by the X-vector. When incorporating
the US policy eﬀects in our model we rely on the long government bond yields. At the
zero lower bound, in the context of forward guidance and large scale asset purchases,
these values provide an interesting proxy for the policy stance.7
We rely on a Choleski decomposition to obtain our structural identiﬁcation. The
ordering is as follows: {US, IP, CP, IR, YLD, NER}. After performing extensive
stationary testing (through Augmented Dicky Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests) we
decide only to take (year on year) growth rates for industrial production and con-
sumer prices. The other variables are simply expressed in levels.8 Furthermore, we
rely on several lag lenght criteria to decide on the optimal dynamic structure of our
vector autoregressive procedure.9 We estimate our VAR procedure seperately for the
pre (from 2000 till 2007) and post crisis period (from 2008 till 2015), individually for
each country, so we can unravel shifts in the monetary spillovers for these emerging
markets due to the ﬁnancial crisis. In the discussion of our results, we focus on the
impulse responses from a rise in US and EMU long-term bond yields on EME long
term bond yields and exchange rates.10 These results are depicted from ﬁgure 5 till
ﬁgure 11.
6Although there is also a burgeoning literature that employs event study techniques in order to
analyse such pass through eﬀects.
7We also look at the concept of real money gap, based on the construction method by Calza
et al. (2003), and implemented by Hofmann (2009) and Drescher (2011). As such, we retrieve the
real money gap proxy from a recursive long-run M3 demand function. However, these results are
less convincing.
8We ﬁnd that overdiﬀerencing often leads to the elimination of valuable information about the
relation of the variables under investigation.
9Aikaike's information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SIC), Hannan-Quinn
criterion (HQC), ﬁnal prediction error (FPE), and Bayesian information criterion (BIC). We chose
the lag length at which comparatively most of these measures are hinting.
10However, many other asset prices could be incorporate in this framework.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 CEEC
For the pre-crisis era in Bulgaria, we ﬁnd a meaningful inﬂuence of shocks in both
EMU as well as in US long term yields on domestic yields, although this is very
short-lived for the latter. The sign for both is as expected. An increase in the
yield of the advanced economies leads to an increase in the domestic yield. After
the crisis only the EMU yield remains signiﬁcant. In contrast, the exchange rate
is not important for both the US and EMU shocks for both periods, except for a
short period with the EMU shocks (in both subsamples) around six months after
the shock. An increase in the EMU yield hence leads to a brief depreciation of the
Bulgarian Lev.
The shocks to the Czech long term yields are remarkably similar, with both EMU
and US shocks leading to a positive shift in the domestic yield in the ﬁrst subsample.
After the crisis, however, only shocks in the US yields aﬀect their Czech counterpart.
The eﬀect on the exchange rate is generally trivial. Except the post-crisis shock in
the EMU yield seems to lead to a slight appreciation in the long run.
Interestingly, a shock in the pre-crisis period to the US and EMU long term
yields does not seem to aﬀect the Hungarian yields. This is still the case for a US
shock in the latter period. However, a shock in the EMU yield now does yield the
expected positive eﬀect. The impact of these shocks on the exchange rate seems less
important, except for very brief devaluating episodes.
Finally, for shocks in the advanced economy yields on Polish yields, we ﬁnd the
expected positive eﬀect for both periods. However, for the US this is very brief
during the pre-crisis periods, and extends somewhat in the latter period. However,
shocks in the EMU yields seem to be more persistant. Again, the eﬀect of these
shocks on the exchange rate, seems to be less meaningful.
Hence, we can conclude that shocks in EMU and US long term yields aﬀect the
domestic long term yields in most of these CEEC, with the former being both more
consistent and more persistent. The impact on the exchange rate of the CEECs
seems less important. To gauge whether our results are driven by country-speciﬁc
eﬀects, or merely by proximity or interconnectedness of these Central and Eastern
Economies to the EMU, we also apply our methodology to two Latin American and
two Asian countries.
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3.3.2 Latin America
While the impact of advanced economy policy shocks on the Chilean long term yields
is signiﬁcant for both EMU and US in the pre-crisis period, this is only the case for
the US after the crisis. In contrast, the policy shocks of the advanced economies
do not seem to matter for the Chilean exchange rate. For Mexico, only the shocks
in the US policy seem to matter for the long term yield after the crisis. The same
shock leads to a very brief appreciative episode.
3.3.3 Asia
Whereas shocks in both EMU and US long term yields have a positive and signiﬁcant
impact on Malaysian long term yields, this is merely the case for the latter shock
(albeit for a blip in the EMU shock after 2 months). The impact on the exchange
rate is less eventful, with only a brief appreciative impact of a pre crisis EMU shock.
The shocks in the long term government bond yields in the advanced economies
do not seem to inﬂuence the Indonesian long term yields, except for the US shocks
in the post crisis period, which have the expected positive sign. The exchange rate
does not show any persistent eﬀects from shocks in the advanced economies.
Hence, we can conclude that both for the Latin American and Asian impulse
responses, US policy shocks seem to lead to more meaningful results, in comparison
to the earlier discussion of the CEEC (where the EMU policy shocks seemed to be
more dominant).
4 Conclusion
Due to the increasing integration of global ﬁnancial markets, emerging markets
are increasingly vulnerable to spillover from monetary policy stance in advanced
economies. More speciﬁcally, the recent episodes of quantitative easing have left
their marks on ﬁnancial systems in emerging economies. A remarkable episode in
this context was the taper tantrum in 2013, when huge volatility spillovers were
caused due to the fact that US monetary policy was hinting at a potential exit out
of their expansionary policy.
Recently, emerging markets non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms have been employing foreign de-
nominated debt to acquire funds which are not available on their local markets,
thus creating exposures to exchange rate and maturity mismatches. These ﬂows
are mainly driven by carry trade strategies. Hence, a reversal in the policy rate of
advanced economies could unravel many potential vulnerabilities.
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We start oﬀ our empirical analysis with Granger Causality tests, through which
we unravel that CEEC long term government yields are more inﬂuenced by EMU
government yields than their domestic policy rates (or US government yields). How-
ever, to analyse the eﬀect of advanced economy spillovers more rigourously, we decide
to look at shocks in the long term yields and their eﬀect on the domestic long term
yield and the exchange rate.
Our VAR analysis focuses on the impact of EMU and US monetary policy on
several emerging markets in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America. We
can discern clear spill-over eﬀects from both advanced economies on emerging mar-
ket variables. For the CEEC the impact of EMU shocks seems more persistent and
consistent than their US counterpart. For Latin America and Asia, the persistence
and importance of the latter increases considerably. Moreover, these spillovers have
gotten signiﬁcantly stronger after the recent ﬁnancial crisis. We mainly focus on the
impact of advanced economy policy shocks on long term government bond yields,
since the eﬀect on the exchange rate seems to be much more trivial in comparison.
Finally, we can extend several methods to gauge the US policy shocks, and inves-
tigate the impact of monetary policy pass through on long term government bond
yields and exchange rates in emerging markets.
Policymakers in these emerging markets therefore should revert to macropru-
dential policy to shield their economies from external pressures that reinforce the
countercyclical nature of their economies. Moreover, many countries are applying
capital controls to limit the impact of short term capital reversals.
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Figure 2: Long Term Government Bond Yields in Emerging Markets and the US
• This ﬁgure depicts a common component in the long term government bond yield
of several CEECs (the Czech Republic, Hungaria, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania)
together with the Term premium for the US (retrieved from the NY Federal Reserve)
Figure 3: Granger Causality, analyzing domestic long term government yield
for CEECs
• This table shows the Granger Causality test running from US government bond
yields, EMU government bond yields and domestic EME policy rates to EME gov-
ernment bond yields. P-values are denoted in brackets. * and ** respectively denote
5 and 10 percent signiﬁcance levels.
US GB9 EMEGB EMU GB9 EMEGB EME PLR9 EMEGB
BL 0.68 3.52** 1.64
(0.51) (0.03) (0.20)
CZ 4.55** 3.12** 4.80**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
HU 2.50* 4.38** 2.74*
(0.08) (0.01) (0.07)
PO 0.95 0.85 2.84*
(0.39) (0.43) (0.06)
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Figure 4: Full Sample VAR impulse responses for Bulgaria
• This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses for the full sample Vector Autoregressive
estimation procedure for Bulgaria, in response to shocks in EMU and US long term
government bond yield
Panel A: Pre-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Bulgarian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Bulgarian bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel B: Pre-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Bulgarian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Bulgarian bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Bulgarian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Bulgarian bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Bulgarian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Bulgarian bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
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Figure 5: Full Sample VAR impulse responses for the Czech Republic
• This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses for the full sample Vector Autoregressive
estimation procedure for the Czech Republic, in response to shocks in EMU and US
long term government bond yield
Panel A: Pre-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Czech long term government bond yield (left panel) and Czech
nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel B: Pre-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Czech long term government bond yield (left panel) and Czech
nominal exchange Rate exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Czech long term government bond yield (left panel) and Czech
nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Czech long term government bond yield (left panel) and Czech
nominal exchange rate (right panel)
18
Figure 6: Full Sample VAR impulse responses for Hungary
• This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses for the full sample Vector Autoregressive
estimation procedure for Hungary, in response to shocks in EMU and US long term
government bond yield
Panel A: Pre-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Hungarian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
nominal Hungarian exchange rate (right panel)
Panel B: Pre-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Hungarian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
nominal Hungarian exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Hungarian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
nominal Hungarian exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Hungarian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
nominal Hungarian exchange rate (right panel)
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Figure 7: Full Sample VAR impulse responses for Poland
• This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses for the full sample Vector Autoregressive
estimation procedure for Poland, in response to shocks in EMU and US long term
government bond yield
Panel A: Pre-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Polish long term government bond yield (left panel) and Polish
nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel B: Pre-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Polish long term government bond yield (left panel) and Polish
nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Polish long term government bond yield (left panel) and Polish
nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Polish long term government bond yield (left panel) and Polish
nominal exchange rate (right panel)
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Figure 8: Full Sample VAR impulse responses for Malaysia
• This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses for the full sample Vector Autoregressive
estimation procedure for Malaysia, in response to shocks in EMU and US long term
government bond yield
Panel A: Pre-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Malaysian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Malaysian nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel B: Pre-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Malaysian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Malaysian nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Malaysian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Malaysian nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Malaysian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Malaysian nominal exchange rate (right panel)
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Figure 9: Full Sample VAR impulse responses for Indonesia
• This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses for the full sample Vector Autoregressive
estimation procedure for Indonesia, in response to shocks in EMU and US long term
government bond yield
Panel A: Pre-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Indonesian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Indonesian bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel B: Pre-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Indonesian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Indonesian bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Indonesian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Indonesian bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Indonesian long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Indonesian bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
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Figure 10: Full Sample VAR impulse responses for Chile
• This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses for the full sample Vector Autoregressive
estimation procedure for Chile, in response to shocks in EMU and US long term
government bond yield
Panel A: Pre-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Chilean long term government bond yield (left panel) and Chilean
bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel B: Pre-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Chilean long term government bond yield (left panel) and Chilean
bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Chilean long term government bond yield (left panel) and Chilean
bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Chilean long term government bond yield (left panel) and Chilean
bilateral exchange rate (right panel)
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Figure 11: Full Sample VAR impulse responses for Mexico
• This ﬁgure shows the impulse responses for the full sample Vector Autoregressive
estimation procedure for Mexico, in response to shocks in EMU and US long term
government bond yield
Panel A: Pre-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Mexican long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Mexican nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel B: Pre-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Mexican long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Mexican nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in US long term government bond yield and
respons in Mexican long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Mexican nominal exchange rate (right panel)
Panel C: Post-crisis, shock in EMU long term government bond yield and
respons in Mexican long term government bond yield (left panel) and
Mexican nominal exchange rate (right panel)
24
